

# Marine Corps

APR 1957

FORTY CENTS

# Gazette



# Marine Corps Gazette

APRIL 1957

NUMBER 4

VOLUME 41

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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**THIS MONTH AND NEXT** The cover is a painting entitled "Portrait of a Leader." It was done by one of America's outstanding illustrators who has had many similar-type works on the covers of other nationally known magazines.

On page 10 begins a short new feature which will continue for several more issues. There is usually a great deal of doubt in the minds of officers when they commence collecting books for a professional library. Since there are so many opinions on where to start and with how much, it was decided to limit the recommendations to the 10 best books most suitable for a beginning. In view of his lifelong interest in military history and its influence on the development of Marine Corps doctrine, it is particularly fitting that the first one is by Gen Thomas.

To assist readers in following the movements of the German retreat out of the USSR in the Manstein-Hart piece, there is a foldout map opposite page 51, which can be extended and used to keep the reader oriented with the text.

Also, the first of a series of articles on the new organization of the FMF appears on page 26 with a discussion of the new division. In subsequent issues the other elements of the air-ground task force will be taken up separately. Although the articles will carry no "byline," they are all written by members of the *FMF Organization and Composition Board*.

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
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## Sharp Ayes

... Since first subscribing to the GAZETTE 2 years ago, I have learned to look forward to each new issue with great expectation. The variety of subjects presented and the interesting manner of these presentations have been a tremendous aid to broadening my professional background.

Occasionally I have noted what I judged to be errors in certain articles. Usually a comment will appear in the Message Center of a subsequent issue to confirm my opinion.

I have looked for several months for comment on the October-issue article *A Comparison: Marine and Russian Weapons*. The photo of the 4.2 inch Mortar, M30 with M24A1 Mount which appears on page 56 shows the elevating handle of the rear of the standard under the barrel. This is not the proper position for this handle. It should be in front of the standard where it can be turned to change the elevation of the tube.

I assumed that your office would be flooded with letters from readers. Could it be that the usually alert contributors missed this one?

1STLT R. L. BELL

Ft Sill, Okla.

... In reference to *A Comparison* on page 56 you show a picture of a 4.2 mortar and your caption identifies it as an M30 mortar and M24 A1 mount. This is incorrect as it is the M24 mount. You can see this by looking at the base plate and base ring. They are two separate pieces and the carrying straps are visible. The M24A1 mount has a one piece base plate and ring.

Who ever put the mortar together put the standard in backwards. As you can see in the picture the elevating hand-wheel is facing the tube and it can't be turned.

According to TM 9-2008 (Sept 1956) the M30 mortar and M24A1 mount weighs 639.5 lbs. not 626 as you stated. The M30 mortar and M24 mount weighs 650 lbs. FM23-92 change #3.

TSgt J. J. BLANK, JR.

3dMarDiv

Ed: Both readers are correct and the only two to report. The mortar was assembled by students under instruction at the Ordnance School, MCS, and even

though improperly assembled it was a question of this picture or none at all.

As to the weights of the piece, they vary according to the method of manufacture. The breakdown of the components on the 626 lb. mortar used at the Equipment Board by weight are: tube 148 lbs; inner base plate 108 lbs; outer ring 100 lbs; rotator 57 lbs; bridge 151 lbs; standard 58 lbs; sighting equipment 4 lbs.

## NCO Core

... Re Col R. D. Heint's letter in the January GAZETTE... increase of NCO prestige through greater formality of speech between themselves and their subordinates. ...

Once in awhile someone brings into the light a problem of which most of us are aware, and thereby contributes to solving this problem. Thanks to the Colonel for this bit of illumination.

However, some of us have been enforcing this aid to prestige and discipline for many years, and would have it no other way. Now, have at it all NCOs! We don't need a Marine Corps Order to prove we are concerned with our prestige or the betterment of the Marine Corps through a higher state of discipline among the troops.

MSgt D. M. HENZ

3dMarDiv

... The January issue of the GAZETTE was one of the most enlightening issues of the publication in many months.

Everyone here, senior officers, career NCOs and junior enlisted have expressed acclaim over the distinctive cover. Many have scrounged copies in order to salvage for framing. Like a picture of the American flag what caption could be added to a picture of our emblem? The vision exercised by the Marine responsible for this cover reflects the fact, very obviously, that a culture of dedication still cultivates itself within our Corps structure. The dignified reserve of our emblem on this cover lends refined annotation to a publication, traditionally dedicated, to serving our professional careersmen; through military journalism.

Supporting the quality of this particular issue were the outstanding letter-contributions by Col R. D. Heint, in *Message Center*; Capt J. K. Parker and Sgt Maj C. P. Gaines, in *Observation Post*.

A large measure of appreciation is also forwarded for the editorial article *Base Plate McGurk*. This article carried a message that although not glaring in evidence at the opening, presented a resounding wallop at the climax. The question exists here whether the closing paragraph could be published as a Headquarters Directive or ALMAR to be read at morning formation every day, to all hands.

Col Heint's letter entitled "Aye-Aye" concerning modern measures in reviving professional military character at the SNCO level was indeed a gesture of unique understanding of a serious issue confronting us today.

In distinct parallel to the Colonel's letter was the splendid contribution of SgtMaj Gaines in "SgtMaj Speaks."

If ever there was a letter that expressed the feelings of so many, the SgtMaj's letter would surely fill the bill. The last paragraph said in 43 words what it would take hours to talk about.

One of the most timely and significant articles relating to our current head-shrinking problem, that is, qualified personnel, was the presentation of "Ship 'Em Over" by Capt Parker. The portion of the letter that hit me between the eyes was his third paragraph regarding the "personal touch" accorded fledgling Marines. Why should I expect a "key-man" to ship over when I fail to paint for him a picture of duties more attractive than his present or illustrate for him the obvious benefits a career in the Corps has over the majority of so called gray trains on the outside?


The future of our Corps, the preservation of our reverent tradition and the salvation of the principles for which we stand are surely dependent upon the action taken now, today, on the well calculated and conceived visions expressed by the authors heretofore mentioned. These visions foretell of a forward-look-into-tomorrow for our profession and already I have obtained a conviction that the dawn of this tomorrow is as close as the first time we take more than the routine interest in the slowest man in our platoon. The apparent merit of such an interest revival can only be evaluated over a span of time, encompassing numerous events and adverse handicaps. The resulting reward then would be an obvious upswing in re-enlistments and a sharp downswing in discharges.

If the before-mentioned does not indicate my abounding gratitude for the contributions of these 3 Marines, allow me to say, "I'm having a shot of ship-ping-over in September; What'll you have?"

TSgt D. L. MACGOWEN

2dMarDiv

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... Col Heinel has hit the nail on the head in his letter in the January *Message Center*.

The "Hey, Mullen" and "OK Joe" retorts have curdled the stomach of many an NCO. A regulation in this matter is required.

However, in the absence of such regulation, it might be profitable if every NCO in the Marine Corps made a belated New Year resolution to correct, on the spot, any disrespect shown his rank by a subordinate. The proper respect for other NCO ranks and of the commissioned officers will set the example for your men to follow.

MSGT A. W. ROWELL

Newport, RI

### The Hand of History

... By way of comment on Capt Liddell Hart's interesting article, *Why Hitler Invaded Russia*: surely it is impossible to doubt Stalin's intention to try and overwhelm Germany whenever the readiness of his troops—badly demoralized by the fiasco of Finland—and a propitious moment at which to tear down the hypocritical facade of "friendship" happened to coincide?

For we have learned from many authoritative sources that when the Germans launched their attack in the June of 1941, the Russian troops were found to be massed on the frontier rather than disposed in depth for defense. In other words, Hitler just succeeded in *jumping the gun*; for this disposition of his troops leaves Stalin's intention open to one interpretation, and to one interpretation only.

MAJ REGINALD HARGREAVES

England

### The Sea Around Us

... In reading Maj N. W. Hicks' com-

ments in the December *Message Center* I detected certain inaccuracies which I feel tend to foster additional misconceptions concerning ships' landing parties.

First, Maj Hicks apparently missed the point of Capt Bradley's "Sea-Going Marines as Recon Troops" in the September *Observation Post*; this article discusses reconnaissance training for Marine ship's detachments, not the entire ship's landing party.

In constructing his "paper" landing party, Maj Hicks must have done so without reference to the *Baltimore's* copy of the Standard Cruiser Organization Book. During my *Baltimore* cruise, May '53-May '55 I had occasion to rewrite her Landing Party Bill for that "Bible." If memory serves, this organization conformed to paragraph 1-3, Section II, Chapter I, Landing Party Manual, USN, 1950. The *Baltimore*, a heavy cruiser, was required to maintain one rifle company, less one rifle platoon. It should be noted that a ship's rifle company is an abbreviated version of its Fleet Marine Force equivalent; there are no mortar or rocket sections in company headquarters. Obviously this is not a "full-sized rifle company."

The statement that the landing party is composed "of various and sundry sailors—anything from a yeoman apprentice to a 3/C steward's mate" gives life to further misconception. Landing Party Manual, 1950 makes provision for definite billet assignments by rank and specialty for this organization.


It is agreed that to accomplish any great amount of training for the landing party is difficult but consider the facts realistically. Neither time, facilities nor opportunity are ordinarily available for the specialized training of a combat unit that is necessary for a major ground

force operation. Further, the concept and mission of ships' landing parties provides for no major ground effort. Its mission, simply stated, is to function in emergencies requiring weapons no larger than small arms, equipment limited to that which can be reasonably carried on the person and in operations of approximately one week's duration, i.e., riot, civil disturbance and/or military police type duties. Training for this type of functioning can be, and was to a limited degree in *Baltimore's* case, accomplished through periods of instruction in shore patrol and guard duties. Familiarization firing and basic instruction in individual weapons was conducted periodically.

The reasons for not permitting the *Baltimore's* landing party ashore for drill are obvious: 1) she was operating with a reduced personnel complement; to release large groups for training ashore would have seriously impaired shipboard operations, 2) the majority of foreign ports she entered did not permit troops under arms ashore and had limited or no training facilities, 3) the majority of her time was spent underway, steaming independently or with fast carrier task forces—this would have made trips to the beach for any reason somewhat difficult! So let's face the sea-going facts—ships' detachments and/or landing parties are not designed or intended to operate as Fleet Marine Force type units. The nature of duty, facilities and operating schedules of men-of-war preclude any emphasis on field soldier type training. Meanwhile, let's be genuine Sea Going Marines and stop acting like frustrated ground pounders out of their element.

CAPT N. KAVAKICH

Reno, Nev.



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## Reserve Reader

... I hope the GAZETTE realizes what a great service it performs for Reserve officers no longer on active duty but with Organized Reserve units. Your articles enable us not to lose touch with what they are doing and thinking at Lejeune and Pendleton, keep us up to date on new trends and concepts and remind us of the problems and responsibilities of command. If we are ever needed we might not be completely lost thanks to the GAZETTE.

1STLT LEON S. DURE, III  
Charlottesville, Va.

## A Rebuttal

... The February GAZETTE contained a letter from Brig Gen Bowser commenting on my article from the November issue, *Time for a Change*. Gen Bowser seems to feel that *Time for a Change* contained an implication of approval for the 38th parallel, stalemate strategy of the Korean War. Such was not intended. The article assumes that the Korean incident was a limited war, and mentions it only for the purpose of providing a reference to an historical example. Further comment, however, on this somewhat tangential point is useful, for Gen Bowser's remarks raise an im-

portant question. What is the criterion for determining the proper military objective of a limited war?

That the General agrees that the Korean War should have been limited is indicated by his view that a major war with China was not the solution. His dissent is directed at the idea that the proper objective of the military action was the 38th parallel and not the Yalu — i.e. a divided Korea instead of a militarily unified Korea. It is pointed out that the issue of the 38th parallel versus the Yalu only becomes a problem after the decision to avoid an all out conflict has been taken. In a major war, these two areas would have tactical significance only and possibly not even that. Once, however, a limited war has been decided upon the proper objectives of military action must be determined in the light of two further questions. Does the proposed objective create too great a risk of broadening the conflict into an all out struggle? Assuming the first to be answered in the negative, do the costs of the campaign to gain this objective outweigh the advantages to be derived from its success? Answers to these two questions are induced by the process of assessing the various factual circumstances — such as enemy strength in the field, enemy national interest, etc. —


which bear on the problem. The point is that these two questions — while they would be irrelevant in an all out war — are central to the military conduct of a limited war. Apparently the Korean War planners looked at the facts and found either that the risk of general war inherent in the Yalu objective was too great, or that the costs outweighed the advantages of a second Yalu campaign, or perhaps both.

If Gen Bowser wishes to disagree with the factual appraisal which led to the selection of the 38th parallel, that is another matter entirely. The purpose here is only to throw light on the special character of limited wars by showing the importance of the two aforementioned questions. This does not contain any implication that the answers of the Korean War planners were correct. It means only that Korea was a limited war, and that the proper military objective for a limited war is determined by analysing the fact situation with regard to those two questions.

CAPT B. H. MURRAY, USMCR  
Philadelphia, Pa.

## PubInfo

... Capt R. B. Morrissey's article, *Pub Info — a Command Function*, in the February issue is as timely as it is telling.



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**MARTIN**

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I hope someone at the Division of Information, HQMC, took note of Capt Morrissey's reference to the framed maxim which he says hangs "on the wall of an obscure Marine Corps clothing issue room in Washington, DC." It should certainly be located and placed where it belongs, in the office of the Director of Information—and in the heart of every Marine.

CAPT ROBERT LINDSAY, USMCR  
Madison, Wisc.

... Capt R. B. Morrissey has earned for himself the heartfelt thanks of every PIO-man in the field. His article brought out truths which have been a thorn in the side of the enlisted reporter as well as the Informational Services Officer.

Any Marine who has served in this field for any length of time at all, has been faced with just such lack of interest, support and understanding as the Captain outlines in his article.

I feel that this article should be reprinted thousands of times over and a copy given to each and every Marine in the Corps.

Every commanding officer should have a framed copy of it hanging in a conspicuous place in his office.

As editor of the Parris Island *Boot*, I feel that it should be made available for reprint in every Marine Corps post and station newspaper as well as service

journals.

TSgt CHARLES F. X. HOUTS  
Parris Island, SC

### Probing the Problem

... The GAZETTE is on the right track in publishing 1stLt Kloeforn's *ATA Platoon—An Orphan*. This is a step in the right direction. It is my considered opinion that more can be accomplished in voicing the grass-roots, nuts-and-bolts problems of our Corps than by dwelling overly long on the high strata of the big picture. Global strategy, military-political trends and national war potential assuredly influence the Marine Corps' mission, organization and employment. But, we should not lose sight of the fact that our most urgent concern is the Marine and his rifle, his wrench, his compass, et al. Was not the "new concept of vertical envelopment" predicated on the need for more effective utilization of Marines?

Lt Kloeforn poses fundamental problems concerning command, training, organization, equipment and tactical employment of a "potentially strong and necessary unit." And the solution to this problem is vital to the solution of the ultimate problem of the best means of accomplishing the Marine Corps' missions. The boards don't have all of the answers and the GAZETTE is one of the best means of getting problems,

and their solutions, in the open. The fact that readers don't necessarily agree with stated assumptions and recommendations provides the requisite stimuli for productive thought. For Example: 1) How can the ATA Platoon be properly trained, while personnel turn over is high, with the existing ammo allowance? 2) Is the Weapons Company being employed and trained according to traditional concepts or according to the dictates of the mission and situation? 3) If the 3.5-inch rocket launcher doesn't pack the gear, what does? How do we get it?

Again, solution of fundamental problems—command, training, equipment and employment—of basic tactical units will lead to "The Solution." I, for one, would like to see more of this sort stimulation in the GAZETTE.

MAJ THEODORE D. HESS

Quantico, Va.

Ed: For other views on the *ATA* problem see the *Observation Post*.

### Equalitarian Evaluation

... I have just read LtCol Simmons' article *Are You and Authoritarian Or an Equalitarian* in the February issue, and taken the test included in the article. The following criticism of the test has occurred to me and I would like to present it for the consideration of you and the other GAZETTE readers.

In reading over the test after taking it, I discovered that most of the questions seem to depend for interpretation on the reader's value judgment of a "key word." Examples of such "key words" are as follows: in Question 1) the word is "question;" in Question 5) the key word is "fairly;" in Question 7) the word is "distinctive;" and so on. By this I mean that, for instance, in answering Question 7, the reader has to decide what is meant by a "distinctive uniform." Is the present insignia of rank "distinctive," or does the author contemplate, for purposes of the question, some additional "distinctive" feature?

Persons familiar with the methods of modern psychological and opinion evaluation methods are aware that such evaluation usually depends upon the value placed by the reader upon certain "key" words, but I feel that in the test presented by LtCol Simmons, the key words have not been selected so as to have any universally accepted standard by which they can be evaluated. In some cases they leave too many questions in the reader's mind.

My score on the test was 27, but this will probably brand me as a thorough equalitarian, in as much as I questioned the value of the test.

CAPT BRUCE BERCKMANS, JR.  
Quantico, Va.

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
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the

# TEN BEST

## Books with which to begin a professional library

Gen G. C. Thomas (Ret)

*What is Past is Prologue, Study the Past*

✱ THROUGH THE MIST OF UNCERTAINTY THAT OBSCURES the nature of future warfare, one fact stands forth crystal clear. The leader in combat, be he high or low, must bring to his task a competence and skill far surpassing that demanded of his forebears. These qualities must be complemented by unshakable confidence in himself, his leaders and the men who follow him. All this can be found only in the man whose professional ability rests upon the firmest foundation. It is my hope and expectation that the officers of our Corps will more than meet these exacting requirements.

In laying a proper foundation to support a career, no element exceeds in importance a knowledge of the manner in which the leader of the past performed — of the why and how he did things. Such knowledge must come from the study of military history.

The field of military history is vast. Fortunately, our bare needs do not encompass more than a fraction of the whole: but that fraction must be relevant; it must illustrate adherence to principles with attendant success or the lack of observance of principles with consequent failure.

Where shall this young (or perhaps not so young) Marine commence his study? Largely, I would say, among the campaigns conducted by commanders of his own nation. Some of the finest, and some of the poorest, examples of military skill and leadership are to be found in the history of these campaigns. It should be a matter of pride with the young leader to know something of the history of his profession and particularly of the portion that applies to trials of arms by forces of his own country. Additionally, in his reading he should not have to be content with the bare bone "it is good for him." He should derive satisfaction and genuine pleasure as well — many of these best works make exceedingly enjoyable reading.

Shortly, I will name several of the works which seem to fit best the needs of the young officer or non-commissioned officer. But let us be clear: we are planning the development of the leader — the tactician, not the technician. And again I would remind you that there will be time to consider only a tiny segment of military history.

Over the centuries great captains have been numerous. Studies of their campaigns are legion. The world has seen a great deal of warfare. For the student, a little bit about the leaders of antiquity will suffice, but that bit is essential — a word of so of Alexander, of Julius Caesar and of Hannibal. For those ancient days, Creasy's *The Fifteen Decisive Battles* will be ade-

quate for the young man who has a very long road ahead of him. If there is time later for a look at the very earliest practice of our art, Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander* (as translated by Col Chinnock) will fit.

Again, for the beginner there is not much time for what we may term the middle centuries. In that period we count Napoleon Bonaparte, the great master. The reader will enjoy and find instructive Headley's *Napoleon and His Marshals*. Gen Burnod produced a useful little compendium, *Napoleon's Maxims of War*, which provides a fine source of reference. To conclude this period we might have another look at the Battle of Waterloo by reading W. O'Connor Morris' *The Campaign of 1815*. The author did well by it. You will get an introduction to Britain's sturdy Wellington and a not excessively unsympathetic treatment of Bonaparte. Some will note the absence of mention of Clausewitz and Jomini. These may come later, but not for the beginner. *The Principles of War* by Foch will more than redeem the omission.

But I would ask that our reader commence his study with an American work — a fine one by the way — Steele's *American Campaigns*. Here he will early detect the elements of leadership as practiced by his own countrymen. Steele covers all of the American wars to include the Spanish-American. When time is available, Wilcox's *History of the Mexican War* is well worth reading. Then our readers should arrive at the American Civil War.

About those great campaigns the writings have been monumental. Many are near the top of the list of fine military writing. The list I give happens to contain works with which I am most intimately acquainted. They present a splendid critical treatment of leadership, mobility and all the other elements and principles which distinguish the art of war:

Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*. An exceedingly fine story of that master of movement.

Freeman's *Robert E. Lee* and his *Lee's Lieutenants* are unsurpassed in the field of military writing.

Alexander's *Memoirs of a Confederate* is most readable, interesting and instructive.

If you find that you are acquiring too much of a Southern accent, try Rope's *The Story of the Civil War*.

There are numerous very good writings on operations of World War I — the reader will grow up to them. At that time he will be qualified to choose for himself. However, for reasons of the pure enjoyment they bring I suggest Harbord's *Leaves from a War Diary* and Savage's *Allenby of Armageddon*.

I do not place too much importance on the sequence in which these books are taken. Generally speaking, the order in which they appear here is satisfactory. The large matter is that these, or works similar and equal to them, should be a study goal of every young officer.

Finally, I reiterate that I am thoroughly conscious of the glaring omissions in the list of books set forth. However, I am attempting no more than a suggestion for a minimum outline of professional reading. The officer who can find time for it will be a far better leader. He will also be of vastly greater value to his Corps.

US ♣ MC



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
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# the defense of the west



☛ THERE IS NOTHING LIKE A GOOD, honest - to - goodness, down-to-earth panic to keep things running smoothly, boost newspaper circulation and keep Senators in the headlines. Having successfully weathered the Axis air power threat, the atomic bomb fright, and the hydrogen bomb menace, American newspaper readers and radio listeners are now standing face-to-face with the biggest and most glorious panic of them all. This, needless to say, involves that old devil, IBM.

For the benefit of those who are not up-to-date on their menaces and still believe that poison gas is going to lead to the premature departure of the human family from the planet, it should be explained that the IBM is not a machine used for punching holes in cards. The newer model is a machine used for punching holes in countries.

The "ultimate weapon," as the machine is described by Hanson W. Baldwin, is also referred to as "the weapon that will rule the earth." In addition to this brilliant regal potential, it also "carries man and his future on its shoulders."

Although it still is a dream on the drawing boards, its optimistic adherents have given it a future that more than compensates for its lack of a past or present. Trevor Gardner recently resigned as assistant sec-

retary of the United States Air Force on the ground that the USAF wasn't spending enough money for the development of the IBM. Gardner and others have argued that the outcome of the so-called IBM race will determine the future of humanity. We are told that we must either win the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile race or lose the human race.

The IBM has achieved a reputation as a decisive weapon that makes conventional air power, the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb look like impoverished relations in the family of weapons. In achieving this pre-eminent position, the new ogre has displaced, in the popular fancy, some extremely highly-regarded weapons.

Only a few years ago, air power enjoyed a universal reputation as the decisive weapon which held the margin between victory and defeat in modern warfare. The Norwegian invasion, the Battle of Britain, Crete, Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Pantelleria, Normandy and a dozen other campaigns demonstrated again and again the vital importance of air power. The United Nations forces did not at any time attempt a major amphibious invasion without first gaining control of the air. Aerial superiority was the first goal of every national on every battlefield.

Alexander P. De Seversky wrote

By Yn3 P. W. Johnson, USN



Defensive movements are slow, but always certain—until we can more properly assess the role of the surface-to-air missile, we had better not assume that WWII will be a “one weapon” war

that strategic bombers could single-handedly win the war, and Walt Disney carried the message to millions of moviegoers in his famous film, “Victory Through Air Power.” The final collapse of Germany and Japan left a good portion of the American population with the impression that the tough Flying Fortresses, weird-looking P-38s, and invincible B-29s had played a dominant role in the achievement of victory in the world’s worst war. The leaders of the vanquished and thoroughly-battered Axis nations wholeheartedly agreed with the most partisan advocates of the air power thesis. Military conflict was reduced to a simple formula: the best air force wins the war.

This theory was not the exclusive property of the airmen. Army and Navy leaders accepted the new doctrine with surprising enthusiasm. According to England’s leading general, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, “If we lose the war in the air, we lose the whole war and lose it quickly.” The victor of El Alamein, then serving as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stated categorically, “It is clear . . . that the dominant factor in future war will be air power.” “I consider,” he added, “that the day of the large warship on the surface of the sea is over.”

The explosion of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided additional material for the air force enthusiasts. In his book, *Air Power: Key to Survival*, De Sev-ersky neatly disposed of the Army

and Navy in chapters containing quiet, non-controversial titles like “Our Own Maginot Line” and “The End of Sea Power.” The ex-Czarist pilot maintained that the airplane was the primary method of delivering the atomic bomb, so it would be the decisive weapon in any nuclear conflict.


Nevertheless, the atomic bomb began to dominate the picture in the minds of the American people. Air power tended to be slightly ignored while popular attention was focused on a new horrible weapon which would exercise such overwhelming influence over war that victory would go to those who got there “fustest with the mostest” atomic bombs, regardless of the number of aircraft involved. The new weapon was so powerful that it tortured the consciences of the very scientists who had created it. It brought fear to the hearts of millions. Books with cheerful titles like *No Place to Hide* and *One World or None* became best sellers. Bernard Baruch stepped before the newly-created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June, 1946, to give the world his country’s generous offer to share atomic information in an international society with adequate safeguards against atomic annihilation. “We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead . . . We must elect world peace or world destruction.”

Although the atomic bomb apparently had the power to destroy the world, a number of doubting Thomases decided to make sure by devel-

oping a new ultimate weapon that was even more ultimate than the last one. The hydrogen bomb was on the way. Newspaper circulation increased. The hydrogen bomb “race” was to determine whether or not the Soviet Union would dominate the world.

Harrison Brown, former assistant director of the plutonium project at Oak Ridge, stated: “We have the possibility of constructing a weapon which is, let us say, of the order of a thousand times the destructiveness of the Hiroshima bomb, or thereabouts.”

Similar views were expressed by other atomic experts. There seemed to be no limit to the destructive potential of the H bomb. “How big it is will depend only upon the amount of heavy hydrogen which you carry in a plane or in any other device



WINNER GROUP III



**Yeoman Johnson** has been in the Navy since October 1955. Recently promoted to 3d Class, he is aboard the USS Hanna (DE 449) operating with CORTRON 9 out of San Diego. Prior to entering the Navy he was graduated from the Univ of Oregon and the Univ of Arizona College of Law. He was motivated to enter the Marine Corps Association Essay Contest "by a desire to stimulate discussion on matters which I believe to be of decisive importance to the military security of Western civilization."

which you may use to deliver the bomb." So said Hans Bethe, war-time director of theoretical physics at the Los Alamos Laboratories. There was a renewed agitation for a ban upon nuclear weapons. Winston Churchill expressed the prevailing sentiment when he warned that mankind was peering over the rim of Hell.

Many people were worried about the H bomb, but they soon discovered that they were wasting their time as they learned that an H bomb delivered by the IBM machine is much, more devastating than an H bomb dropped by a mere Boeing B-52 intercontinental jet bomber. Humanity was off to the races again. Only the H race has been shoved aside in favor of the more exciting IBM race. A different theory of one-weapon warfare has taken hold of the popular imagination.

During the various spontaneous publicity campaigns launched on behalf of the various ultimate weapons that would win wars singlehandedly, the Army and Navy and Marine Corps have been quietly eased over to the sidelines. If strategic air power, the H bomb, or the supersonic IBM machine will control the margin between victory and defeat, the infantry divisions, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault teams become significant only as auxiliary forces for supply and occupation. The typical postwar theory of military combat regards the Navy as a glorified ferry service and the Army and Marines as a bunch of guys in radiation-proof zootsuits who march across the bodies of their atomized opponents and plant the flag on the top of a pile of debris once known as the enemy capital.

Maybe they are right. No one can say with any degree of certainty that any particular theory as to the future of warfare is correct or incorrect. The course of warfare never could be, and cannot now be, deter-

mined in advance. New weapons will be developed that will completely revolutionize the relations between weapons and tactics. The high-priority weapon of today may clutter up the junk heaps of tomorrow. Who could have predicted that the tactics of the Civil War at sea would change so fast that the wooden war vessels of 1861 would be helpless in 1863? What good were all of the crystal-ball speculations as to the probable course of military operations in World War II, in view of the total ignorance as to the existence of that amazing weapon, radar, that would dominate operations in every theater? A single discovery blotted out a million words on the subject of the future of warfare.

In view of the tremendous influence of new weapons and theories upon the outcome of military operations, it should be emphasized that any observations upon the validity of the one-weapon war concept, or of any other military theory, must be made with full knowledge that there may be, and probably are, highly secret weapons in existence today that will demonstrate the total inadequacy of some of those observations. The man who attempts to plot the future course of military tactics is like the blind man in a

dark room at midnight, hunting for a black cat that isn't there. He can only state various probabilities based upon the inadequate information available to him. Even the great genius Einstein wouldn't predict the type of weapons that would be used in World War III, although he volunteered the information that World War IV would be fought with clubs.

With these reservations in mind, a few observations may be made upon the probability of international conflict being reduced to a one-weapon proposition. First-hand information not being readily available, it will be necessary and extremely desirable to rely heavily upon the statements of scientific and military experts concerning the performance characteristics of various weapons.

Since all of the decisive weapon theories are based upon delivery by air, the defense, if any, must cope with the 2 major means of aerial attack, the airplane and the IBM.

There is a great deal of evidence that indicates that the first of these, the offensive airplane, has more than met its match and is doomed to follow the dodo bird into peaceful oblivion. While defensive fighters may play a major role in aerial operations, it may become impossible to maintain their offensive counterparts over enemy positions or ships.

As long ago as 1945, Gen H. H. Arnold stated that strategic bombing may be made "impracticable" by "improved antiaircraft defenses." This remarkable statement — an amazing statement in the year of the great Army-Navy aerial conquest of Japan — was made by a man who had achieved world-wide fame as the builder of the greatest air force on

*A fast carrier task force will be the world's toughest target*





earth. The commanding general of a force regarded by many as the strongest military instrument of all time took his thoughts away from the aerial battering of Germany and Japan and looked into the future to foresee a time when his beloved superbombers would be smashed into junk, not by defensive fighters which his contemporaries regarded as the only reasonable defense against aerial assault, but by "improved anti-aircraft defenses." Some of his bombardiers, having repeatedly penetrated the toughest AA defenses Axis ingenuity could devise, must have laughed at their General's seemingly-fantastic statement. It was as if Nelson had come back from Trafalgar muttering about the approaching doom of sea power. It was too ridiculous to be true.

Subsequent developments, however, indicated that the father of the Air Force, as usual, knew what he was talking about. In 1952, the Army revealed a new weapon, possibly the most significant military development of the postwar decade.

The "improved anti-aircraft defense" was named "Nike," after the Greek goddess of victory. Its amazing ability to knock down all types of aircraft, including supersonic jet fighters, makes it one of the most valuable weapons in the American military arsenal. The Defense Department credits the Nike with the ability to attack all planes with "the altitude and the speed and the maneuvering qualities that we have any reason to expect to encounter." Army Chief of Staff Gen Maxwell B. Taylor is equally optimistic: "... this weapon can operate effectively against any presently operational aircraft regardless of height and speed. Moreover, we have anticipated the capabilities of higher-performance aircraft; an improved Nike, the Nike B, will be more than capable of dealing with such aircraft when they become operational." Adm Louis Denfield, then Chief of Naval Operations, presumably was thinking of defense as well as offense when he called the guided missile "the basic naval weapon of the future."

The Nike and its sister weapons in the family of "steel-feathered fire-birds" that will confront any future aggressor, will probably raise a defensive fire barrier over the sea as

well as over land targets. The modern aircraft carrier, "with guided-missile carrying companions, will offer a formidable defense against any weapons now on the drawing boards or even on the horizon."

According to Secretary of the Navy Thomas, "Any enemy who launches an attack against a modern carrier task force with its mobility, aircraft, new missiles and other equipment, will be attacking the toughest target in the world. . . ."

The deadly new "bullets with brains" haven't been accepted by everyone as a satisfactory solution to the aerial defense problem. However, it is significant that most of the criticism comes from the Air Force, which has more than a passing interest in the matter, because it is rapidly headed for extinction as an offensive weapon if the Nike has the performance characteristics attributed to it by the men who have seen it in action. An additional explanation for the somewhat partisan attitude of the airmen lies in their not unreasonable desire to control the major weapons used in aerial defense of land areas. Since it would be rather outrageous for them to seize control of a weapon developed exclusively by the Army, they would prefer to throw the weight of their influence behind a different missile which they could claim as their own.

Whatever the cause of the criticism, the Nike has been strongly attacked by Air Force leaders. They charge that a plane can outmaneuver it, although it was revealed, in the early days of the development of the Nike, that "enemy planes can dive, climb, bank, side-slip or turn tail, but the Army's new weapon still will knock them out of the skies." The newer models of the Nike are reputed to be far superior to the old, and most authorities agree that any good homing missile will follow the path of a maneuvering opponent and destroy it.

It also is claimed that the Nike failed to live up to expectations in a 1956 test demonstration that was supposed to prove its reliability and silence the critics: "The results were — at best — debatable. In one shot at a 500 mph aerial drone target, Nike registered a direct hit. In 6 other shots the Army said Nike scored shrapnel hits, claimed 'kills'



1956 Nike tests—is one test valid?

in each case. One Nike suffered an electronic brain storm and blew itself up." (*Time* magazine.) The results of Billy Mitchell's attack on the German battleship *Ostfriesland* also were "debatable," but the battleship went down. So did the Nike's drone target. A missile system that will send its projectiles into shrapnel range 7 times in 8 attempts is good enough to knock any air force out of the skies. As long ago as 1949, the United States was using homing missiles with proximity fuses. A direct hit is not required. This is particularly true where atomic anti-aircraft warheads are employed, although the conventional AA burst should be sufficient, since the missile does not explode until it is within lethal range. It might be added that the "electronic brain storm," while interesting, is not particularly significant, because the defense won't be shattered by a few malfunctions in a huge mass of airborne missiles. The few missiles that miss probably won't be missed.

Another objection to the Nike is the fact that its boosters occasionally fall off at the wrong times and batter up some civilian residential areas. While this is unfortunate, the dropping of a few enemy atomic or hydrogen bombs in the area also can prove to be irritating. The fire department is not to be abolished because it gets the floors wet. Anyone who would propose abolition of the Nike on the ground that it damages ourselves ought to be transferred to the lunatic asylum to share a cell with the character who proposed painting tremendous Hirohito faces on the roofs of essential war industries to prevent aerial attacks by the



Emperor-worshipping Japanese.

The Air Force also claims that the Nike does not fit into its own radar defense network. This is a minor flaw which can be remedied, if necessary.

A more rational objection is the claim that the radar system guiding the Nike can be confused or jammed. There are 3 major antiradar techniques—the use of decoys, employment of devices like Window, and physical jamming.

Decoys should not be particularly effective against the Nike. One decoy can account for one Nike. After the decoys are eliminated, the defender can send up more missiles and knock down the planes. Since the decoy must approximate the speed and size characteristics of its mother plane, there is a definite limit to the number that each attacker can carry. In addition, the heavy decoys might cut down the speed and armament characteristics of the attacker, making it more vulnerable to defensive aircraft employing air-to-air homing missiles.

Antiradar devices like Window, Chaff and Rope were very effective against German and Japanese radar during the war, although Allied scientists were quite skeptical as to its ability to hamper the superior microwave radar used by the Western Powers. Window was tinfoil cut into strips and dropped by Allied bombers to cause radar reflections that would blind the enemy radar sets. German radar operators began

to believe that the Flying Fortress, which could do just about everything else, was now reproducing itself as they saw one image become 2 and then spread into dozens, cluttering up the entire radar screen. Nazi radar became "as impotent as a long-distance movie camera in a blizzard."

Although it seems probable that modern electronics systems can overcome the difficulties presented by Window, its threat to the defense may be the reason for the development of surface-to-air missiles which shoot higher than the enemy bomber and attack from above, where Window would not interfere with a radar-homing mechanism (although Window might be dropped from enemy parachutes shot above the mother plane).

One drawback in the employment of devices like Window is their lack of speed. They either fall vertically or drift along with the wind. The enemy formation would soon leave it far behind, where it would not affect radar directed from the target area. Although a few lead planes might be sent ahead to drop Window near the target, it is likely that they would be shot down before arriving at the unloading point.

A more significant objection is that Window, Chaff and similar devices must be cut at the particular length which makes them resonant at the frequency of the particular radar set involved. The frequency of all of the enemy radar sets must be known in advance. Although the

information that has been released to the public on this extremely important subject is very sketchy, it appears that the defense has the advantage in this phase of warfare.


The use of radar jamming was effective during WWII, but definite problems are created in a postwar world of electronics experts and homing missiles. Jamming must be on the same channel that is used by the radar set being jammed. It can be avoided by changing channels. Thus the enemy bomber fleet must be prepared to jam every channel that is in existence.

Another difficulty is the fact that the defense knows which channels will be jammed. Jamming is useless unless it involves the particular channels being employed by the defense. Consequently, the defense, knowing which channels will be jammed, can send up missiles which "home" on the jamming radar signal. Once the jammers are destroyed, additional missiles can be sent up to take care of the payload customers. Jamming does not appear to be the answer to the Nike.

The possible use of antimissile missiles to protect the bomber was discounted by one of the nation's top military scientists, Donald A. Quarles, former head of research and development for the Armed Forces: "The attempt to counter Nike with a missile that would intercept Nike before Nike could make its kill is a proposition that I'm quite sure we aren't up against."

The most valid objection to the Nike is concerned with its short range. It is argued that an enemy plane can launch deadly air-to-ground homing missiles from a point outside of the operational radius of the winged terror. While this is a reasonable argument, assuming that the bomber-launched missiles are too small for effective radar detection (an unlikely assumption—the course of enemy mortar shells was plotted by radar during WWII), it should be remembered that the aerial defense of the nation is not dependent solely upon the Nike. The Air Force has already adopted the Navy Talos, which apparently is superior to the Nike. There is no magic law that holds that a Nike-type missile with a range of 500 or 1,000 miles cannot be developed, if it is not already in

*Perhaps the surface Navy is not as obsolete as some think*



existence. The modern history of warfare teaches us that every major weapon will undergo tremendous improvements before it retires from the scene.

The Nike hasn't been tested against some of the latest Air Force fighters. There is an excellent reason for this. Donald Quarles says that "we don't want to sacrifice planes for such purposes." The men who developed and tested the Nike know what he is talking about.

The Nike is generally considered to be dependent upon the use of radar. However, the success of enemy radar jamming, confusing and decoying techniques will not necessarily emasculate the ground-to-air missile. Other homing devices can be used to guide the missile unerringly to its helpless target.

"Homing devices have been developed which respond to acoustic or electronic waves emanating from the target and include devices which react to noise of all kinds — e.g., from engine or wings. . . . An alternative method is the use of instrumentation which is receptive to infrared radiation emitted by the engine exhaust." — *Development of the Guided Missile*, K. W. Gatland.

"Certain devices have also been made which are super-sensitive to heat radiations, and others have the uncanny ability to distinguish light differences either between the target and the sky or between the target and land or water areas surrounding it. Installed in the nose of a missile, these, too, can bring it to an objective without any other outside control assistance. One of these heat-seeking units, so sensitive it could detect the warmth of a human body a quarter of a mile away, was developed at the close of the last war." — *Guided Missiles: Rockets and Torpedoes*, Frank Ross.

Missiles can home on a target through heat-seeking, light-seeking, radar, acoustic, magnetic, or infrared methods. The proximity fuse could be used to detonate the missile when it came within effective range, so that a direct hit would not be necessary. Even if the proximity fuse radar was nullified by the enemy, an analogous method could be employed, e.g., mechanism set to explode when a certain temperature or sound intensity or brightness is registered.



### *What are the possibilities of intercepting air-to-air missiles?*

Suppose that the ground radar could be confused, so that the defenders wouldn't know in which direction to head the missiles. American scientists have developed air-to-air homing missiles which promise to be just as valuable, if not more valuable. These amazing missiles are effective up to 10 miles from the launching aircraft. It appears that the aerial battles of the future, if there are any, will be mutual mass suicide affairs with homing missiles taking a deadly toll of both sides. The chance that antimissile missiles will be employed is unlikely. What device could intercept the Navy's air-to-air supersonic Sidewinder, "a 5-inch missile with brains?" It also is possible that decoys could be used with satisfactory results, but there are so many different types of homing missiles that the decoy would have to be almost as fast, large, hot, bright, magnetic and noisy as the mother plane in order to lure the brainy bullets away from the real objective. It is obvious that the defensive aircraft can send out the little missiles faster than the enemy can send out cumbersome decoys. This defensive activity is expensive, but aerial defense always is expensive, and well worth the cost. Germany's WWII antiaircraft gunners averaged 50,000 shells for every enemy plane shot down. The English found it expensive to dump depth charges all day long around anchored ships in order to keep Mussolini's bomb-carrying frogmen away, but they considered the effort necessary and worthwhile. In a nuclear war, wasting money will save money.

Although the weight of the missiles may tend to reduce the speed of the defensive fighter, this would not be equal to the attacker's handi-

cap involving bombload and additional fuel requirements. The defender will continue to be faster than the attacker.


With ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles in full production, it appears that the wartime commander of the world's greatest air force, Gen Arnold, had some advance information when he wrote, "We must bear in mind that air power itself can become obsolete."

It is said that naval airmen visiting one of the Navy's guided missile warships are shown a little box in which they may deposit their wings, since they won't be needing them any more.

Indeed, it is possible that offensive aircraft will become so useless that aircraft carriers will be left with the sole task of providing defensive fighter protection on the rare occasions when that is necessary. The battleship might return as the king of the seas, giving the much-ridiculed battleship admirals a chance for the last laugh on the air-minded naval leaders who have practically relegated the battlewagon to the naval counterpart of the glue factory.

While it is apparent that the guided missile has the upper hand over the bomber, there has been much comment as to its impotency as an answer to the IBM. The Nike obviously is not the answer, because its range is inadequate, but there have been statements that indicate that better missiles can stop the IBM. According to the wartime chief of Britain's antiaircraft defenses, Gen Pile, "the controlled projectile in defense will deal as surely with a rocket flying at 4,000 mph as it will with a jet bomber flying at 700 mph." Gen Arnold made a similar





**Terrier—the Marine Corps' surface-to-air missile**

prediction in 1945, long before the tremendous potentialities of the anti-aircraft guided missile were realized over the testing grounds.

On the other hand, most of the IBM articles of today claim that, instead of being a supersonic white elephant that may out-dodo the dodo bird by becoming extinct before it is born, the big missile actually will be unstoppable. "Imagine," says Hanson W. Baldwin, "trying to hit an artillery shell in mid-flight with another artillery shell." He does not mention the possibility of the defenders detecting this oversized artillery shell with radar, plotting its path in advance, and sending up an atomic-warhead guided missile to meet it somewhere along that path and give it the worst beating any IBM machine ever saw.

While wartime radar was ineffective over 250 miles, the limitation was imposed by the curvature of the earth, not by any range limitation in the radar set. If enemy planes had been flying high enough they would have been detected over 250 miles away. However, since the IBM is supposed to reach tremendous heights, the curvature of the earth will not interfere with the defender's radar. When not hampered by the curvature of the planet, radar can

reach any height that is required. The Army Engineers bounced a radar signal off the moon shortly after the end of WWII.

Nevertheless, the tremendous speed of the IBM is listed as a possible means of escaping interception. It is expected to have a speed of from 12,000 to 16,000 miles per hour, completing its intercontinental journey in less than 30 minutes. Those who remember the delays in radar operation in the last global conflict feel that 15 or 20 minutes is not a sufficient period of time for a radar-directed defense to come to grips with an attacker. However, they do not realize that the system can be made completely automatic with the human element entirely eliminated. An anti-aircraft missile can be automatically released as soon as the IBM is detected and its course predicted. This operation could take place without the intervention of human hands. The defenders could sleep through the battle. Speed? The speed of electronics is the speed of light—186,000 miles per second.

Those who say that there can be no defense against the IBM are ignoring military history. Every mechanical weapon undergoes tremendous improvements before it finally is discarded from the arsenal of use-

ful weapons. The surface-to-air missile is in its infancy. Its earliest models could knock down the best aircraft of its day. What will it be like when it is improved to a state 2 or 3 or perhaps 10 times as effective as its early models? How does John Ericsson's *Monitor* compare with the USS *Missouri*? How effective was the Confederate submersible *Hunley*, which took 5 crews to a watery grave and committed suicide on its only successful mission, in comparison with the atomic-powered *Nautilus*? What would the armored warriors of 1956 think about the mobile "cisterns" that frightened the Germans at Cambrai? The anti-aircraft missile also is slated for great improvements in range and accuracy. It would be a strange thing indeed if the men who invented the incredible proximity fuse, counter-mortar radar, the 6-jet B-52, and the hydrogen bomb, could not extend the ground-to-air missile's range sufficiently to enable it to knock down the IBM.

It is possible, of course, that they won't. It also is possible that undisclosed weapons, such as improved antiradar devices, will leave the Air Force in its dominant role. For example, there is some talk of using a special type of reflector which will return radar waves at the wrong speed. There also is a possibility of absorbing radar waves, leaving the operator in the dark. Other possibilities may arise.

However, until we are fairly certain that WWII, if it comes, will be a one-weapon war, we had better recognize the continuing importance of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps in the defense of the West.

US MC



### **Salt Is in the Sea**

☛ BACK IN BOOT CAMP in 1945 after having received a lecture in military courtesy, my buddy and I took a short stroll. We came up behind two Naval dentists and unable to think of the appropriate remark to accompany a salute in this situation, such as, "By your leave, Sir," my companion greeted them with a "Coming alongside, Sir."

1stLt R. D. Flint

### **Hot Line**

☛ ONE DAY, during the defensive stage of the Korean conflict, the Division Commander was inspecting the Main Line of Resistance. The party had stopped near an 81mm mortar OP from which the General was conducting a visual reconnaissance. As he was peering through the BC scope, the EE-8 rang and, being closest, the General answered it with a brisk "Wizard 6." There was an uncomprehending silence until finally, obviously unaware of the significance of this title, a gruff voice snapped back, "Wizard 6, my ———, this is the Gunny at the outpost—lemme talk to Dolan." With complete aplomb, the General turned and asked, "Is Dolan here?" A very uneasy Pfc Dolan completed the conversation.

Maj W. A. Butcher

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)



What does it do between

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**THERE?**

*For the  
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pattern  
of a free space  
Moving Target  
can be directly  
calibrated  
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The proof of any guided missile is its performance. Not only is it necessary to provide accurate trajectory data in order to determine its effectiveness, but this must be made immediately available.

To meet both requirements is the purpose of the AN/FPS-16 instrumentation radar. This is the first radar developed specifically for Range Instrumentation. It has demonstrated its

ability to track with accuracy in darkness, through clouds—under any atmospheric conditions—over extended ranges, and to yield data that can be reduced almost instantaneously to final form. This unit can also be assigned to plot performance of missile, satellite, drone and other free space moving targets.

In the past, this data has depended upon

optical devices, triangulation systems with long base lines and precision limitations, modified radar equipment and data reduction methods often requiring months for computation. The immediate availability of data evaluation provided by the AN/FPS-16, now being built by RCA under cognizance of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics for all services, is a great forward step in Range Instrumentation.



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# DON'T HOBBLE THE HELICOPTERS

There are far more important problems facing Marine helicopters than the fuss and fury raised over whether or not they are "aerial trucks" or "flying boatspaces"

By Capt Theodore K. Thomas

RECENT GAZETTE ARTICLES HAVE presented their opinions on what is rapidly becoming a perennial argument in any discussion of Marine air-ground tactics. The issue concerns the assignment of operational control over helicopter units. One argument favors operational control of helicopters by aviators under the wing air support structure, utilizing the proven techniques of the TACC. The other side argues for control by ground commanders, using the example of a Helicopter Assault Force engaged in a land operation. These are not mere distinctions between methods of communications control but, instead, concern the authority to dispatch and direct helicopter units on their missions. Both arguments are well presented and, to a limited extent, well-supported. At the same time, however, neither takes into consideration certain important aspects of the operational nature of the helicopter itself, its background, and its natural utilization in combat.

Thus the issue is still in doubt, as it should be, if we are to approach the subject with a flexibility of mind equal to the flexibility of the helicopter itself.

We need to keep open minds on all aspects of the employment of helicopters, and so, as in all new machines of war, we must begin with the machine itself and see how it adapts. Before doing this, it would be well to keep in mind a statement from paragraph 208 (b), LFM8 (Air Operations) regarding "Command and Control," which reads, "... The tasks being performed (by the helicopters) will govern the assignment of operational control . . ." This is a broad statement. The key word is tasks, or jobs, if you will, and it is upon the understanding of this word by the planners that the decision of command assignment is to be made.

What, then, do we know of the jobs that the helicopter has performed in the past and may be cap-

able of performing in the future? We know a great deal about the past. We may be able to predict, with reservations, a great deal about the future.

Consider the helicopter. In its short life-span it has captured the imagination of Marine Corps planners—more than any other single machine of amphibious war. It was utilized in Korea for troop transport and resupply, liaison, medical evacuation and some air rescue work. It proved to be, in its several configurations and types, a vehicle of unique and amazing capabilities, though definite in its limitations. The use of the helicopter in Korea had, in addition, an experimental aspect which was especially present during transport operations. Statistics of missions flown were painstakingly recorded in order that the coldly-told reports could form the basis of tomorrow's doctrines. The author himself participated in many of the missions flown by HMR-161 in



Korea, and at no time was the question of operational control a major problem in those operations. Communications was always a problem. The helicopter's standard radio equipment, in all types, was more suited to Sunday afternoon private flying than to air-ground support nets. What equipment there was functioned with neither more nor less than the usual built-in cussedness of all aircraft radio gear. Maintenance was always a problem, a fact which should be kept in mind by those who favor the permanent attachment of helicopter units to ground forces. Weather was neither more nor less the problem it has eternally posed to the actions of both soldiers and airmen. But the assignment of command, whether to clear a particular medical evacuation or to control a troop-lift, was never an impediment to completion of the missions flown by the whirlybirds.

Previous GAZETTE articles have discussed the formation and operation of a Helicopter Assault Force. The timetable of history did not wait for the HAF in Korea. Combat operations ceased before a full-fledged helicopter assault could be mounted, an assault patterned according to the conceptual terms of "vertical envelopment." But such assaults have been made, many times, in LANTFLEX and TRAEX training problems, according to the pattern, and under the operational control set-up similar to those previously outlined. I agree that the movements of transport helicopters can be successfully controlled by an enlightened ADC. I agree that the communications requirements of a helicopter operation can be satisfied by use of the TACC. And I emphatically insist that the

helicopter is an aircraft. It has the maintenance, logistic, piloting and navigational requirements peculiar to aircraft, and that is all there is to the definition. To quibble about its being an "aerial truck," a "flying boatspace," or a "replacement for the mule" is to split hairs. No, there are far more important problems confronting the future of Marine helicopter utilization.

For instance, should the pilot of the helicopter be a fully-qualified Naval Aviator (that is, qualified and required to maintain proficiency in other types of aircraft besides the helicopter) or should he be trained from the beginning as a helicopter pilot only? Which type would most satisfy the requirements of the Corps from an overall standpoint, both economically and operationally? If you contemplate a Helicopter Assault Force of 100 aircraft, each piloted by two Naval Aviators, you are utilizing the pilot strength of almost 4 squadrons, and there may well be a question here concerning the most efficient use of personnel.

Again, how can the mobility of the helicopter's base of operations (heavy maintenance, refueling, communications, quarters and messing facilities, etc.) be increased to match that of the helicopter itself? Could the entire facility be transported ship-to-shore by its own helicopters? If that could be done, the usefulness of the helicopter in all phases of an amphibious operation could be realized to the maximum degree.

Transport helicopters will increase in size and complexity. Smaller types will be necessary for liaison and medical use. A cargo helicopter is needed, something that will lift, say a 6x6 truck, across a mud-flat and

go back for two more. Evaluation is now underway at Quantico on one-man types. I do not see how the Marine Corps can properly use any less than the above 4 types of helicopters. They will do the jobs that have been performed by what models have been available up to now.

I envision one more type of helicopter. It will be small, handled by one man, fast, very powerful, heavily armored. It will carry rocket or missile launchers. It will do the air support job.

Consider the advantages. It will not have to orbit on station. It will carry special night vision equipment, so it will be available on all-weather call from its carrier or rear area base. It will be able to leapfrog the MLR, approach its target quickly, hugging the ground. Its approach angle will be as unpredictable as a hummingbird's, and it will be exposed to nothing heavier than small-arms fire.

Thus the elements of the helicopter's future are ready to hand. The helicopter is too new as a tool of war to be hobbled by doctrines that are imperfectly projected upon the experiences of the Korean conflict and fleet training exercises. I have attempted to bring out the fact that such problems as pilot training, maintenance and specialization of type are much more important to the helicopter's future than the problem of assigning operational control. The Marine Corps has a chance, in the helicopter, of developing and utilizing an amphibious weapon uniquely suited to its mission. Therefore the Book must not be written too soon.

USMC

### ★ ★ ★ ★

#### **One-Way Trip**

PILOTS FREQUENTLY VIEW the weather predictions of the Aerologist with considerable suspicion. An outstanding example was a pilot filing a flight plan from MCAS, Cherry Point a few years back. He presented his clearance form to the forecaster for the weather briefing, who noted the current weather in the space provided, and wrote "no change" in the space requiring a forecast for the duration of the flight.

The pilot eyed the completed plan, did a double take, and headed for my office in righteous wrath. "What does that forecaster mean," he screamed, "by writing 'NO CHANCE' on my flight plan?"

LtCol H. F. Brown

#### **Wart Four**

MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT Tom Jones was one of the finest rifle shots the Marine Corps ever had. One day in the Western Division Rifle Matches, he fired a group at 300 Rapid that you could cover with a 3-inch spotter. However, they were all at 12 o'clock and one was just out.

"I always knew I could hold 'em and squeeze 'em," Jones said sadly. "I just haven't got enough sense to set my sights."

Col W. F. Prickett

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)





# INFANTRY DIG!

♣ QUESTION ONE: WHO LIKES TO dig?

Answer: Nobody.

Question Two: In your 2 years in an infantry outfit, Pvt Felstrup, did you ever dig a standing foxhole?

Answer: Yes sir! Twice.

Question Three: In your 4 years as an 0302, Mr. Interlocutor, have you ever dug a fighting hole?

Answer: I decline to answer, on the grounds that the question is designed to embarrass and incriminate me.

The above interrogatory is important in only one respect. If the answers are typical, they represent a situation the consequences of which may be serious.

In the history of warfare, few weapons have been wielded with such consistently deadly effect as has

the shovel. Enough dirt will neutralize the effect of any weapon, even gamma radiation. Tomorrow's streamlined super-trooper may climb into his chrome-plated, feather-cushioned troop carrier and cross 150 miles of disputed territory between breakfast and lunch, but he had better be ready to use a shovel the other 18 hours of the day.

Military fortifications—their construction and reduction—have been the hinge points of a number of the decisive campaigns in history. Over the years, enough decisive campaigns have been offensive strategically and defensive tactically, as to establish a pattern for successful future operations. It is interesting to note that even Robert E. Lee was not particularly impressive in the *tactical* offensive.

By 1stLt J. W. Kennon

Notable defenses require notable troops, and generally favorable terrain, but a great deal can be done in the organization of that terrain. There was an occasion during the last war, when Russian troops (probably the "digginest" of all present-day armies) dug out a 12-foot vertical cliff around the front slope of one land mass. Considering that the average tank was capable of, at best, a 3-foot vertical step, it is difficult to visualize a more effective barrier to tank mobility than such an escarpment. It would even be more effective than concrete and steel dragon's teeth, and although half a dozen rains would have been enough to ruin it, it was only wanted for a few days.

True, this is a rather extreme example of the lengths to which hasty field fortifications may go, but it does illustrate that resourceful men, faced with a mass tank attack and lacking any other effective antitank weapon, made the shovel—not a bulldozer, or a Bay City crane—a very effective passive antitank weapon.

Are fortifications invariably good?

Over the past 3 decades billions of dollars of national treasure have been used by various governments in creating permanent-type concrete and steel fortified belts along their frontiers. These fortifications were undoubtedly very impressive, but their main use seems to have been to infect too many troops with a fortress-garrison attitude.

A fortification is not a home. It is merely a temporary refuge. The chief use of the field fortification should be to make troops occupying them relatively safe from the attentions of enemy supporting weapons; not to protect them for protection's sake, but in order to multiply their normal defensive capability and to preserve them for offensive operations at a later date.

There are few areas of present strategic interest where adequate field fortifications cannot be constructed. Even the desert areas of the world are not in great part, bottomless seas of sand, and even areas of intense permanent cold have useful fortifications' materials to offer. (Not the least of which are snow and ice.)

## The simplest tool devised by man can thwart the deadly effects of our most powerful "super weapons"

There is some reason to speculate (recalling Korean defensive positions) as to just how profitable a target well dug-in troops would be, even for atomic explosives.

But, good military fortification is an art—it is a valid art—not learned on a child's sand pile. The better planned and laid out scheme of fortifications you can apply, the better the results will be. But even the worst position, hastily chosen, and occupied under adverse battle conditions, *properly controlled* can be expanded and improved to the point where it becomes a veritable defensive hedgehog.

But, the labor must be well aimed. There is little point in expending labor anywhere in the construction of a trench line that will not drain, or in locating a bunker so that it is placed on the focal point for all the drainage off a particular hill.

Hasty field fortification, when conditions permit, should be so well planned that they approximate plans which might be used to permanently fortify a position. You might leave that position tomorrow, and again, as in Korea, men might be occupying it 18 months after you initially moved onto it.

The first alinement of defenses is vital. As the area becomes permanently occupied and enemy attention to your movements can become more personal, major re-alignments of your position will become correspondingly more difficult. And your position might very well have to be so expanded and improved as to be all but permanent. It would behoove every troop leader directed to occupy a certain area of terrain to devote what preliminary study he can to the methods and dispositions he would use to fortify that particular area should the need arise.

What is the first requirement in fortifying a position? Fighting positions—fighting holes for each man in the unit. One might think there was little need to belabor the obvious by saying that these holes should be so placed as to allow their occupants to deliver effective fire on an approaching enemy. Unfortunately such is not the case. You are advised to lie down on the ground and check

these positions personally. Again, you must not allow your natural sympathies to prevent you from re-locating improperly placed personnel. I am informed by "usually reliable sources" that it is a good deal less painful to have a crew dig a new gun position than it is to be overrun.

Well constructed crew served weapon and rifle positions are the must of any defensive position. Everything else that you can do is nice to have, but not an extreme necessity.

Perhaps next most desirable to have is a good covered route of communication interconnecting the unit's line of positions along its front. (I avoid the use of the word trench, because there are positions where such a route of communications need not necessarily be a trench.)

The desirability of being able to shift men rapidly and safely from point to point along your front needs no particular emphasis. (Mobility, physical and mental, is the soul of defense). Protected routes of communication to the depths of your position, a protected position for your unit leaders and medical personnel to function in, and living bunkers, are also things which may be constructed should time and materials permit.

In this wise, it is well to remember that to construct the refinements above, is both unfair to your men and dangerous to their combat efficiency, unless the projected period of occupancy and the tempo of action can really justify them.

Fortifications should be constructed so as to offer adequate protection for the task involved. Troop leaders should search their minds very carefully before allowing the digging to expand into projects which are merely nice to have.

To state that a defensive position is never completed is a vast understatement. It is only very rarely that one will become even marginally satisfactory to the personnel occupying it. But every few hours of organized work that can be done on it, will serve to increase greatly the dissatisfaction of a prospective attacker.

Barber wire placed in an area



through which an enemy may launch an assault *can be* extremely effective. It will almost always have some canalizing effect, somewhere along its front and, too, it will almost always be the origin of some delay to the attacking force.

But, for wire to be truly effective, the manner of its use must be intelligent and imaginative. Merely taking the illustrated employment of double apron from the FM and scaling it to the length of your front will not serve. Tactical wire should be placed well within the truly effective range of small arms fire from the defensive position. Belts of "tangle-wire," properly placed are effective obstacles, but there are places conceivably, where a web of wire arranged as "trips" 8 inches above the ground, will cause even more confusion and delay to an assaulting unit. "Knife rest" type obstacles also have their employment. However, you must remember that there is virtually no wire obstacle which an agile man with a moment or two for careful concentration cannot surmount. After having spent days constructing a good 15-foot belt of "tangle wire," it can be damn discouraging to see how fast a practised man can get across it.

But wire, placed where it will have the maximum disruptive effect upon an enemy, once he has physically launched his assault, may provide the margin between a successful repulse of an enemy's assault, or that enemy's invasion of your battle position.

An athletic enemy, assaulting at a dead run, might conceivably vault entirely over a double-apron, when a concealed trip wire could have laid him low for the crucial moment when a rifleman in your position could have obtained a good, steady aim on him.



Wire is not too often available to rapidly moving troops, nor are the other refinements possible to a fortified position. We must remember, however, that in the improvement of natural conditions on the battle position, some of history's most effective obstacles have been constructed of wooden stakes and logs. The sharp pointed stake, *fraises*, *abattis* and tangled brush obstacles, used at the lines of Torres Vedras and in our own Civil War, were very effective obstacles to the movement of assaulting infantry.

Although such obstacles are no more a hindrance to the movement of armor than the average wire entanglement, and are perhaps even more vulnerable to preparatory artillery fires than is wire, they are still to be regarded as highly effective. Any organization that has time to construct obstacles to its front, and lacking wire does not employ the natural materials available to construct such obstacles, is remiss in its obligation to prepare its position.

Mines have been touted to us as being an extremely effective defensive weapon, and particularly in Korea we saw their effect. Accounts have been given which leave no reason to doubt that this weapon, in the hands of trained engineers, has had, on occasion, a decisive effect on the successful defense of a position. But, the only knowledge that too many of our infantry have of mines, is the maimed bodies of their fellows who suffered damage from mines—all too often "friendly mines." But mines, properly used, can do a lot of good for you.

Mines in front of a particular platoon's position unless laid, recorded and marked by division engineers, should be subject to the following conditions:

The laying of each antipersonnel mine in front of a platoon's position should in its entirety be personally supervised and recorded by no less a person than the platoon guide, or a squad leader designated for that purpose. They should be so laid, that they may be readily and safely destroyed in place, and once emplaced, no effort should be made to deactivate them and move them to

another place of employment. Safe lanes through the field should be restricted, and covered with fire, but they should be so marked that no possible mistake can be made that they are, in fact, safe lanes.

When the unit which placed the mines leaves the position, or the person who personally supervised the laying of the mines leaves the position permanently, destroy all mines. If further occupation of the position makes it necessary, lay new mines under the same conditions.

Expensive? Of course—but in money, not in lives. Again, all units in Korea were plagued by the abandoned and unsuspected mine field. From the evidence of the ground, it would appear that extremely few units ever retrieved antipersonnel mines. They just up and left them, too often, a completely unrecorded hazard for any who came after them. Non-engineer troops evidently, will deactivate and recover antipersonnel mines only when driven to it. It would seem reasonable, therefore, once more to confirm by doctrine, a decision already made in the field.

Antitank mines when available and suited to the position, should be laid. Certainly these should be a recoverable item. Again, however, except when laid and recovered by trained engineers, these should not be "booby-trapped."

Units should practise a fast "dig-in" and fortification just as they hold field exercises in any other tactical routine. A trained body of troops occupying terrain of any normal nature should be able to adequately protect themselves within a very short period of hours. As time permits, men can construct for themselves in the near vicinity of their positions, adequate, protected resting and sleeping places. By such places I do not mean living bunkers. I mean, merely, a covered prone shelter leading off from the wall of the fighting position itself. In such a shelter, a man can sleep, and find protection from the elements at those times when he is not on an alert status. But, all too often, it appears that our troops will not dig unless stood over with a whip. The shovel is, of course, not a natural

companion to the educational cycle of the average American. And the terms "ditch-digger" and "shovel-jockey" are often used to outline the position of those people who occupy the lowest scale of our cultural structure. But, the shovel, wielded under proper direction, is likely to provide the salvation of many a unit in the years to come. Men must be schooled from recruit training, to live as intimately with the shovel as they now do with their rifles. Getting a properly dug position out of troops in a reasonable length of time will probably be the highest test of leadership that a unit leader will be called upon to make in a defensive situation. The statement most commonly heard in this regard, is "just let 'em get hit good once, and they'll learn how to dig." I have often wondered how many troops we are ready to sacrifice to that attitude. True, nobody *really* feels that way, but the statement is symptomatic of a dangerous way of thought.

There are certain devices that can be used to speed digging-in and lighten the burden. There was an Army unit in Europe in the last war that furnished each man a capped ½ block of TNT when a digging-in position was reached. The man was assigned a position, scooped out a starter hole, fired his charge and was well started in getting underground. TNT is not a good cratering charge, but it worked well in cracking frozen ground. Of course, a block of TNT costs about as much as a pack of cigarettes, or a can of rations; if it will do any good at all, is that too expensive?

A word of caution: there will be occasions when a few hours rest for an exhausted unit will be a more positive contribution towards a successful defense, than will a few hours of further exhaustion spent in digging-in. But, units in such a state of exhaustion are not often encountered. Any unit, after a day's operations, will be tired. What it is necessary to gauge accurately, is whether they are actually as tired as they think they are. Lack of fortifications does not mean that an organization is doomed, but . . .

The military art of the shovel and the pick has altered very little in the course of centuries. It is unlikely that its importance will diminish in the future.

USMC

An alumnus of the Naval Academy ('52) 1stLt Kennon served as a rifle platoon leader with the 5th Marines in Korea. At present he is with the 2d Marines.



# *New Cessna YH-41*

*"delivers" top performance*

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*to helicopter flying!*

Cessna's all-new YH-41, recently purchased by the U. S. Army for its air "arm," combines the latest in design and engineering advances to give operating and maintenance performance never before experienced in the helicopter field!

For example, the engine—mounted in the nose of the fuselage—makes installation and servicing easy, provides extra cargo or passenger space. Cessna has made the rotor assembly aerodynamically clean. Also, the drive system on the new YH-41 is a masterpiece of simplicity, has a minimum of parts—conveniently located for easy servicing.



Offering multi-utility uses, the 4-place YH-41, at 3,000 lbs. gross weight, can climb higher, faster than any other helicopter in its class—sea level to 10,000 ft. in less than 12 minutes! Its speed is the fastest in the light helicopter field.

CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO., WICHITA, KANSAS

# FMF ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION BOARD REPORT THE DIVISION

In order to give Gazette readers a comprehensive account of the new organization and structure of the Fleet Marine Force, this issue initiates a series of articles on this important subject.

The articles were prepared by officers of the "FMF Organization and Composition Board." Headed by MajGen Robert E. Hogaboom, the Board met at Quantico from June to December 1956.

Insofar as possible, the articles not only describe the new organization, but also narrate some of the background thinking which led to the final decision.

This first article deals with the new Marine division. Subsequent issues of the Gazette will contain material on FMF aviation, artillery and logistics.

✻ NO FOOTBALL COACH WOULD LAST LONG IN HIS profession if he did not scout next Saturday's opposing team and organize his offense and defense to win that particular game. Nor would his contract be any safer if he attempted to meet a heavier team excelling in power plays on their own terms rather than relying on speed and deception to come out the victor. Yet in the game of war we too often forget these basic tenets, trust only our past experiences and end up organized and trained to "play" our opponent according to his rules of the game rather than our own.

The Organization and Composition Board was charged with the mission of determining the optimum Marine division organization and composition.

It was apparent that the optimum division should be one with a clearly defined basic capability. A capability that would be required in any type of mission whether in a conventional or a nuclear war. Recognizing that a force-in-readiness would encounter missions with unusual aspects requiring an extension or addition to the basic capability of the division, the need for a well balanced Force Troops structure was, of course, mandatory. As a result, every effort was made to keep from creeping into the division the "in case" and "nice to have" type units and equipment that can so easily put unmanageable blubber on the muscles of a hard hitting fighting entity.

Another characteristic required was what might be called a "change potential" in order that new equipment and techniques could be readily adopted in the future without requiring a major reorganization. Consequently, although restricted by hardware presently available, consideration of future weapons and equipment gives the proposed division increased stature.

Thus, the Board established 5 basic criteria which it believes the division and its subordinate commands must meet in the period beginning FY 58. These criteria are:

1) *The Marine division must be organized and equipped to conduct an amphibious assault against*

*the most modern defenses.*

2) *The division must have the greatest possible capability for executing an amphibious assault in accordance with the Marine Corps' modern concepts for amphibious operations and tactical atomic warfare.*

3) *Combat elements must shed maintenance and service functions to the greatest possible degree in order to attain mobility, freedom of action and a homogenous tactical structure.*

4) *The organization of the division, and its subordinate elements, must facilitate the rapid creation and smooth operation of temporary task groups.*

5) *The Marine division, to answer the requirements of a force-in-readiness, must be capable of making rapid strategic movements by limited air, sea or land transportation means.*

The proposed division that evolved from these criteria is markedly different in some areas and surprisingly similar in others to the present L Series T/O.

To start at the top and work down, the Division Headquarters Battalion has been designed to provide the facilities for a Division CP, an alternate CP and an administrative CP. All general staff sections are increased slightly to provide the necessary personnel for the alternate CP, and the G2 section includes 10 air observers who are organic because of the increased dependence on air observation for enemy information. Special staff sections are reduced to the minimum consistent with effective operations. The present Headquarters Co is reorganized into an H&S Co. The Headquarters Co consists of the Div Headquarters, Bn Headquarters, a CP Security Plt and the Div Band. The Service Co contains the Reproduction Sec, Photo Sec, Disbursing Sec, MT Plt and Service Plt. Additional units in the Div Hq Bn are a MP Co with 4 identical military police platoons, a reorganized Communication Co with reduced wire laying capabilities and increased radio relay capabilities, and a Communication Intelligence Co with the same capabilities now possessed by the Force Radio Co.



The deletion of the Recon Co was occasioned by the addition of a Recon Bn to the division organization. This was necessary in order to provide more adequate means for gaining enemy information in extended formations of modern warfare, and to provide better target acquisition in order to exploit more fully our nuclear and conventional fire support means. This battalion consists of an H&S Co and 3 Recon Cos. Its concept of employment is that it will conduct:

- 1) Helicopter and ground reconnaissance beyond combat area but short of distant reconnaissance missions.
- 2) Flank, separation and rear area reconnaissance.
- 3) Road reconnaissance.
- 4) Battlefield surveillance by establishment and displacement of helicopter lifted observation posts.
- 5) Counter reconnaissance.

Necessarily, in order to accomplish these missions, the entire battalion is capable of being helicopter borne and a helicopter reconnaissance squadron has been structured in the Light Helicopter Group of the Marine Aircraft Wing specifically to support this battalion. This is not to imply, however, that the battalion will not be trained and equipped to conduct ground and amphibious reconnaissance.

A significant and perhaps controversial change in the proposed division is the deletion of the Tank Battalion. Tanks were removed from the division because of the tactical requirements of nuclear warfare with its emphasis on mobility, night operations and dispersed operations. In view of the fact that the Communist force as well as many of our allies still rely heavily on armored forces, the opinion of both British and American tank officers as well as the recommendation of the Fleet Marine Force were taken into careful consideration. From this investigation, several agreed upon, if somewhat contradictory, facts emerged. Briefly these were first, that the old concept that only a tank can defeat a tank is no longer valid in view of the effectiveness of the rocket, recoilless rifle and close support aircraft. Officers with tank experience, both British and American, agreed on this without including consideration of the greatly improved infantry antitank weapons now in the test stage that will eventually replace the 3.5-inch rocket and the 106mm recoilless rifle. The same officers were also unanimous in their agreement on the second fact—that the great shock power of the tank in the assault was an essential necessity on the modern battlefield. Further, there appeared to be complete agreement on the third fact which concerned the necessity of utilizing operations executed under conditions of reduced visibility or total darkness, possibly to the exclusion of daylight operations because of the devastating effect of one well-placed nuclear munition. The contradiction between facts two and three lay in the complete agreement that tanks are somewhat less than effective under conditions of reduced visibility or total darkness. Consequently, here was a case in which it appeared desirable to “play” the game according to our own rules and turn the enemy’s armor advantages into liabilities rather than accept his concept and attempt to meet him on his own terms.


Although it was considered that tanks were no

longer required in the basic division, it is believed that various missions or situations may arise requiring that tank Force Troop units be attached to the division. Once the tactical requirements for tanks had been decided upon, which moved them from division to Force Troops, a chain reaction was set off which eliminated a great amount of heavy maintenance equipment and supplies as well as engineer and bridging formerly carried in the division, either in support of, or organic to, the tank battalion. Therefore, when time, method of transportation, terrain and the enemy permit, the utilization of tanks, force engineer and bridging units will also form a part of attachments required by division. The possibility of a completely air transportable division sought for, but not absolutely required by the fifth criteria, appeared at this time.

The direct fire punch of the tank gun in support of the infantry, as well as its antitank capability, was replaced to a degree by inclusion of recoilless weapons and a greatly increased number of rocket launchers in the infantry units as will be outlined shortly. However, the need was realized for additional weapons to provide antitank and close support to infantry and reconnaissance units, at the division level. The Ontos consequently was chosen to be the heaviest anti-mechanized weapon organic to the division because of the lethality of its 106mm recoilless rifles, its speed mobility and great cross-country maneuverability, and the fact that the vehicle is air transportable.

The 45 Ontos vehicles that are included in the ordnance of the division are carried in an Ontos Bn,

#### The new Marine division



consisting of an H&S Co, and 3 Ontos Cos. Each company has 3 platoons, 5 vehicles per platoon. The principle mission of the Ontos Bn is the destruction of hostile tanks and other gun or personnel carrying, armored, tracked vehicles. Its secondary mission is to provide direct fire support to infantry and to motorized reconnaissance patrols as a close support weapon rather than as an armored spearhead vehicle. It is considered that the battalion's most probable employment will see the attachment of subordinate elements to infantry units with unattached elements assigned specific tasks under division control.

The artillery regiment provides the division commander with an organic means of close and intermediate non-atomic artillery fire support and is organized to meet the criteria set by the Board for the optimum Marine division.

The regiment consists of a Hq Btry, 3 Close Support Bns and one Intermediate Support Bn. Each battalion is composed of a headquarters battery and 3 firing batteries. As differentiated from present organization, however, each firing battery is organized into two 4-gun platoons.


The close support battalions are equipped with the 105 mm or 120mm mortar rather than the 105mm howitzer and jeeps have replaced 2½ ton 6x6 trucks as prime movers. The only 2½ ton 6x6 trucks remaining in this battalion are those in the Battery Ammo Sec and bulldozers have been deleted. Consequently, the battalion has the same ground and air mobility as the infantry regiment.

The Intermediate Support Bn is equipped with the 105mm howitzer rather than the 155mm howitzer and 2½ ton 6x6 trucks have replaced the 5-ton 6x6 trucks as prime movers. The added range capability of the battalion over the close support battalions provides a source of fire support to engage targets deeper in enemy territory and to reinforce fires locally available to infantry unit commanders. A detailed study of the new artillery organization will appear in a subsequent issue of the GAZETTE.

As in our present organization, the infantry elements of the division were organized into 3 regiments of 3 battalions each. The triangular structure was retained at the regimental level since, in the dispersed formations which the division may adopt in nuclear warfare, it is considered that the division commander requires an intermediate headquarters to properly direct and control his 9 infantry battalions. The increased emphasis on mobility and night operations required in fast moving, highly fluid combat situations, highlights this need for well-trained and efficiently-directed battalions.

Therefore, the organization and composition of the infantry regiment is designed to accomplish the following:

1) *Provide a tactical headquarters for the command of organic battalions and attached units.* Certain administrative and supply personnel have been removed from regimental headquarters and placed in division headquarters so that the personnel administration and supply chain extends direct from division to infantry battalion. Insofar as the personnel administration is concerned, we have already had consider-



**The infantry battalion, infantry regiment**

able experience with this system in that during combat, divisions invariably set up "administrative villages" in the rear to which subordinate units assign certain administrative personnel and records. As was stated earlier, the division headquarters is organized to provide, in addition to the division CP, an alternate CP and an administrative CP. The proposal, therefore, is that the administrative organization and procedures be the same in training as they are in combat. Explanation of how the supply chain will function will be contained in an article on the division logistic system.

2) *Provide for the co-ordinated training of subordinate elements.* The Board considered that, since the basic prerequisite for success in combat is effective training, the responsibility for training must be firmly, permanently and clearly fixed. Although it is conceded that battalions could be grouped under combat command headquarters for tactical operations, it is believed that battalions which have trained together under a regimental commander will operate as a more efficient team on the battlefield. Therefore, the Board rejected the concept of tactical groupment of battalions under command groups, a principle which is utilized in some modern theories of infantry organization.

3) *Facilitate the organization of task groups of infantry battalions and reinforcing units from division or Force Troops.* The Board considered that the organization of the regiment into 3 infantry battalions facilitates the creation of 3 major task groups by reinforcing each battalion with artillery, antitank or other supporting units from division or Force Troops.

4) *Provide maximum mobility.* The regimental headquarters has been made smaller and more mobile by the deletion of certain functions and the elimination of such weapons as the 4.2-inch mortars and the tanks from the regiment. The 4.2-inch mortars, it should be noted, were eliminated completely from the division weapons systems since they are so inferior to either the 105mm or 120mm mortars. The type mortar support formerly provided the regiment by the 4.2-inch mortars will now be provided by the close support artillery. The headquarters, as well as the 3 infantry battalions, are therefore completely helicop-



ter transportable and possess sufficient organic transportation in the form of jeeps and "mechanical mules" to ensure cross-country mobility of heavier weapons and equipment. The cross-country mobility required in this instance is that necessary to move the heavier weapons and equipment at the same rate of march as the troops on foot.

The concept of employment of the infantry regiment is that it will normally have supporting elements such as antimechanized, engineer, motor transport and service, attached to form a regimental landing team for assault operations.

The organization of the infantry battalion is designed to provide maximum mobility, reconnaissance capability and shock power necessary to implement the modern concepts of warfare. The increased mobility has just been mentioned in the description of the regiment. The increased reconnaissance capability and shock power is a combination of several factors, the major one being the organization of the battalion into 4 rifle companies. The addition of a fourth rifle company will:

1) Meet the increased reconnaissance and security requirements. The Board considers that, rather than one specially organized and equipped reconnaissance unit within the battalion, each of the 4 companies must be thoroughly trained in this type of mission.

2) Increase the shock power of the battalion by providing more tactical units and weapons. Firepower is increased.

3) Permit the battalion commander to commit sizeable forces to the initial attack, while retaining immediately at hand a powerful reserve with which to influence the action, and at the same time provide strong security to exposed flanks and rear, while attacking. Therefore, when security requirements are present, the old "2 up and 1 back" concept still pertains but when operating as an interior battalion, the formation might well be 2 up and 2 back. Under no circumstances should the addition of a fourth company be used as an excuse to simply increase the frontage assigned the battalion.

4) Provide increased staying power in battle by allowing the battalion to continue effective combat for protracted periods, even though sustaining heavy casualties. It will also decrease the infantry fatigue in combat. Frequent passage of lines is visualized as a necessity in order to sustain the momentum of the attack.

5) Allow the battalion commander to helicopter lift 2 or 3 tactical elements, and, at the same time, provide him with a sufficient security element for those reinforcing units not helicopter transportable, or those awaiting a subsequent lift.

Additionally, the infantry battalion is organized to allow the rapid creation of temporary subordinate task groups, since it provides in its mortar, antitank and assault organization, squads and sections which facilitate their assignment to rifle units. To meet the requirement for a major task group formed around the battalion, it also has the necessary staff and communications to control and co-ordinate reinforcing units from division or Force Troops.


In spite of the greatly increased capabilities of the

proposed infantry battalion, it is only one Marine officer, 58 Marine enlisted and 11 Navy enlisted larger than the present battalion. In addition to the inclusion of a fourth rifle company, for the reasons stated above, changes include the deletion of the battalion weapons company. Battalion weapons are carried in H&S Co and consist of a platoon of 106mm recoilless rifles, a platoon of 81mm mortars and a flame thrower section. The heavy machine gun has been eliminated but 11 light machine guns have been added for use by H&S Co in emergencies. The number of 3.5-inch rocket launchers in the battalion has been increased from 18 to 32, 8 of which are carried as T/E ordnance items to be manned by H&S Co personnel in an emergency.

The infantry battalion is considered to be the basic tactical unit. It has sufficient fire support and anti-tank weapons to operate on an extended front and is organized to provide a balanced firepower and maneuver team. It is equipped with special surveillance and reconnaissance equipment and with vehicles which can be furnished any of its organic rifle companies for reconnaissance missions.

Although the rifle company is smaller than its L Series counterpart, it retains a machine gun platoon and an enlarged 3.5-inch rocket section combined into what is designated the Weapons Platoon. This pla-

H&S Co, infantry battalion



toon consists of 3 machine gun sections of 2 squads each; however, the size of the L Series squads are reduced from 8 to 5 men. The rocket squads are the same as presently provided for in the L Series T/Os; however, an additional squad is added to the rocket section to provide greater flexibility and increased firepower.

The 60mm mortar has been eliminated from the battalion weapons system in view of the antipersonnel lethality of the 106mm HEAP round and as the first step in simplifying the weapons system. The 3 rifle platoons and their squads remain unchanged from the L Series T/O. Therefore, the proposed strength of 6 officers and 197 enlisted Marines, rather than the present strength of 7 officers and 231 enlisted Marines, results from the elimination of the 60mm mortar section, a reduction in the size of the machine gun squad, and a slightly smaller company headquarters.

The problem of organizing the service elements of the division to meet the 5 basic criteria established by the Board, was possibly more difficult than the tactical elements.

In this case it was essential to insure the staying power of the combat units by providing service and support units which could, in fact rather than in theory, support highly mobile, widely dispersed task groups. Consequently, major organizational changes were made in the engineer, service and medical units and a sizeable reduction was made in the motor transport capability.

The organizational title of the Eng Bn was changed to Pioneer Bn as being more appropriate to its assigned functions and to establish a ready distinction between this unit and the Force Eng Bn.

The Pioneer Bn is designed to provide both tactical and logistical type support. It is organized into an H&S Co, a Pioneer Support Co and 3 Pioneer Cos.

The present division Service Regt has been redesignated a Service Bn and has been reorganized to provide for more flexible employment in support of tactical operations. The present division Shore Party function is incorporated in the division Service Bn and a considerable saving in personnel and equipment has been effected by this move.

The battalion is organized into an H&S Co, 3 Light Support Cos, a Medium Support Co and 2 Landing Support Cos.

The principal change in the Medical Bn has been the deletion of the 2 hospital companies which were formerly organic, and the addition of one collecting and clearing company. The battalion therefore is organized into a H&S Co and 4 Collecting and Clearing Cos.

The Motor Transport Bn is organized essentially the same as the L Series battalion except that one truck company has been removed. The size of the H&S Co has, however, been reduced to reflect the support of one less company. With the increase in helicopter support available to the division, the Board considered that a corresponding reduction in ground transport could be effected at this time.

The Battalion, which now consists of an H&S Co and 3 Truck Cos, has the capability of lifting the assault elements of 2 infantry battalions. A detailed study of the reorganized service units will appear in a coming issue of the GAZETTE.

In summary, the major changes from the division of today that are represented in the division of tomorrow, will have the following general effect on the capabilities of the Marine division:

- 1) The capability for continuity of command and control in case of atomic attack is increased.
- 2) The Division is less dependent on land lines of communication.
- 3) The over-all mobility has been increased without sacrificing essential fire power. The organizational flexibility of the division has been increased in that it has a better capability for rapidly establishing subordinate task groups for accomplishing a specific mission.
- 4) The infantry strength has been increased and a better balance has been created between fighting elements and headquarters and supporting elements.
- 5) The antitank capability has been increased although the offensive value of the tank has been lost through the elimination of the division tank battalion.
- 6) The division has a greater reconnaissance capability.
- 7) An overall personnel reduction of 10 per cent has been made.
- 8) The heavy equipment has been reduced to the point that the assault elements of the division are helicopter transportable and the entire division is air transportable.

USMC



### **Cukela Quiz**

☛ PRIOR TO WWII the standard rifle grenade was the VB (Vernier Briessar), fired with a wooden bullet cartridge.

Capt Louie Cukela, at NOB, Norfolk, while inspecting transients, took great pleasure in questioning and testing a Marine's knowledge concerning the Marine Corps.

During one of these inspections he asked a young Marine: "Vize guy, vot it mean VB?"

Young frightened Marine: "Vooden Bullet, Sir."

Maj Walter Smulski

### **Chain of Command**


☛ DURING A SHORT PERIOD of time in 1944, the 1st Mar Div was in New Guinea preparing to jump off for Cape Gloucester. Meanwhile, the Tank Battalion, under the command of Maj Donald J. Robinson, was getting squared away in its tank park.

One day shortly after a group of recruits had arrived from the States, one of them was placed on sentry duty at the tank park. The first afternoon an Army General, who was visiting the Division, approached the sentry and asked if the new tanks were Gen Shermans. "No sir," replied the sentry, "they are Maj Robinson's."

LtCol W. J. King

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)





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Time saved by 1,000-hour lubrication intervals on your Allis-Chalmers tractor adds up to 245 hours every year—an extra month of production!

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For 1,000 tractor work hours, you can forget about every grease point below track level. When it's time for servicing, simple low-pressure flush lubrication replaces old grease completely, eliminates seal popping, prevents damage to seal faces. Allis-Chalmers, Construction Machinery Division, Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin.

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No. of greasings per year (5,000 hr)	up to 500	5
Greasing time (av. conditions)	½ hr	1 hr
Time spent greasing	up to 250 hr	5 hr
PRODUCTION TIME GAINED ... 245 HOURS EVERY YEAR!		


# ALLIS-CHALMERS

*Engineering in Action*




✿ *The USS Bauer (DE 1025) will be launched on 4 June 1957 at the Bethlehem Pacific Coast Steel Corp. Yards, San Francisco. LtCol Harold R. Bauer, for whom the ship is to be named, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous intrepidity as a commander of a fighter squadron (VMF 212) on Guadalcanal in 1942. The ship, an escort vessel, will be sponsored by Mrs. Harold R. Bauer.*

✿ *The Talos guided missile will soon be in quantity production. The missile will be manufactured by the Bendix Aviation Corp. at the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant, Mishawaka, Ind. The guided missile cruisers USS Little Rock and USS Galveston will be equipped with the Talos.*



✿ *The Army's traditional artillery insignia has been modified to reflect the modernization of his art. The insignia places a guided missile over the crossed cannon.*



✿ *A rucksack-type pack (below) which converts into a contour chair is now available commercially. It is called the Everest Assault Pak as the theory of its design came from those who conquered that peak. Manufactured by the Himalayan Pak Co., San Jose, Calif., it is made of light metal alloys and has floating, self-adjusting shoulder harness.*



✿ *The Navy's developments for the coming year should prove highly profitable to the Marine Corps. Perhaps the most spectacular of these is the prototype 30-knot hydrofoil landing craft (above). This craft will utilize the same principles of fluid dynamics which enable the wings of an aircraft to lift it; in this case, however, the lift will be provided by the submerged hydrofoils so that at high speeds only the hydrofoil surfaces will be in contact with the water, eliminating most of the drag.*

✿ *A record of 1028.8 incident-free flying hours in 22 days was set recently by VMF(AW) 115 of El Toro. The squadron was in deployment at Mojave undergoing training exercises with their F4D-1 Skyrajs. This new record is nearly triple that set by a Navy Skyraj squadron which surpassed the 300-hour mark.*

✿ *A green summer uniform for the Marine Corps will be tested during the coming summer months, Headquarters Marine Corps has announced.*

This is included in a study aimed at putting Marines in only a green or blue uniform throughout the year. The summer uniform under consideration is of 7-ounce dacron wool. If approved, it would replace the present khaki tropical worsted summer uniform. The green summer uniform would be worn with khaki shirt and tie, eliminating the problem of matching shirt and trousers when wearing the present summer uniform. The winter uniform would be green gabardine.

Cotton khaki uniforms (which will include a new short-sleeve shirt) would be issued only to those Marines stationed in tropical zones.

The year-round blue uniform under consideration is 14-ounce gabardine and would replace the present blue kersey over a 3- to 5-year period.

Results of the test will be placed before the Marine Uniform Board for action. Under the plan, officers would continue to wear the present summer white uniform on appropriate occasions.

Other uniform changes include the approval of an "action-back" coat which may be worn by officers and staff NCOs as an optional item in lieu of the present jacket. Jackets, however, may continue to be worn. Also approved is the deletion of the blue cap cover with the blue uniform. The white cap cover will be worn on a year-round basis.

✿ *The Lacrosse guided missile (below) is now in production as another supporting field artillery weapon. The Marine Corps is considering this all-weather missile as an intermediate-support weapon to supplement air and artillery preparations. The missile system is composed of a solid fuel rocket, a guidance station and a truck-mounted launcher. The Lacrosse, developed by the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, is being manufactured by the Glen L. Martin Co.*







• An integrated torso flight suit (above) incorporating a life jacket, parachute harness, seat belt, shoulder strap and oxygen equipment thus freeing the pilot of many of the usual encumbrances, has been adopted for use in the A4D Skyhawk. The pilot, wearing the suit, is held to the seat by 4 quick release fittings which, upon ejection, automatically release the pilot after the plane is cleared. The parachute is opened by a timing device.



• A new aluminum tripod for the M60 machine gun (above) has been approved. The new gun, which uses either a bipod or tripod, is scheduled for issue to troops in 1960.

• Marine Corps marksmanship competition will get under way May 6-9 at Camp Lejeune with the Eastern Division Rifle and Pistol Matches. Shooters from all posts and stations east of the Mississippi will compete for the Elliot, Wirgman and Edson Trophies. Western and Pacific competitions have yet to be designated.

• The self-service system of supply has recently been introduced at Camp Lejeune by the 8th Marines. This system, which had previously been instituted at Quantico, greatly simplifies supply procedures and enables the supply officer to maintain a realistic amount of supplies on hand.

• An electronically operated and scored target device has been developed by the Office of Naval Research. It will be used in connection with the Marine Corps' Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition and similar forms of training. Called Target Set, Disappearing, or Pop-Up, this target appears suddenly and upon receiving a hit disappears. Each time a target is hit it transmits a signal to a control booth where the score is kept, the actions of the targets controlled. A device similar to this was described by LtCol F. C. Bacon in *New Targets*, GAZETTE, Aug '54.

The new Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition will take place in September at Marine Corps Schools, with one rifle squad, plus one alternate fire team from each FMF infantry regiment competing. Scoring will be based on actions, orders and hits on field targets. Gold, silver or bronze medals will be awarded to each member of the first, second and third place winners. These medals will be authorized for wear in the same manner as other marksmanship badges.

• Kaman has been awarded a research and development contract for a new utility helicopter, its single-rotor, GE T-58 gas-turbine-powered HU2K-1.

• A field water purification plant able to produce 12,000 gallons of potable water per hour is undergoing field test at Ft Belvoir, Va. The unit, which can be operated by one man, consists of 3 aluminum sections: an "Erdlator" and 2 gravity-type sand filters. The Erdlator is a cone-shaped up-flow coagulation basin 18 feet in diameter. Its function is the removal of all matter not actually in solution in the water. Polluted water can be pumped into the unit, chemically and physically treated, and discharged as potable in approximately 20 minutes.




• The Marine Corps Association sword was presented to 2dLt John C. Williams, III of Fayetteville, NC, the honor graduate of the 3-56 Basic Class, by LtGen M. B. Twining, Commandant Marine Corps Schools (above).


Lt Williams took his degree in Civil Engineering at Duke University where he was a member of the NROTC. He has been assigned to flight training at Pensacola, Fla.

• Marine Corps Test Unit One, having completed its mission, will be deactivated on 30 June 1957. Formed in July 1950 to test and evaluate tactics and techniques, its most extensive activities were those involved in testing the doctrine of the vertical assault, tactics of nuclear warfare and operations utilizing helicopter assault aircraft carriers.

• Hiller Helicopters, Palo Alto, Calif. has been awarded an Air Force contract for the development of a tilt wing, transport size aircraft to be called the X-18 (below). Though having less hovering capability than a helicopter, the plane will be fully capable of VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) and STOL (Short Take-Off and Landing) and of far greater speeds than the helicopter. (See Jan '57 GAZETTE.)



# FMF PAC



DEPUTY COMMANDER  
*MajGen S. S. Jack*



COMMANDING GENERAL  
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINF)  
*MajGen R. O. Bare*



COMMANDING GENERAL  
3D MARINE DIVISION (—)  
(REINF)  
*MajGen A. Shapley*



COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORCE TROOPS  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*BrigGen T. G. McFarland*



COMMANDING GENERAL  
1ST MARINE BRIGADE  
*BrigGen G. R. E. Shell*



COMMANDING OFFICER  
H & S BATTALION  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*LtCol D. L. Cool*





COMMANDING GENERAL  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*LtGen E. A. Pollock*

COMMANDING GENERAL  
AIRCRAFT  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*MajGen C. C. Jerome*

COMMANDING GENERAL  
MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
*MajGen M. L. Dawson*



COMMANDING GENERAL  
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
*BrigGen A. F. Binney*



COMMANDING OFFICER  
FORCE AVIATION AIRCRAFT  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*Col E. E. Bard*



COMMANDING OFFICER  
1ST ANGLICO  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
*LtCol J. E. Johnson*

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA  
SECURITY FORCES



# rotate

By Capt Richard B. Sheridan

THE SCENE WAS ABOARD SHIP returning from Korea. A group of Basic School classmates who had served together in the 2d Mar Div, gone to Korea in the same draft, and were now headed Stateside, were gathered in a bull session.

We were musing over our experiences in two Marine divisions operating under widely differing circumstances. "If only I could have had my old platoon I trained so hard at Lejeune and then took on the Med cruise," said one. "I would have been saved a lot of worry and several close calls the first few weeks on the hill." "Yes, and if we'd had Maj Blank from the 6th Marines as S3 we'd have been able to understand those patrol orders," someone else added. "I had a good skipper out here," another threw in, "but it took me a while to get used to the way he used his machine guns. Wouldn't it have been great if we could have gone out with the same companies

we trained with at Lejeune and the same battalion staff?" "Even with old Whosis as Supply Officer?" questioned the skeptic. "Well at least you knew how to wheedle what you needed out of him," answered one of the others.

## THE PROBLEMS

GAZETTE writers over the past few years have bemoaned the large manpower force tied up in the rotation pipeline, and the rapid, continuous turnover in combat units. (*T'Hell with Rotation*, June '55). They have also plugged for greater unit spirit and pride, a revival of unit social traditions (*Mess Night*, Dec '55) and an emphasis of other Old Corps traditions, not the least of which is a sense of teamwork and "belonging" within smaller units. The American is a "joiner" and wants to belong somewhere. It's hard to feel you belong to a platoon or company when you or most of the other members

change every couple of months. Consider the effect of this feeling of belonging on re-enlistment, on UA, and on mutual confidence and dependability in battle. Its importance in all these areas has long been axiomatic.

In his article *Fighting Formations*, May '56 GAZETTE, LtCol R. P. Keller discusses the organizational problems of air-ground task forces, and emphasizes this point of unity in the following words: "All components of — (this) force must be conditioned constantly and closely under common direction. The principle of unity must remain inviolable during preparation for combat if it is to obtain during actual combat operations."

Some of our colonels enjoy telling their lieutenants how they had the same platoon for 2½ years during their 3- or 4-year tour as second lieutenants. But what lieutenant in the Marine Corps today gets to keep the



In this day of tailor-made task forces built around the battalion, we can not dissipate our effort on a wasteful system of individual replacements

# by battalions

same platoon for even the brief period from the time he reports to his first unit after Basic School until he gets silver bars? What can we do to foster this old fashioned continuity of command and family spirit or "band of brothers" loyalty to the small unit?

It is also rumored that the modern concept of tactics will probably lead to task force organization of Helicopter Assault Forces, Armored Link-up Forces, etc., which don't exactly fit the present organization of regiments, and will vary with each beach or landing zone. We are told that in A-bomb or H-bomb warfare whole units will have to be replaced after a burst, probably companies or battalions.

## THE PROPOSAL

As a step toward solving the variety of problems mentioned above, it is recommended that the Marine Corps adopt a system of rotation by battalions, keeping essentially the same people together in a battalion for a "normal" 2½- to 3-year tour of duty in the FMF. After this the battalion would disband, send more of its personnel to staff and non-FMF duty, and be reformed from recruits and from NCOs and officers due for a second (or third) such FMF tour. An infantry battalion would disband and reform about every other month, artillery battalions about once per quarter, one tank battalion would reform every 9 months, and one engineer battalion every 7 or 8 months.

Instead of regiments, a Marine Division would then consist of "task force" groupings which might be called Brigades or Combat Commands or any other suitable handle, each tailor-made for its mission (or, in garrison, made to fit the geographical location of units. Thus the 5th Marine Brigade of the 1st MarDiv might consist of the 5th and

12th Inf Bns, the 1st Tk Bn, and the 3d Eng Bn, to fulfill a mission of Armored Link-up Force. By substituting an HMR for engineers and tanks you could change it to the Helicopter Assault Force.

Periodically the battalions of this hypothetical Brigade would rotate. This month the 12th Inf Bn would go overseas, to be replaced by the newly re-formed 4th Inf Bn. Two months later 1st Tk Bn would go overseas, to be replaced by the 2d Tk Bn from the 2d MarDiv. Probably their tanks, trucks and other heavy gear would remain in the same location, and be invoiced over to the incoming unit after inspection by an advance party.

Such a system would allow a unit to embark and travel with an organization that has trained together a year or two, and is functioning smoothly, in which the people know each other, and where platoon leaders and company commanders have already seen to it that their men have required clothing, serviceable boots, dog tags, etc. This should mitigate some of the confusion occurring when a draft of more or less strangers tries to keep track of one another while processing through Staging Regiment. It should also reduce the time spent in checking all administrative details before men ship out.


If this system of battalion rotation and Brigade groupings seems revolutionary we have only to look for illustration to the armies of the British Commonwealth, who have been using it with apparent success for years.

It was originated in the last century to meet a need for rotating troops between the home islands and the colonies. It met strong opposition when first proposed, but now they're quite sold on it. Of course their system ties in with a system of

"regimental" recruiting, a regiment being a number of associated battalions serving in different places. For us, however, the "regimental" loyalty and traditions must continue to be focused on the Marine Corps.

British success with a system of rotating by battalions is neither an argument for nor against its adoption by the US Marine Corps. However, in devising a system to meet our needs we can profit by British experience, and still tailor it to meet our problems of wartime expansion and atomic war. The system used by the Canadian Army would bear study. In size, tradition and spirit they are probably more like the US Marine Corps than like the US Army. They combine a system of rotation overseas by battalions with a home garrison system based on a completely different organizational structure. This would seem to be akin to our problem of combining FMF and non-FMF commitments.

Such a system might just turn out to be the answer to the modern concept's need for task force groupings and the need to maintain a sharp edge on unit proficiency, which is now continually dulled by transfers. Everybody would know better where





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he stood with his boss, what the unit SOP really was, how to get along with the battalion staff, the company property NCO, and the mess sergeant. The battalion commander might even get to know the names of the good men in the battalion instead of just the disciplinary cases. In short, most of the problems of continuously breaking in new personnel, from lieutenant colonel to private, could be largely eliminated.

### SOME DIFFICULTIES

Perhaps the biggest blow to the *status quo* would be the abandoning of regiments as we know them, and the redesignation of infantry and artillery battalions. It is regrettable that regimental colors would be relegated to the Marine Corps Museum in such a task organization, wherein a whole battalion changed every 2 or 3 months. On the other hand battalion colors, honors and traditions would be much more meaningful to the average Marine. Let's ask ourselves frankly, how many Pfc's and corporals in the 7th or in the 10th Marines know what each of the streamers on their regimental colors means? How often do they see them? Do they know the battles their regiment fought, or who its Medal of Honor winners were? Yet, if such traditions were related to battalions, and the same men stayed together for several years, such things could become quite meaningful to Pfc Joe Marine, particularly if he were expected to know them at command

inspections and if the pictures and citations of the unit's Medal of Honor winners were hung in the mess hall or rec room. Mess Nights for battalion officers and Staff NCOs could also knit a strong bond over a period of a couple of years if the group remained about the same. Pride in the record of unit athletic teams would mean more. The battalion wives clubs could solve many family hardship problems on a personal friendship basis.

There are a lot of personnel problems left unanswered in this rather sketchy presentation. One of them is higher echelon headquarters units. They might be made up of volunteers from battalions about to be disbanded, who wanted to extend their FMF duty (particularly NCOs), people with a year or two remaining before release, officers awaiting the start of a school or just graduated from a school, etc. Most of these people would already be well oriented on local problems of the Division or Brigade.

Another of the more obvious problems is what to do after 1½ or 2 years when a lot of the unit's Pfc's are ready to make corporal, but there are insufficient billets. Perhaps midway through the battalion's tour of 2½ or 3 years a lot of the junior men could be reassigned to higher headquarters, to retraining in another field where there were more NCO specialist billets (riflemen to join a newly forming tank battalion or engineer battalion) and to non-FMF duty. Many young single Ma-

rines would enjoy such a change during their first enlistment and eagerly volunteer for it. Others would volunteer to stay with the battalion. Such an option halfway through first enlistment should help the re-enlistment rate. One big draft of recruits or first cruise men from non-FMF duty could be absorbed in the battalion at this time. Attrition losses could be made up here. Training schedules could be developed to build up from the initial formation of the battalion and then go back and review at a faster pace when the "half tour" crop of new boys arrived.

It is also true that such a system would require a complete revision of procedures now used by Personnel Branch, HQMC. The monitors and detail officers would probably have to throw out their file cards and set up a new system. They would have to get that emergency replacement for an Inspector-Instructor who is killed in an auto wreck from the supporting establishment instead of from the FMF. Schools would have to be set up to feed graduates into newly forming battalions and take men before, not during, their FMF tour.

There is a price to be paid for anything worth having. The question is, whether the benefits of this system are worth the price of revising personnel procedures.

The author is not a personnel expert, nor a modern concept tactics expert, nor expert anything but rifleman. However, I have waited for several years for someone to come up with a better scheme than individual rotation on drafts, with its continual re-shuffling of personnel in every company and platoon, which makes difficult the building of small unit *esprit*. Therefore this proposal is offered, incomplete as it is. Maybe the experts can shoot it apart and then reassemble something that will be the solution.

Fire away, gentlemen. USMC



### Long Haul

☛ In 1939, I was driving cross country after a tour of duty in Guam and the Guam license plates were still on my car. In Wyoming, we had occasion to stop at a filling station. The attendant's curiosity was aroused at the strange license plates and he stood in front of the car spelling out loud, "G-U-A-M—Gooem, —where's that?" "About 5,000 miles out in the Pacific," I replied. Without blinking an eye he came back with, "Didja drive all the way?"

MajGen H. R. Paige

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)



# Dateline Darling

PHONE-LINE Romeos or stag-line Lotharios, she's the object of their affection. And there's every reason—for her good sense tells her to watch her diet—to eat lighter, less-filling foods and her figure shows it.

Pepsi-Cola can share honors in this field. Reason? Pepsi is the *light* refreshment. Never heavy, never too sweet, it refreshes without filling. Have a Pepsi.

Pepsi-Cola  
refreshes  
without filling



# Defensive

# Operations

## In

## Southern

## 1943



IN THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT, ALL REMARKS SET IN *Italics* ARE THE EDITORIAL COMMENTS OF B. H. LIDDELL HART. TO FO

### PREFACE

The general verdict among the German generals I interrogated in 1945 was that Fieldmarshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in their Army, and the man they had most desired to become its Commander-in-Chief. It is very clear that he had superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanical forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank arm. In sum, he had military genius.

An extraordinary aspect of Erich von Manstein's career is that he is best known, outside Germany at any rate, in connection with operations that took place when he was a relatively junior general, and in which he took no part. For his fame primarily arose from his influence on the design—or, rather, on the recasting—of the plan for the German offensive of 1940 which broke through the Western Front, and led to the fall of France, with all its far-reaching results. That new plan, for making the decisive thrust through the hilly and wooded Ardennes—the line of least expectation—has come to be called the “Manstein Plan.” That is tribute to what he did in evolving it and striving to win acceptance for it in place of the old plan, for a more direct attack through Belgium—which would in all probability have resulted in a repulse.

At that time of the “great argument,” Manstein was Chief of Staff to Rundstedt's Army Group, and when his arguments for changing the plan became irritating to his superiors he was honorably pushed out of the

way by promotion to command a reserve corps of infantry, just before the new plan was adopted under Hitler's pressure (after listening to Manstein's arguments).

In the crucial opening stage of the offensive, which cut off the Allies' left wing and trapped it on the Channel coast, Manstein's corps merely had a follow-on part. But in the second and final stage it played a bigger role. Under his dynamic leadership, his infantry pushed on so fast on foot that they raced the armored corps in the drive southward across the Somme and the Seine to the Loire.

For the invasion of Russia in 1941 he was given his heart's desire—the command of an armored corps, the LVI. With it he made one of the quickest and deepest thrusts of the opening stage, from East Prussia to the Dvina, nearly 200 miles, within four days. Promoted to command the Eleventh Army in the south, he forced an entry into the Crimean Peninsula by breaking through the fortified Perekop Isthmus. In the summer of 1942 he further proved his mastery of siege warfare technique by capturing the famous fortress of Sevastopol, the key center of the Crimea—being Russia's main naval base on the Black Sea.

He was then sent north again to command the intended attack on Leningrad, but called away by an emergency summons to conduct the efforts to relieve Paulus' Sixth Army, trapped that winter at Stalin-grad, after the failure of the main German offensive of 1942. The effort failed because Hitler, forbidding any withdrawal, refused to agree to Manstein's insistence that Paulus should be told to break out west-



# Russia

1944



ART. TO FOLLOW THE NARRATIVE, FOLD OUT MAP OPPOSITE PAGE 51.

ward and meet the relieving forces.

Following Paulus' surrender, a widespread collapse developed on the Germans' southern front under pressure of advancing Russian armies, but Manstein saved the situation by a brilliant flank counterstroke which recaptured Kharkov and rolled back the Russians in confusion.

Then in the Germans' last great offensive of the war in the East, Operation "Citadel," launched in July 1943 against the Kursk salient, Manstein's Army Group South formed the right pincer. It achieved a considerable measure of success, but the effect was nullified by the failure of the left pincer, provided by Army Group Center. Having checked the German offensive, the Russians now launched their own on a larger scale along a wider front, and with growing strength.

From that time onwards the Germans were thrown on the defensive, strategically, and with the turn of the tide Manstein was henceforth called on to meet, repeatedly, what has always been judged the hardest task of generalship—that of conducting a fighting withdrawal in face of much superior forces.

It is at this point that Manstein's story opens.

WHEN OPERATION "CITADEL" WAS DISCONTINUED the initiative conclusively passed to the Russians in the Eastern theater of the war. At this time, on the southern flank of the German Eastern front, a series of heavy defensive battles began. The only breaks came during the spring thaw of 1944 along with a concurrent weakening of the Russian offensive power. Until then, Army Group South had to withstand the heaviest pressure of the enemy, although the right flank of Army Group Center and Army Group A were progressively drawn into action.

Army Group Center, commanded by Fieldmarshal von Kluge, held the central stretch of the German front in Russia (as its title conveys). It was thus on the left of Fieldmarshal von Manstein's Army Group South (formerly Army Group B), which did not at this time cover the whole of the southern stretch. For the extreme southern flank, bordering the Black Sea and embracing both sides of the "inland" Sea of Azov, was held by Army Group A—which in the summer of 1942 had carried out the far-extended drive to reach the Caucasus oilfield area. Here it was in imminent danger of being isolated that winter, as a sequel to the Russians' counteroffensive on the Stalingrad sector which trapped the German Sixth Army. Finally it was successfully extricated after a 500-mile retreat of great difficulty. Following this retreat of Army Group A, which was commanded by Fieldmarshal von Kleist, it formed an awkwardly placed extension of the main southern front. For while it still clung onto a bridgehead in the Kuban Peninsula, the near edge of the Caucasus east of the Sea of Azov, and held the rearward Crimean Peninsula—separated from the Kuban by a narrow channel—its left wing also held a strip of the mainland north of the Sea of Azov. Such a division of the southern front, and of responsibility, was an extra complication in a dangerous situation.

In considering the course of these decisive battles, it is well to remember that Army Group South suffered a double handicap: a) The overwhelming superiority of the enemy, and b) the operational limitations imposed by the German Supreme Command.

The overwhelming superiority of the enemy permitted him to attack the Army Group front again and again with a crushing 7-1 preponderance in troops and heavy weapons which he could bring together without weakening his other positions. In contrast to this, it was never possible for the Command of German Army Group South to pull a single division out of the battle for even a short time. Again and again, the sectors not being attacked were weakened

**By Fieldmarshal Erich von Manstein**  
**annotated by**  
**Capt B. H. Liddell Hart**

GERMAN PORTIONS TRANSLATED BY CAPT H. W. HENZEL

to the utmost in order to provide the necessary reserves for critical battle positions. This resulted in new danger points along these exposed portions of the front. That risk, however, had to be accepted. The total strength of the Army Group was not even sufficient to adequately defend the entire front line area assigned to it—about 570 miles. The only alternative was to adopt a stop-gap system.

In such a system attempts must be made to gather forces promptly at vital points to contain an incipient enemy breakthrough; or, where the opportunity presents itself, to strike a blow at the enemy in the realm of the **strategic defensive**, even at the risk of setbacks in other areas.

*Fieldmarshal von Manstein's concept of the strategic defensive gives strong emphasis to offensive action in fulfilling it. In studying his operations it becomes very clear how keenly he sought opportunities for an offensive riposte, and how ably he exploited them.*

Above all, the greatest danger to be avoided was a deep enemy breakthrough. In such a case, parts of the Army Group would be cut off, and suffer the same fate as the Sixth Army at STALINGRAD. To remain master of the battlefield, by weakening the offensive power of the enemy to the greatest degree was the concept of these defensive battles. Strategically, however, the plan remained exactly as in the winter campaign of 1942/43—to prevent an envelopment from the north of the entire southern flank of the German Eastern Front (Army Groups South and A), thereby encircling us with our backs against the Black Sea. In view of the front line dispositions of the German southern flank, extending far to the east along the middle Donets and the Mius, it was clear that the critical area for Army Group South would always be the northern (left) flank.

*The southern end of the main German front at this time ran eastward along the middle stretch of the Donets River, and then southward along the Mius River to the Sea of Azov. It formed a vast salient projecting some 150 miles beyond the general line of the front, while its width was considerably less. Thus it was dangerously exposed to a Russian enveloping stroke, southward across the Donets towards the coast, with the aim of cutting it off.*

The second handicap under which the Army Group Command labored were the operational limitations imposed upon them by the German Supreme Command. Hitler was not ready to accept the above operational point of view as final. He continued to give political and economic aspects priority over the stark realities of operational requirements.

Thus, he ordered that under all circumstances the following areas were to be held because they were indispensable to the German war effort: first, the Donets Basin with its coal mines, and later the great bend of the Dnepr because of the manganese resources of NIKOPOL. Later it was the Crimea that he refused to evacuate because of political considerations (with regard to the attitude of Turkey)—all with the final

result that he not only lost Crimea, but also the army which defended it.

The result of this was that Army Group South was forced, again and again, to commit too much of its strength (2 of its 4 armies) to the **wrong operational objectives**—first, the defense of the Donets Basin; then, the bend of the Dnepr. Thus they could not be strong enough at the **north flank** where a Russian breakthrough could have followed with deadly effect. Here it has to be considered that because of Hitler's order, the necessary echeloning of the southern flank not only resulted in the elongation of its front, but at the same time would give the enemy the opportunity to snip off this extended protrusion.

On the other hand it demonstrated again that Hitler was not willing to face the consequences of assigning additional forces to Army Group South. So it happened, that in the defensive battles fought by Army Group South, it was not able to operate freely nor did it have enough units to be secure on its northern flank. Instead, I found myself, as Army Group Commander, engaged in a constant struggle with Hitler for sufficient forces to hold the northern flank.

*Fieldmarshal von Manstein's reflections in these last four paragraphs are of such far-reaching importance that they call for comment. The term "operations" or "operational" has a more specific meaning in German military language than in English. It covers the intermediate sphere between strategy and tactics, and is applied to generalship in handling the forces in the field. The German sense is best expressed in English by the old term "grand tactics," which has fallen into disuse. In the German Army the distinctive meaning given to "operations" was of much value in developing the concept of maneuver, in contrast to battering-ram methods and mere massing of superior weight—in men and weapons. On the other hand, it tended to obscure the wider importance of strategy, and the way that action in the field is interconnected with the other factors and pressures—economic, political and psychological—that affect a nation's will and capacity to wage war.*

The co-ordination of these various factors and pressures, and their direction in such a way as to ensure achieving the national object in the war, and in the subsequent peace, is embraced in the term "grand strategy." While grand strategy is primarily the task of the statesman, it is not likely to be effective unless the military chiefs also have a clear understanding of it. On the other hand, it is also essential that the statesman should understand the military factors—and above all take careful account of the realities of the military situation. That was where Hitler failed. Although he had an instinctive flair both for strategy and grand strategy, he became increasingly regardless of the military realities, and even of the political realities, with the consequence that his leadership led to disaster. As with most dictators his growing unrealism was



fostered by too absolute power, while his fear of losing "face" became obsessive.

## THE BATTLE FOR DONETS AREA AND KHARKOV

ALREADY DURING THE EXECUTION OF "CITADEL" THE enemy's offensive preparations on the fronts which bounded the Donets area became known.

On 17 July the enemy launched an offensive over the Mius against the Sixth Army and over the middle Donets against the First Panzer Army. At the end of July both armies had succeeded in preventing an enemy breakthrough. If they were to remain in the Donets area where they faced an extraordinarily heavy concentration of enemy forces, it was essential to bring in more strong units from the north flank of the Army Group.

In spite of this, in the north the enemy had pressed hard on the heels of the armies which came back to their original line of departure before Operation "Citadel." In addition, the enemy had been able to replace the losses suffered during our offensive more quickly than we had expected. At the beginning of August I notified the Oberkommando des Heeres that an enemy offensive against my northern flank west of BELGOROD must be expected shortly. This offensive would obviously be supplemented by an enemy attack southeast of KHARKOV to catch our forces in a pincers' movement and open up the approaches to the Dnepr. It was probable that in the foreseeable future he would also go over to the attack in the Mius-Donets area again.

The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH for short) was Supreme Command of the German Army, while the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, as a whole. The Polish campaign of September 1939, the Western campaign of May-June 1940, the Balkan campaign in the spring of 1941, and the first stage of the Russian campaign that summer, were conducted by OKH under the broad direction of OKW—of which Hitler was head. But at the end of the 1941 campaign, after the failure to capture Moscow, Hitler relieved the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch, who was in bad health, and took over the post himself—doubling it with that of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as a whole. (Many of the German generals had hoped that Manstein would be promoted to succeed Brauchitsch, but their hope was disappointed, for Hitler did not wish to hamper his own control by replacing Brauchitsch with a man of stronger character and more determined strategic views.)

Gen Halder was kept as Chief of Staff of OKH for the time being, and in that capacity directed the Russian campaign of 1942, but with increasing interference from Hitler. Moreover, OKH's sphere of direction was limited by Hitler's decision that it should be confined to the Russian front, while OKW exercised exclusive control of all the other theaters of war. In September 1942, after the renewed German offensive had been



**Situation of July-August 1943**

checked at Stalingrad, Hitler dismissed Halder and replaced him by Gen Zeitzler who, being a much younger man and indebted to Hitler for his promotion, might be expected to do as Hitler wished. (That change worked long enough to enable Hitler to get his own way about holding on at Stalingrad, which led to disaster there, but Zeitzler in turn came to differ from Hitler increasingly, though he lasted until July 1944.)

On 3 August the enemy offensive smashed against Army Task Force Kempf and the Fourth Pz Army west of BELGOROD. For this the enemy had gathered fresh strong forces from other fronts. He succeeded in breaking through at the boundary between both armies, forcing Kempf's withdrawal southward in the direction of KHARKOV and the Fourth Pz Army to the west. After a few days there was a great gap of 35 miles between both armies—the way to POLTAVA and further to the middle Dnepr appeared to be open!

Poltava, which stands on a steep-sided plateau, is an important rail and road center a hundred miles west of Kharkov, and a midpoint between the Donets and the Dnepr. Besides its strategic significance it is historic—and thus had symbolic significance—as the place where, in 1709, Charles XII of Sweden's dream of conquering Russia was shattered by Peter the Great's counterstroke. Like Hitler, Charles XII had narrowly failed to reach Moscow in a December advance, seen his army ravaged by a Russian winter of extreme severity, then turned southward in his renewed offensive, and finally committed the fatal mistake of clinging on too long with dwindling strength.

The Army Group succeeded once again in bringing the Russians to a halt. This was done by a counter-attack employing a double envelopment against the east and west flanks of the enemy penetration. A new front, even if gapping and loosely tied together, was reestablished in the area west of KHARKOV. However, on 12 August another enemy offensive broke against

our front east and southeast of KHARKOV. The weakened forces standing there were unable to hold it back.

Already on 8 August I reported to the OKH that there was no doubt that the enemy was now seeking the decision against the northern flank of the Army Group, and that far-reaching measures were necessary if the encirclement of the entire German southern flank was to be prevented. Either Hitler would have to permit the abandoning of the Donets area in order to reinforce the northern flank, and in the south at least be able to hold the prepared positions MELITOPOL-ZAPOROZHE-DNEPROPETROVSK; or he would have to make powerful forces available for the reinforcement of the Fourth Pz Army and along the middle Dnepr. The urgency of this request was apparent by the fact that the Russians had assembled in the area west of KHARKOV the "Voronezh Front" with no less than 5 armies and one armored army, and in the area east of KHARKOV, the "Steppe Front" with 3 armies!

Hitler, however, was not ready to make such a sweeping decision. Even if the danger was already apparent that major elements of Army Task Force Kempf would be surrounded at KHARKOV, he ordered that the city had to be held under all circumstances. Nevertheless, on 22 August I ordered their evacuation in order to prevent the encirclement of Kempf's Task Force (which in the meantime had been redesignated the Eighth Army). By this means, and by a counter-attack against the enemy penetration west of KHARKOV, the situation was once again stabilized.

*This is an interesting example of Manstein's capacity to disregard Hitler's orders when he considered that they were sure to prove disastrous. That was very rare among the German commanders. It is significant, too, that Hitler swallowed this act of disobedience, though he may not have forgotten or forgiven it, and does suggest that it might have been possible for other senior commanders to have shown more moral courage than they did in acting according to their judgment in a critical situation, without suffering such dire penalties — as they feared.*

On 22 August the enemy again launched his offensive against the Donets area. The Sixth Army was able to prevent a breakthrough of its front although it did not have sufficient strength to restore the situation. The First Pz Army succeeded in bringing the enemy attack to a halt, but after initial successes, its strength also gave out. (See map, previous page.)

The overall situation can be best summarized by the comparison of the forces of both sides.

Army Group South had available to cover its front which now stretched 610 miles: 38 infantry and 14 panzer divisions which all had suffered greatly during the weeks-long battles and whose losses in personnel and matériel could only be replaced in small measure.

The enemy had available 127 to 140 rifle divisions, 16 armored corps and, in addition, a great number of independent armored brigades and regiments. His units were for the most part fresh and up to strength.

The continuation of such a menacing situation at the end of August resulted in my renewed request for either freedom of movement for my southern flank

or speedy reinforcement with fresh units (at least 12 divisions) on the northern flank. Thereupon, Hitler finally left his headquarters in East Prussia and came for a conference to VINNITSA. Reports on the situation and the conditions of the overcommitted and understrength troops finally brought him to realize that some drastic action had to be taken. He promised to assign any divisions available from the zones of Army Groups Center and North. He still did not want to hear anything concerning the abandonment of the Donets area. The next day was to prove that nothing would come of the reinforcements which had been promised. The Russians had attacked the southernmost army of Army Group Center. A local crisis had developed which eliminated the transfer of divisions.

With regard to the prospect of replacement with new units from other theaters of war in exchange for combat-weary divisions of Army Group South, Hitler wanted to wait and see how the situation in the Mediterranean developed; that is, if a landing of the Western Powers could be expected in Apulia (heel of the Italian boot) or in the Balkans.

*The Western Allies had just completed the conquest of Sicily, and were preparing their next spring — onto the mainland of Europe.*

Unfortunately, the Soviets took no consideration of Hitler's wish to postpone his decision. In new attacks, they succeeded in making a breakthrough on the front of the Sixth Army. Thereupon, on 31 August, I ordered them to withdraw to established defensive positions in the rear.

South of KHARKOV, the Eighth Army could prevent an enemy breakthrough only by withdrawing, thus shortening its front and making more units available. The Fourth Pz Army, because of the withdrawal of the right flank of Army Group Center, found itself threatened on its left flank by the crisis developing there. The southernmost corps of the army affected by this crisis gave way to the south into the territory of the Fourth Pz Army which hereby "inherited" this corps, and along with it an open flank as well as another sector of the front 56 miles wide.

The acuteness of this situation caused the Commanders of Army Groups South and Center (*Manstein and Kluge*) to fly to the Fuehrer's Headquarters. They had already requested the assembly of a powerful army before KIEV to eliminate the danger on the boundary between the two army groups. At the same time, both of these field commanders wanted to convince Hitler that the creation of a unified command for all theaters of war with one responsible chief of staff would result in a practical system of command leadership at the highest level. This would mean that he (Hitler) would have to give up — if not formally, at least in actual practice — the execution of the duties of Supreme Commander.

The conversations on this subject were fruitless. Hitler refused to consider any change in the question of command leadership. Further, he declared it was impossible to transfer fresh forces to the area.

Pressure was renewed upon Army Group South, which would now have to take drastic measures in order to contain the enemy's main effort. It was under



these conditions that Hitler appeared at the Army Group Headquarters on 8 September.


In the meantime, the enemy had opened a wide gap in the Sixth Army's left flank and sufficient forces were not available to close it. Therefore, I told Hitler that the situation here could not be restored. Furthermore, my right flank would have to be pulled back to MELITOPOL-DNEPR line as far as DNEPROPETROVSK in view of the critical situation on my north flank. In order to obtain more strength for Army Group South, I proposed that Army Group Center be pulled back to the upper Dnepr. At this time, Army Group Center was still required to hold a strategically unimportant area which projected in a great bulge far to the east.

*There were no centers of key importance in this area, and behind it lay the area of the Pripet Marshes — a hindrance to the enemy's rapid and deep exploitation of any breakthrough here.*

A withdrawal by this Army Group would have reduced its linear front by  $\frac{1}{3}$  and would make the necessary forces available. Hitler now saw the necessity for withdrawing the right flank of Army Group South to the MELITOPOL-DNEPR line. He would not agree, however, to the principal solution—shortening of the front of Army Group Center. He stated that such a rapid withdrawal of Army Group Center was impossible in view of the loss of matériel which would result. In this he was understandably supported by the CG of Army Group Center. It is unavoidable that a front which has become more or less static for so long a period could go over to fast-moving mobile-type operations only with the greatest difficulties. Nevertheless, Hitler promised that a corps of 4 divisions would be assembled by Army Group Center on its right flank to protect Army Group South from an encirclement of its left flank. He also promised to assign forces for the security of the Dnepr crossing. Finally he agreed to the evacuation of the Kuban Bridgehead (*in the Western Caucasus*).

But again it happened that Hitler's promise was

#### Adjustments after Soviet summer offensive



not fulfilled. Following this, I gave the order, immediately after Hitler's visit to the Sixth Army and First Pz Army, to go over to a limited war of movement forward of the MELITOPOL-DNEPR line (with the intention of conducting a fighting withdrawal to this line). On 14 September I reported to the OKH that I had been forced to pull back the northern flank of the Army Group behind the Dnepr—because leaving this flank forward of the Dnepr was no longer possible in view of Hitler's unfulfilled promise.

#### THE RETREAT BEHIND THE DNEPR

The order to execute the withdrawal behind the Dnepr was issued in the evening of 15 September. In view of the exceptional difficulty in conducting this operation under pressure from a much superior enemy in close pursuit, I ordered that the rate of movement be made dependent on the preservation of combat efficiency. All decisions and orders had to be guided by the principle that any difficulty could be overcome by maintaining the combat integrity of the unit. Wherever possible, the armies were to permit the enemy to rush on in order to sap his attacking power and to gain time for the evacuation. With these points in mind, the retreat was successfully conducted with minor losses, thanks to the adroit tactical leadership in the lower echelons and the fine performance of the troops who still maintained the feeling of superiority over the enemy.

*A strategic withdrawal is the highest test of generalship as well as of the troops' training and morale, but provided that these qualities have been adequately developed, the delaying power of modern weapons has made it a less difficult and dangerous operation than in earlier times of shock and close-range weapons. The troops' ability to execute such a maneuver successfully can be greatly increased by educating them to regard it as a natural part of the art of war, and an essential qualification of trained soldiery. A too single-minded, and simple-minded emphasis on the virtues of the offensive—which is a common tendency in military training and education—is apt to result in an army being unprepared for "maneuver in retreat," and thus, much liable to break down if its front is penetrated or outflanked. It is also important to emphasize the ways in which, and the extent to which, well-judged offensive ripostes can aid the execution and enhance the effect of a strategic withdrawal.*

The situation was simplest with the Sixth Army which could retreat perpendicularly to the prepared MELITOPOL-ZAPOROZHE bridgehead position. Army Group A was now finally allowed to withdraw from Kuban back to Crimea.

Far more difficult was the conduct of the withdrawal of the other 3 armies. From a 440-mile front, they had to be concentrated to make the 5 crossings of the Dnepr at DNEPROPETROVSK, KREMENCHUG, CHERKASSY, KANEV and KIEV. Immediately after crossing the river they had to be dispersed again along the same linear front as previously before the enemy

attempted to cross the Dnepr between the 5 bridgeheads. Troops to contain such an enemy crossing were not available. Another difficulty was that these 3 armies could not withdraw perpendicularly to their crossing points, but during the course of the rearward movement they had to push westwards parallel to the stream and even had to fight their way to the approaches of their assigned crossing points.

On 30 September the Army Group stood in its new positions behind the Dnepr, in contact to the north with the right flank of Army Group Center.

Of course, all means of destruction had to be employed to slow the pursuing enemy and prevent him from crossing the river before our troops could move into their new positions. Thus the Army Group was able to take a "breather" which was necessary to organize defenses behind the Dnepr. Since the German retreat was followed by a considerable portion of civilian population (who did not want to fall into the hands of the Soviets and who also had to be cared for) this added another assignment to our already difficult task.

Despite our difficulties, by and large, the enemy was successfully prevented from crossing between our armies at the 5 bridgeheads. He succeeded only in establishing footholds at 3 places on the west bank. An immediate exploitation of such small bridgeheads could, of course, be prevented.

### THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR AREA

BY CROSSING THE DNEPR THE ARMY GROUP HAD placed a major obstacle between itself and the enemy. In spite of this, there was no relaxation. The enemy would continue to seek the decision in this sector of the Eastern Front and nowhere else.

On the other hand, what were the Army Group's chances of making a positive stand behind the Dnepr? Next it must be emphasized that the positions along the Dnepr were in no way an "East Wall" so to speak. In the previous year Hitler had rejected a proposal to strengthen and further develop it into a deep defensive area because he considered that positions in the rear only tempted rearward movements. But most of all, because he wanted to assign all available concrete and steel to the "Atlantic Wall" (the name given by Hitler to the coastal fortifications in France, Belgium and Holland that were planned and begun in 1942 to meet the impending Anglo-American cross-Channel invasion). Consequently, the development of the Dnepr positions could only begin under the operational control of the Army Group, and then could only be carried out at the field-expedient level. The Army Group had at its disposal 37 infantry divisions to occupy 440 miles of front which remained after the detachment of the Sixth Army. This meant one division for every 12 miles. Combat strength of these divisions had sunk to an extraordinarily low level because replacements had only been one-third of the requirements. In addition to these, there were 17 panzer divisions as a mobile reserve which were also of limited combat effectiveness by reason of their high casualty rates in the weeks-long engagement. From an operational point of view the situation remained



**The retreat behind the Dnepr**

unchanged inasmuch as the southern flank of the Army Group (including the Sixth Army) was echeloned far forward so that its north flank remained the critical one. An enemy victory here would offer to him the possibility of encircling the entire southern flank against the Black Sea. But Hitler's instructions remained that the Dnepr area—and the Army Group in Crimea—must be held under all circumstances. This resulted, as before, in Army Group South being forced to allot too many forces to an area which was not vital. A proper balance could be achieved only at the highest command level, thus making forces available from other fronts for the northern flank of Army Group South. Therefore, the disagreements continued between Army Group South and the OKH.

At the beginning of October it was known that the enemy would conduct his offensive with 4 points of attack:

1) **Eliminate the Zaporozhe Bridgehead**—and continue the attack against the Sixth Army; 2 & 3) **both salients on the Dnepr** where he already had footholds on the west bank; 4) as well as against the northern flank of the Fourth Pz Army **north of Kiev**.

The attack against the ZAPOROZHE bridgehead was begun by the Russians under the cover of an artillery preparation in unheard-of concentration. After the first attack was repulsed, the enemy reinforced with fresh units. With 10 divisions and strong armored units he finally succeeded in penetrating our positions. The bridgehead had to be abandoned.

Between DNEPROPETROVSK and KREMENCHUG the First Pz Army, by the employment of its mobile reserves, succeeded in initially preventing a considerable expansion of the bridgeheads on the west bank. The enemy reinforced here with strong new forces.

Nevertheless, the Eighth Army succeeded in holding the enemy at the Dnepr bend at PEREYASLAV although he had forced 8 rifle divisions and one armored corps into this narrow bridgehead. Enemy parachute brigades which had jumped behind our lines were annihilated.



*Parachute troops were rarely used by the Russians, and I have never before seen or heard mention of this one, or any on such a scale. When, after the war, I interrogated ColGen Student, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Airborne Forces, he did not remember any case in which the Russians had dropped more than small parties.*

North of KIEV, at the boundary of the two German Army Groups, the enemy was able to gain a foothold on the west bank of the river. But we were able to halt them at the high ridges which lay west of the stream.

This proved that these attacks were just a prelude to the enemy's offensive.

During the entire month of October the enemy's "Steppe Front" commander, the most active by far, reinforced the bridgehead with new units.

By the end of October the enemy was situated here with no less than 5 armies (among which was the First Tank Army) totaling 61 rifle divisions and 7 armored corps. Against such a superiority the two German armies could not hold. They were forced to withdraw with their inner flanks to the west and east respectively. The approach to the heart of the Dnepr bend and to KRIVOI ROG lay open to the enemy. The acute danger to our possession of the magnesium resources of Nikopol influenced Hitler to assign to Army Group South 2 fresh panzer divisions and one infantry division and to promise 3 additional panzer divisions. How different the situation would have developed if he could have only reached this decision 4 weeks earlier; or if the Army Group, even at that time, could have planned on the arrival of these forces at least within the foreseeable future!

On 28 October the enemy launched a new offensive, this time against the southern portion of adjacent Army Group A. With greatly superior forces he forced the penetration through the MELITOPOL-DNEPR position. The Sixth Army withdrew northward with both their northern corps behind a bridgehead on the south bank of the Dnepr on each side of NIKOPOL. The remainder of the Army pulled back to the lower Dnepr. Thereby the approaches to Crimea lay open to the enemy within the area controlled by Army Group A.

*As already mentioned, Army Group A held the southernmost stretch of the main front, north of the Sea of Azov, as well as holding the great Crimean Peninsula. From the east an advance into the Crimea had to cross the Kerch Straits, and the only land route of entry was by the narrow Perekop Isthmus in the north—now exposed by the latest withdrawal.*

At this time the First Pz Army—fighting on a front to the north and to the east in Dnepr bend—was struck in the rear, creating an untenable situation.

In the beginning of November the enemy launched an offensive against the Fourth Pz Army on both sides of KIEV with 20 rifle divisions, 3 to 4 tank and one cavalry corps. The weakened divisions of this army were no longer up to repelling such a superior force.

KIEV had to be evacuated. The Fourth Pz Army withdrew eastward as far as ZHITOMIR and KOROSTEN.

*Zhitomir and Korosten are important rail and road centers some 80 miles west of the Dnepr—Zhitomir being almost due west, and Korosten northwest, of Kiev. At this time they were also railheads.*

It appeared the enemy could cut off the two armies of Army Group South which were still fighting in the Dnepr bend as well as Army Group A. Already he had seized FASTOV south of KIEV, the important railhead for the resupply of both armies.

With this development, I assigned the 3 fresh panzer divisions and all other available forces of the Eighth Army, for a counterattack on the northern flank. This attack struck the enemy armored corps which had been advancing toward the Bug. It succeeded in taking some of the pressure off the corps of the Fourth Pz Army which was withdrawing westward, so that they in turn could recapture the vital railheads of ZHITOMIR and KOROSTEN which were the linking points with Army Group Center.

*The Fourth Pz Army was commanded by Col Gen Rauss, while the main counterattack was delivered by the IIL Pz Corps under its new commander, Gen Balck, who in this operation controlled 6 panzer divisions and an infantry division.*

*For a more detailed account of this operation, and some of the earlier ones, it is worth reading that well-known and illuminating book Panzer Battles, 1939-1945 by MajGen F. W. von Mellen-thin—who was Balck's Chief of Staff then and later.*

*Balck was one of the most masterly tacticians among the German commanders. Promoted to command the Fourth Pz Army at the beginning of August 1944, after the collapse of the German front in Poland, he succeeded in checking the Russians' effort to drive on from the bridgehead they had gained on the west bank of the Vistula. The next month, when the Western Front collapsed, he was sent to command Army Group G (comprising what remained of First, Fifth Pz, and Nineteenth Armies) which faced Patton's Third US Army, Patch's Seventh US Army and de Lattre's First French Army.*

The attempt to drive the enemy from the western bank of the Dnepr in the area around KIEV was frustrated because of the onset of the muddy season. Nevertheless, the counterattack caused the enemy considerable losses—20,000 dead, 5,000 prisoners, 600 tanks, 300 artillery pieces and 1,200 antitank guns. Figures which indicated how well equipped the Red Army had become in heavy weapons since the beginning of the war! While these battles were in progress, the enemy launched another massive offensive which was an attempt to annihilate all the German forces in the Dnepr bend by an attack from three sides.

The Eighth Army was attacked simultaneously from the north on the Dnepr, on both sides of CHERKASSY, and south of the river where its front faced east. Likewise, far superior forces assaulted the First

Pz Army in the Dnepr bend from the north, and sought to cross the river south of ZAPOROZHE. Then the enemy launched an attack from the south against the NIKOPOL bridgehead.


Until the end of November the situation developed as follows: The NIKOPOL bridgehead was held against 18 divisions and strong armored forces. Nothing was undertaken against the Sixth Army on the lower Dnepr nor against Crimea. The First Pz Army could not prevent the enemy from crossing the Dnepr south of ZAPOROZHE and establishing a small bridgehead on the west bank. On the other hand, it conducted successful defensive operations against the Third Ukrainian Front which was attacking its main battle positions in the north. It held a continuous front from north of ZAPOROZHE to northwest of KRIVOI ROG where it linked up with the Eighth Army. In this case it was forced to commit its last reserves in order to contain the numerically superior enemy.

The Second Ukrainian Front drove the Eighth Army south of the Dnepr and captured the crossing at KREMENCHUG. At the same time, the enemy crossed the Dnepr on both sides of CHERKASSY. Since the Eighth Army possessed no reserve with which to throw the enemy back across the river, it had to give up this bank for a distance of 63 miles. Because of this, by the end of November, the Dnepr line was in Russian hands from north of ZAPOROZHE to west of CHERKASSY, and again from south of KIEV to the boundary of Army Group Center.

The breathing spell, resulting from the counter-attack, still existed with the Fourth Pz Army.

During this time I had tried again and again to make it clear to the Supreme Command that, with ever-diminishing forces and without effective reserves, there was little hope of holding out through the winter in an over-extended front caused by trying to hold the whole front along the Dnepr bend. Sufficient and combat-worthy reserves were a prerequisite to ward off an enemy offensive or to defeat him by local counterstrokes. If the Supreme Command would not be in a position to assign these reserves to the Army Group from other fronts, the only alternatives would be a sweeping consolidation on the southern flank — thereby giving up the Dnepr bend and evacuating the Seventeenth Army from Crimea (by sea). But still Hitler would not consider the necessity of such action. He believed, as before, that success in battle must be sought on every foot of ground.

The Soviets intensified their efforts to achieve an encirclement of the First Pz Army. To this end, the Fourth Ukrainian Front attacked from the south with 3 armies both bridgeheads at NIKOPOL. At the same time the Third Ukrainian Front stormed the northern sector of the First Pz Army. Most dangerous was a new offensive of the Second Ukrainian Front (until now "Steppe Front") which strove to penetrate the left flank of the First Pz Army and the front of the Eighth Army facing eastward. If successful, this would have led to the encirclement of the First Pz Army. Heavy attacks south of the middle Dnepr together with an attack expected from the two bridgeheads he had seized at CHERKASSY indicated



**The Soviet midwinter offensives**

that the enemy was also striving for an encirclement of the Eighth Army. At the NIKOPOL bridgehead and on the northern sector of the First Pz Army, the enemy did not succeed. But he did achieve, through the mass employment of the Second Ukrainian Front, a step-by-step withdrawal of the German front in the area of KRIVOI ROG and the middle Dnepr. Nevertheless, the Germans denied the enemy his operational objectives and, for the time being, were able to remain in the Dnepr bend. But the price of this was the more rapid deterioration of the overcommitted German forces. This caused the commitment of the Army Group reserves. They would have been of much more value on our northern flank!

Here the German counterattack by the Fourth Pz Army had brought temporary relief. The situation still continued to remain precarious. Between KOROSTEN, held by a single isolated corps, and its main forces facing north, a wide gap developed between the Dnepr and the area north of ZHITOMIR. Given time, the enemy would use this gap to envelop the open flank. Consequently, I ordered the Fourth Pz Army to take advantage of this situation and launch a surprise attack. The IIL Corps, made available from the main front of the Army Group, conducted a night march and launched an attack into the exposed flank of the enemy Sixtieth Army located north of ZHITOMIR. The surprise attack which followed, rolled up this army from the west. Its units were completely scattered and disorganized. Immediately following this, the Fourth Pz Army conducted another attack against enemy groups assembling southeast of KOROSTEN; at least 3 mechanized corps were badly mauled.

*Both these counterstrokes were carried out by Balck's IIL Pz Corps — which came to be called "the fire-brigade." In the first, the decisive role was played by Manteuffel's 7th Pz Div with a left hook to the Russian rear, on 6 December, after a swift night march northward to its "take-off" point. Here again it is of value to read the detailed account in Mellenthin's Panzer Battles.*



Manteuffel was subsequently appointed to command the elite Grossdeutschland Div, and handled it so brilliantly in a series of counter-strokes on various sectors of the Eastern Front that in the Western Front crisis of September 1944 he was sent there to take over command of the Fifth Pz Army—a jump in promotion direct from division to army commander. In December 1944 his army achieved the deepest penetration in the Ardennes counteroffensive, and almost reached the Meuse.

In this way we succeeded not only in weakening portions of the enemy offensive group which was already forming forward of the Dnepr, but also to bring under positive control again the area in front of the left flank of the Fourth Pz Army. Yet it was certain that a new storm was brewing over this flank of the Army Group. On 24 December it broke. In spite of the success of the German counterattacks, the enemy Hydra had again grown new heads.

The First Ukrainian Front launched its large scale offensive in the area of KIEV with 3 powerful groups.

Advancing in the center and south of the KIEV-ZHITOMIR highway were the Thirty-eighth Army, the First Guards Army and the First Tank Army, with a total of 18 rifle divisions and 6 armored corps. Soon the Eighteenth Army was also added to this group. To the south, this attack was expanded by the addition of the Fortieth Army. North of the central group, the Thirteenth Army and the Sixtieth Army (which had again been rebuilt) advanced with 14 rifle divisions and 1 cavalry corps in the direction of KOROSTEN. Behind these units, the Third Guards Tank Army with 6 armored corps was still assembling.

The German Fourth Pz Army was in no position to ward off this numerically superior force. Also, on the left, the Army Group was unable to cover the deep flank developing between itself and Army Group A which was still echeloned far to the east. Consequently I reported to the OKH that, if it were not possible to reinforce the Fourth Pz Army immediately and effectively in this situation, the Army Group would be forced to withdraw at least 5 or 6 divisions from its right flank. That the Army Group then was no longer able to remain in the Dnepr bend was self-evident. The situation on the left flank of the Army Group could not be retrieved by local action. A decision had to be made. But Hitler could still not bring himself to decide to withdraw our right flank out of the Dnepr bend in order to reinforce the north flank.

*The front-straightening withdrawal that Manstein proposed would have shortened the stretch to be defended by well over 100 miles.*

In this crisis, I made the necessary decisions myself. The eastern portion of the Dnepr would not be evacuated because this would have an immediate influence upon the situation of Army Group A. Because of this weakening of the forces fighting in the Dnepr bend, it was obvious that a renewed enemy offensive could no longer be contained. If Hitler still did not want to admit this, he would finally be overtaken by facts. He then resigned himself to tacit agreement with my directives.

While this shifting of forces was still in progress on the German side, the enemy naturally had all advantages against the far-inferior Fourth Pz Army. The Soviet main assault group succeeded in making a wide penetration to the southwest in the direction of VINNITSA. That sector of the front south of KIEV taken over from the First Pz Army still held. But adjacent to them on the west, an 11-mile gap was open. A thin front held by the Fourth Pz Army began 28 miles southwest of BERDICHEV and ran sharply east to ZHITOMIR. Around ZHITOMIR, a corps was located fighting facing east and north. Between it and a second corps, forced back west of KOROSTEN, another wide gap of 47 miles developed where a third corps was approaching to assemble further in the rear. Fortunately, the enemy permitted himself to be engaged with these German units. The enemy was unaware of, or at least he did not utilize, the opportunity to strike quickly with his armored units through the gap in order to cut off the communications in the rear of the entire German southern front—or at least to encircle the separated groups of the First Pz Army.

*This is an interesting and significant example of the way that the Russians still tended to miss opportunities by lack of quickness and flexibility in maneuver.*

The situation grew more critical during the first part of January. In the Dnepr bend as well as against the NIKOPOL bridgehead the enemy was preparing a new offensive. If it broke, then the situation there would become crucial. The reassignment of additional units from this sector to the northern flank, which had already been ordered, was now questionable. In the sector of the First Pz Army the enemy could extend his penetration to 30 miles north of UMAN. The Fourth Pz Army, in order to avoid a double envelopment, had to withdraw to a frontline which began 40 miles east of VINNITSA, then ran north toward BERDICHEV and then 38 miles west to the former Polish border. Further to the north, near Army Group Center, a wide gap had forced a withdrawal to positions north of the ZHITOMIR-ROVNO highway and the Polish border.

Futilely, I sought—even through a personal conference with Hitler—permission to bring the situation under control by means of extreme measures. These still could only consist of pulling back the southern flank of the Eastern Front out of the Dnepr bend and out of Crimea in order to make forces available at the critical left flank. At the same time, this would make possible a shorter but much stronger front in the south.

But even now Hitler remained intractable toward these proposals. He declared the loss of NIKOPOL would result in a shutdown of our tank production. The evacuation of Crimea would result in Turkey taking sides with the enemy and later the defection of Rumania and Bulgaria would follow. He was unconvinced that certain loss of the German southern flank would be the sure consequence. He could only take fresh forces for the southern flank from Army Group North. But then their withdrawal could again

mean the defection of Finland. He could only withdraw forces from the West after warding off a landing attempt by the Allies. He perhaps realized the danger in the situation of Army Group South; however, he believed that he had to accept the risk. It proved to be impossible to change his mind. So no other course of action remained for me but again to attempt to become master of the situation in my sector. Two dangers confronted me. With limited forces, my utmost capabilities were to meet just one of these. The enemy plan attempted to smash the left flank of the German Fourth Pz Army with 3 armies (the Eighteenth Army, the First Guards and the Third Guards Tank Army) and at the same time his Sixtieth and Thirteenth Armies went over to the pursuit in the direction of ROVNO further to the north. Simultaneously, he struck with two armies (the First Tank Army and the Fortieth Army) in the gap between the German First Pz Army and the Fourth Pz Army in the direction of UMAN. Soviet armor already blocked the most important supply line of the Army Group at ZHMERINKA.

Next I decided to counter the danger of a final breakthrough by the enemy in the vicinity of the First and Fourth Pz Armies. If the enemy could continue this, the severing of the entire German southern front (the First Pz, the Eighth and the Sixth Armies as well as the Seventeenth Army in Crimea) could not be prevented. An advance by the enemy in the northern flank against ROVNO would only later be of tactical consequence. Because of this, I gathered together all available forces for a blow against the enemy advancing in the direction of UMAN. The counterattack could be conducted in the latter part of January. With a total of 3 corps, it succeeded in striking the flank of the enemy which had broken through at UMAN with a 2-pronged attack from the east and the west. Fourteen enemy rifle divisions and 5 armored corps were badly mauled by these counterattacks and partially encircled. The one counterattack (no figures being available for the other) caused the enemy losses of about 14,000 men, 200 pieces of artillery, 500 anti-tank guns and 700 tanks. The final enemy breakthrough to the south was prevented and thereby the immediate danger to the rear of the German southern front eliminated. However, it had not been possible to do away with the deep bulge which the enemy offensive had punched in our front. As before, this was still a dangerous situation, especially for the rear of the Eighth Army which was still in the Dnepr bend far to the east.

## THE LOSS OF NIKOPOL; THE CHERKASSY POCKET

IT WAS UNAVOIDABLE THAT THE SHIFT OF STRONG forces (First Pz Army) from the Dnepr bend into the zone of the Fourth Pz Army — in order to counter the deadly danger to the entire situation of the German southern flank — could not be effected without serious consequences to the situation of the Sixth and Eighth Armies remaining in the bend. The evacuation of the bend beforehand, or its complete loss in case of a renewal of the Soviet offensive there was unavoidable. Hitler would not agree to its evacua-

tion as long as there was still time, but rather re-assigned the Sixth Army to Army Group A, perhaps to make impossible an independent evacuation order by Army Group South. This resulted in the loss of the Dnepr bend in the battle which caused serious crises and heavy casualties.

At the end of January, the Soviet Second, Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts resumed the offensive in the Dnepr area. In the zone of the German Sixth Army the NIKOPOL bridgehead was attacked from the south, and the army front in the Dnepr bend from the east and the north. This offensive clearly indicated that the combat strength of the German units was no longer equal to the assault of the much superior enemy. The enemy strove to achieve a deep penetration in the NIKOPOL sector as well as on the northern front of the Sixth Army. Now, finally, Hitler saw how untenable the situation was and permitted the evacuation of Army Group A. In fact, the Army just succeeded in pulling its corps out of the noose in the course of extremely heavy fighting; but only at the cost of great loss of matériel. The timely abandoning of this untenable, overextended bastion would not only have made possible the orderly withdrawal of all the forces there, but also would have made divisions available for our critical left flank.

At the time it appeared as if the fate of the Eighth Army in the Dnepr bend was sealed. The Army was still situated there with the right flank of its front extended to the east to link up with the left flank of the Sixth Army. Its center—the front to the north—held in the face of the enemy forces which had crossed the Dnepr on a wide front on either side of CHERKASSY. The left flank of the Army had to be drawn back around to the south—with its front to the west following the enemy breakthrough at UMAN. Thus the enemy had the capability of attacking it from three sides. In fact, it was in a bag which only had to be tied up at the southern end. Hitler had also insisted that this impossible position be held. With the Sixth Army in mind first, and then because he hoped that we could later conduct a thrust in the direction of UMAN against the overextended enemy in the sector of the Eighth Army. With what forces, however, this was to occur remained his secret. The Soviet Command did not forego the offer of such an opportunity.

While Army Group South was still busy with its counterattack against the enemy north of UMAN during the withdrawal of the forces in the Dnepr bend, the Soviet attack was launched against the Eighth Army. From the east, two Soviet Guards armies with fresh forces broke through the eastern front of the German army southwest of CHERKASSY. At the same time, additional Soviet armored and mechanized corps broke through on the front facing west from the northwest. The advance points of both attacks joined at ZVENIGORODKA. Caught in this bag in the south were two German corps. Of course, I had to do everything in my power to free the 2 encircled corps.

The First Pz Army received orders to shift 3 panzer divisions from the counterattack (which was still in



progress in the area of UMAN) to attack from the west the enemy forces which had broken through at ZVENIGORODKA. The Eighth Army was ordered to pull out 3 panzer divisions from the undisturbed portion of the southern front and launch an assault from the south. This was the greatest number of divisions which could be made available for this mission in view of all the risks involved. How necessary this was can be seen by the fact that the enemy squeezed into this area 26 rifle divisions, and 7-9 armored, mechanized and cavalry corps. Deep snow hindered the assembling and the approach march of both German assault groups. Nevertheless, they succeeded in effectively attacking and completely destroying a considerable portion of the enemy forces which had locked themselves around the 2 encircled corps in the southern part of the ring. Great quantities of enemy equipment were captured or destroyed. Finally, however, the German relief attack came to a halt when a period of thaw with its bottomless mud set in. The spearheads of one corps came to within 8 miles of the pocket, while the other corps had diverted to itself a large portion of the enemy encircling forces. Now the weather had brought the rescue attempt to a standstill. As at STALINGRAD, Hitler also wanted the encircled corps in the pocket to continue to hold. Not willing to sacrifice my troops, I ordered a breakout. It may have been the memory of the results of STALINGRAD which moved Hitler to resign himself to this. In the night of 16/17 February the encircled corps succeeded in breaking out to advanced points of the relief column.

Of the 6 divisions and one brigade which were in the pocket 32,000 men gained their freedom. In view of the reduced strength of the units this was indeed the greater portion of their combat effectives. The seriously wounded, however, could not be taken along. The heavy equipment remained stuck in the mud. Yet, it was a success in that these men were saved from Soviet captivity. Naturally, the divisions which had been freed would not be combat-ready for quite some time (a weakening of the overall combat effectiveness of the Army Group which, in view of the pressing situation, was critical enough). This entire chain of events could have been avoided if Hitler had agreed to a timely evacuation of the Dnepr bend. The success of our counterattacks is reflected in the figures for January and February:

Prisoners	Tanks	Pieces of		Antitank
		Artillery	Guns	
25,353	3,928	788	3,336	

The bloody losses of the Soviets from July till January more than doubled the German losses.

The figures given here of the Russian losses in tanks are extraordinarily high in comparison with the number of prisoners taken. The ratio of loss in guns is still more extraordinary—even allowing for the tendency to overestimate the enemy's losses that is common in war.

### STRUGGLE TO REMAIN MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD

AT THE END OF JANUARY I HAD TO DECIDE WHICH OF the two dangers I would have to face first: 1) the dan-

ger of a shattering of, or a wide envelopment around, my left flank (the Fourth Pz Army), or 2) an enemy breakthrough to the south in the area of UMAN behind the German right flank. The latter danger appeared the most pressing and it would have to be dealt with first. In the meantime, it was possible for the Fourth Pz Army to again establish a more or less continuous front—facing north—beginning at VINNITSA and stretching west to the small city of SHEPETOVKA. But north of the western flank of this Army was a vast space extending to the southern flank of Army Group Center which the Fourth Pz Army could not control.

The one isolated corps holding this area had to give up Rovno, giving to the enemy the capability of a wide envelopment around the left flank of this army and the entire Army Group. Had this maneuver been successful, it would have enabled the enemy to push both Army Group South and Army Group A into Hungary and Rumania, respectively, and opened up the way into Poland over LEMBERG (LVOV). (*Another and bigger missed opportunity on the Russian side.*)

As soon as the battle of the CHERKASSY pocket was concluded and a tactical link-up was again achieved with the Eighth Army and the First Pz Army, I commenced a comprehensive reinforcement of its left flank. It would take to the middle of March until these units could be deployed behind the left flank because of the onset of the muddy period and the undependable rail connections. At the same time, this shifting of forces to the left flank signified considerable danger for the right flank. How precarious the situation was can be shown by the following comparative orders of battle:

RUSSIAN FORCES		GERMAN FORCES	
Sector of the Sixth Army:		The Sixth Army	
62 rifle divs		(Army Group A):	
4 armd corps		about 18 inf divs	
1 cav corps		3 pz divs	
Sector of the Eighth Army:		The Eighth Army:	
57 rifle divs		8 inf divs	
11 armd corps		4 pz/pz grenadier divs	
Sector of the First Pz Army:		The First Pz Army:	
37-40 rifle divs		10 inf divs	
11 armd corps		4½ pz/pz grenadier divs	
Sector of the Fourth Pz Army:		Fourth Pz Army:	
18 rifle divs		4 inf divs (3 more coming up)	
5 armd corps		1 security div	
1 cav corps		6 pz/pz grenadier divs	

*In terms of divisions (and equivalent formations), the figures show a ratio of nearly 4 to 1 in favor of the Russians on the whole front, and nearly 6 to 1 on the Eighth Army sector. It was a very adverse ratio, though not so great as has often been suggested in broad statements made by the German commanders. But many of the German divisions had shrunk to the size of a regiment—as Manstein remarks later in his article. How far the Russian divisions, which had a smaller establishment, were kept up to strength is uncertain.*

I had done everything in my power to make the positions as strong as possible in those places which appeared to be strategically decisive. The compara-









*Situation in March 1944*

tive order of battle showed, however, that the enemy preponderance in the sectors of the Eighth Army and the First Pz Army would be almost crushing. The concept of holding every position regardless of cost, could no longer be considered here. If the enemy attacked, nothing remained but to withdraw step by step, fighting a retrograde action. If such could be planned for and executed by these two armies and by the Sixth Army adjacent to the south, then we could hope to get through the short period remaining before the beginning of the seasonal muddy period which would even bring the enemy to a standstill. This was especially true since behind the present front lines, first the Bug and, if necessary, the Dnestr would make possible a defense even for inferior forces. But success depended upon our own forces not being defeated **in front of** these great natural obstacles, but that they reach their defensive positions behind these—as planned—by means of a disengaging action. When, at the end of February, there were indications of an imminent enemy offensive against the Eighth Army, I asked for permission to conduct the battle according to this concept. But even then Hitler did not want to change his opinion about fighting for every foot of ground. So fate had to take its course in this sector of the front.

It is not possible in the scope of this writing for the author to describe the battles of this sector in detail. These battles were characterized by the constant ebbing strength of the overcommitted troop units. The infantry divisions had shrunk to regimental size and the panzer divisions had but few tanks available. When the offensive by the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts was renewed and the planned withdrawal by the Sixth and Eighth Armies to the Bug and later to the Dnestr was prevented by the Supreme Command, heavy casualties and serious crises followed.

Let us turn now to the course of events on the left flank of Army Group South.

Here also the enemy attack was launched on 3 March. Against the First Pz Army the Second Ukrainian Front attacked from the east against its left flank,

and the First Ukrainian Front attacked the Fourth Pz Army from the north. Further to the north, out of the sector of Army Group Center, the first White Russian Front launched a wide sweeping envelopment against TERNOPOL over BRODY and the area to the north. The result was that the enemy achieved a breakthrough on the right flank of the First Pz Army. Following up on this, he was able to cross the Bug and later the Dnestr at MOGILEV-PODOLSK and advance further in the direction of CHERNOVTSY. In the area of the Fourth Pz Army the situation also grew critical. In see-saw battles the Army Group succeeded in preventing the enemy envelopment of our west flank. On 20 March, however, the enemy succeeded in making a breakthrough to the south with the 2 tank armies on the boundary between the German First and Fourth Pz Armies in the direction of the upper Dnestr. The spearheads of the Soviet First Tank Army approached the Dnestr crossing north of CHERNOVTSY as did the Soviet Fourth Tank Army to the south at KAMENETS-PODOLSK, on 23 March.

Since the enemy had also been advancing south of the Dnestr from MOGILEV-PODOLSK in the direction of CHERNOVTSY, the German First Pz Army was encircled at KAMENETS-PODOLSK. The crisis had reached its climax. It was absolutely clear that the First Pz Army had to be led out of the menacing trap before the complete encirclement was achieved. Since my requests to the OKH referring to this were fruitless, I notified the OKH at noon on 24 March that on the evening of the same day I would order the First Pz Army to break out to the west, regain contact with the Fourth Pz Army and re-establish communication to the rear. Then the Solomon-like instructions followed; that Hitler agreed that the Army should fight out to the west to establish its communications, but that it must, however, continue to hold its former front between the Dnestr and TERNOPOL. With what forces this dual assignment was to be accomplished in the face of this situation, remained Hitler's secret. I was ordered to report to the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

At the conversation which took place at noon on 25 March I reported to Hitler that it was vital to get the First Pz Army out of its encirclement as soon as possible. The order for this Army to break out to the west would have to be issued this very evening. To assure the success of this operation it was further necessary that the Fourth Pz Army move forward to meet the First Pz Army in its break out. Hitler rejected this idea completely. Though he admitted that it was necessary for the First Pz Army to fight its way back to link-up with the main body to the west, at the same time he insisted that they must still hold their previous positions. It developed into a sharp difference of opinion until Hitler broke off the fruitless discussions. Pressing my point, I then let it be known that if Hitler would not listen to this advice, he could appoint another commander for Army Group South.

At the evening briefing, to which I had been called, Hitler had changed completely. He had reconsidered the matter again and agreed to a breakout of the First Pz Army. "With a heavy heart" he decided to



organize a new panzer corps from the forces now located in the west, to be used to lead the assault of the relief units. In view of Hitler's agreement to my proposals, I felt this was the time to present my concept of how the operations on the southern flank of the Eastern Front should be conducted until the beginning of the muddy period. The setting in of the muddy period on which Hitler had placed his hopes for a long time had just begun. It had already hampered German movement. The Russians were in far better shape since their tanks had wider tracks and, above all, they had available countless numbers of American motor vehicles which were far superior to ours in cross-country mobility.

The same evening the order went out to the First Pz Army to break out westward from its encirclement. With its new units, the attack of the Fourth Pz Army eastward could commence on 5 April. By 9 April the First Pz Army had fought itself free, and contact between the two armies was re-established. Herewith the winter campaign of 1943/44 by Army Group South came to an end. Just when the last serious crisis ended because Hitler finally agreed to a sound operational plan, my appointment as Army Group Commander had also come to an end. My relief occurred under the same circumstances as had that of the Commander of Army Group A, Fieldmarshal von Kleist. Both occurred a few days after the final conversation in which Hitler had to yield to our points of view. Nevertheless, the First Pz Army had been saved!

### IN RETROSPECT

IF ONE CRITICALLY CONSIDERS THE COURSE OF THE 1943/44 campaign in southern Russia, it can be established that the result for the German side was the loss of the extensive and economically valuable area of southern Russia and a vast reduction and weakening of the national combat efficiency as well as the war potential. The hope that in the east a condition of remise could be achieved militarily, before the Western Powers could make their decisive assault against the Continent (which still held some promise in the spring of 1943) had to be forgotten.

This result certainly did not rest solely on the many-fold superiority of forces which the enemy could place in the field, but also in the basic errors committed by the German Supreme Command.

1) It had not been able to make the **decisive position strong** enough, which, during the course of the year was always the southern flank of the German Eastern Front, especially the sector of Army Group South. It would have had to accept great risks in other sections of the front and in other theaters of war in order to achieve this. Such a risk, which certainly involved elements of doubt, scared Hitler. It may be because he did not want to voluntarily give up anything which he had won. It may be that as dictator he thought he had to avoid imposed set-backs. The result was that he finally had to pay a greater price in the end than he would have over one such set-back. Violation of the logic: "He who wishes to possess everything, possesses nothing," had to have its revenge. Consequently, "Citadel" miscarried be-

cause Hitler could not decide to draw on just a few more units from other sectors to bolster his offensive. The timely evacuation of Tunis, which would have retained the Army deployed there, could have at least prevented the withdrawal of forces from "Citadel" for the Italian front at the critical moment. Then, during the defensive battles of the winter and fall, the reinforcements for the German southern flank arrived to which Hitler finally consented under the pressure of the situation. But these were always too little and too late. The final result of this was, that in the end he always had to give more than would have been necessary by a timely decision.


2) The wish of the German Supreme Command to **occupy everything which had been seized**, as justified as it may have been out of political or economic reasons, led to the condition whereby greatly **over-extended fronts** always had to be held by insufficient forces during the defensive battles. At the same time, the continuous echeloning forward of Army Group South (and Army Group A) which resulted from this, **gave to the enemy his best strategic opportunity** to make a breakthrough on the left flank of the Army Group and force an encirclement of all German forces on the coast of the Black Sea. The Army Group, in order to remain master of the battlefield, first in the Donets and later in the Dnepr areas, was always forced to commit too great a proportion of its forces in the **wrong place**; namely, on its southern flank instead of the strategically more important northern flank.

3) Hitler's principle, **that every foot of ground had to be defended**, in the hope that the Soviets would bleed themselves white in their attacks, would have had a certain justification if such a defense could have been conducted with sufficient forces. With the division frontages that existed this was not possible. In the art of war, only a sufficiently strong defense shows itself to be superior when compared to the attack. This aforementioned principle of Hitler not only led to renewed crises and the danger of encirclement, but also vastly deprived the German side of the capability (by dissipating its strength) which lay in the superiority of its troops and commanders to conduct a **mobile war of strategic movement**.

So it happened that in the decisive year of 1943 in which perhaps there existed a fighting chance to achieve a return to the status quo, brought instead only set-backs. Concerning my own direction of operations during this campaign, in view of the superiority of the enemy and the obstacles created by the Supreme Command, I could only strive to master the situation. After the discontinuation of the last German offensive "Citadel," we could only try to achieve this by alternating from the defense to the counter-attack; thereby, at times, accepting doubtlessly altogether too high risks. If our own losses were high, then those of the enemy in terms of soldiers and equipment were certainly much higher. In spite of acute crises and heavy losses the Army Group was, nevertheless, successful in remaining master of the battlefield. No major units were captured by the enemy!

US & MC

# CASE FOR THE 2-MAN RECON TEAMS



By Capt Stanley Knowlton

☛ DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS OF Korean conflict when the front lines remained basically stable, the Marine Corps was faced with periods of poor intelligence as to local Communist strength, movements and positions on or near their forward areas. The overall picture of enemy activity was known, but the local picture concerning gun emplacements, supply points, routes of approach and build-ups was far from complete. This situation became especially true during the rainy season when inclement weather hindered all aerial observation.

The ground reconnaissance then being undertaken by the Marine infantry companies was accomplished by squad or larger sized units mainly at night. Control of these big patrols was difficult, rarely were Red outposts and forward MLR ever more than probed. Furthermore, these patrols were hindered by the distance they could travel. Departing after dark, they returned home before first light since scouting during the day grew more and more impossible. The Communists had excellent observation of the terrain to their front; and their mortar fire was accurate and heavy. A squad-sized element caught moving out after dawn usually was spotted immediately and put under heavy fire.

As a result, reconnaissance was done at night and emphasis was placed on security through numbers, reducing immeasurably mobility and the effectiveness of the patrols. Routes of travel became standard, covering the general sectors just forward of the chain of outer defenses. This cautious attitude often enabled the Communists to close in, build up, and mount attacks on our outpost system without their initial efforts being well known or effectively hindered by us.

Though the division had a recon company, the latter's capabilities were never fully adapted to the trench-line-type of warfare. Few were the times that its scouting missions went out as far as the nightly line company forays. One of the main reasons for this was that the personnel used were not as familiar with the terrain as the infantry company men.

It was in these times that good opportunities to send 2-man reconnaissance teams into and behind enemy lines for periods of 2 days to a week were overlooked.

Though often discussed at company level, the idea of infiltrating a 2-man patrol through the Communists' positions was vetoed at higher echelons because of the fear of MIAs. However, the feasibility of such small

recon units was recognized by many of the small unit leaders who saw the unwieldiness of the big patrols. Also they knew the latter, though great in fire power, could be far more easily detected than 2 men moving quickly and more quietly through the night, for the smaller the unit the quicker and further it can usually move.

As to the question of being able to penetrate the Communist defenses to any depth, individual Korean line crossers, traveling at night, were successfully crossing back and forth from North and South Korea carrying messages and gathering information. Then too, the British in the 1st Commonwealth Division, located for part of that time on the Marines' right flank, were succeeding in sending out 2-man scouting elements which frequently returned through our positions. Also, our large combat patrols, probing and hitting the Reds outer defenses at night, initially took the enemy by surprise a big percentage of the time. This showed the weakness of the latter's night watch.

And as to daylight detection in enemy territory if one remained hidden, there were instances of Marine patrols, caught by the arrival of dawn way out in front of their outposts. These units were able to hole up for the day by lying still and then return the following night to friendly perimeters.

Thus, here was a situation in 1952 and 1953 which could happen easily again in future wars, a situation where 2-man teams equipped to operate independently up to a week in

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the field could gather intelligence about the enemy which was beyond the practical scope of the average larger reconnaissance patrols. This information could range from the location of troop assembly points, mortar and artillery positions, vehicle and troop movement and count, to new construction of trenches and bunkers. These 2-man teams, watching the enemy from hidden vantage points, could see their activity at night as well as day, in bad weather as well as good; in other words during all those times when aerial observation is ineffective and the enemy is able to move about freely.

The 2-man patrol would be requested by battalion to scout the enemy areas in front of its position. The request then would be approved and co-ordinated at regimental level.

In choosing the men for such a mission, volunteers would be taken directly from the frontline infantry companies. These men would be familiar with the terrain facing their unit. The volunteers would go through special scouting and patrolling school at those times when their company was off the lines. Part of the course would consist of living in the field for 3 or 4-day intervals without shelter and only emergency rations. At this time these men would operate completely independent of all friendly troops, avoiding their detection and observing their movements as part of the training. Naturally it would be of great advantage if these men could have such type schooling in survival before entering a combat zone.

Leaders of the teams would be either an officer or Staff NCO for the following reasons: they would know what to observe; they could better evaluate information gathered; and they could make quicker decisions.

The 2-man team would be briefed at battalion before departing. All the latest intelligence on the area they were preparing to enter would be given them and specific instructions on what to look for would be issued. After studying their maps and making a visual reconnaissance of their initial route, the 2-man team would check their gear and wait for darkness.

The team would carry light-weight carbines for close-in firepower if

surprised. The rest of the equipment would be mostly standard scouting articles: sneakers, cap, short bayonet knife, wire cutters, compass, watch and a canteen of water. Enough light emergency rations would be carried to last a week, binoculars, small colored air panel and an oil skin case of maps. Use of small radios would be impractical because of the distance of communication. An exception would be the possibility of directly contacting planes overhead on some missions. But the radio would have to be extremely light and portable.

The team would move out after dark, perhaps accompanying a regular squad patrol out to a spot near the hostile lines, and then drop off and move on ahead alone. It would take its time penetrating the enemy's defenses, working through them slowly, requiring perhaps 2 nights to go past them. The 2 scouts would halt to rest during the daylight hours, choosing if possible a commanding piece of ground for concealment. This would not only give better opportunity to watch the enemy, but also give less chance of detection. While one man slept, the other would guard and observe.

Once behind the enemy's forward lines, the possibility of discovery would be slight if the team stayed off the main trails and kept daytime movement to a minimum. To the rear of most front lines there are large areas infrequently patrolled such as the many hills behind our positions in Korea from which Communist infiltrators could have observed our activities undisturbed.

To avoid friendly fire, a system of grid co-ordinates would be evolved before the unit went on its mission. Certain co-ordinates would be kept free of fire on specific days. The team would attempt to be in those co-ordinates at those times. If the weather permitted, planes would fly over those sectors to read air panel messages. Each man would carry one small silk air panel, each side colored differently, giving a minimum of 7 signal combinations.

When the patrol was sent out on a specific mission it would return as soon as the desired information was acquired. Also if a vital piece of intelligence was discovered the team would return as quickly as possible

back to the MLR. Otherwise the men would stay out as long as practical, gathering and recording enemy activity on maps.


If detected, the 2 men would keep together and attempt to fight their way out until they escaped the enemy or were killed. If one member were killed, the other still would continue the effort to get back to friendly lines with the information.

When coming back into our perimeter, standard prearranged patrol signals would be used for identification and the team would move back into the MLR at one of a number of designated points.


In such patrols as this, the risk is enormous. But it has been proven time and again that one or 2 well-trained individuals can remain undetected in all types of enemy terrain if they observe the basic fundamentals of scouting. Keeping their movements to a minimum is a must. Practicing the patience of the old Wild West Indian scout and hunter and learning to live and move at night are the elements which have to be relearned by our troops to survive under these conditions.

Small reconnaissance units with great mobility and endurance can well be a part of any future campaign of the Marine Corps. They can serve as the eyes of the lower echelon commands. Training for such missions should start today in the peacetime advance infantry training schools, with special emphasis placed on the individual living alone in the field for extended periods of time.

USMC



HONORABLE MENTION GROUP II



By Capt W. D. Chapman

# CONFESSIONS OF A 2502

Communication SOPs which only serve to "snow" the troops are a boomerang to the professional efficiency of a good CommO

WE ARE A GANG OF "STUFFED-shirts!" It isn't all our fault, but many of us actually *enjoy* our ability to "snow" the "ground pounders," and scoff at their views on communication technicalities. As a result the average infantry officer has been forced to defend himself against the embarrassment of being constantly held up to the light as a hopeless ignoramus in communication matters. It is a very human trait in all of us that we tend to minimize and

even mock that which is not easily understood by us and eventually we can say deep in our hearts that *this* is something which is no concern of *ours*. Like the theory of relativity, which is the basis for the progress which we enjoy, it is the product of volumes of "hen-scratches" made by a host of "eccentric type characters" who are the only ones who can understand it, therefore it is "*their* baby, not *ours*." By-and-large, this is the relationship between infantry


officers and NCOs and communications at the present time—and *we've brought it on ourselves*.

The "semi-dilemma" starts with secrecy (a result of our technical advances) which resulted in a split-up of related information and so on, but it is abetted *immeasurably* by our *own addition* of professional terms and "high level" order forms, which serve us communicators well enough, but are confusing as all-get-cut to non-communicators, particularly in the companies and platoons.

We are so afraid of using unprofessional language and forms (which might make us seem like novices) in our Communications Orders that we are the only ones who can understand them, and it follows that we are the ones who *read* them, too.

Granted that security is necessary to a certain extent in order to prevent the enemy from gaining information which he could use to hurt us, but when we have so *much* security, that our own people don't know what we are doing, *then it is time to take a calculated risk!*

The infantry battalion is not a place where we can afford to be fancy with our educations. This is





where the trigger-pullers are, whose prime concern is to destroy the enemy. If they don't have any way to holler for help, or bullets, or beans then they will lose the battle for us, or rather, *we* will lose it for *them*! They don't have the time or inclination to decipher our "Staff Manual" Communication Orders, and what's more they don't give a damn whether we can replace the word "work" with "operate at optimum efficiency." What *they* want to know is "what are the call-signs, who's on the net with us and what's the frequency?" They want to know that in a nutshell without wading through any diagrams which must be turned upside down and sideways to decipher. They also want to know "How, what, when and how much?" Without wading through 10 pages of *esperanto* to catch a sentence here and there which applies to *them*.

In short, let's throw the precedents out, and write the battalion communication orders for the subordinate units. Let's make paragraph 3 a set of detailed instructions to A, B, C and Weapons Company instead of Wire, Radio and Message Center. Why write fancy orders to *ourselves* when we already know what *we* have to do?

If we have a Communication SOP which is worth its salt, all we need to do is hold a good briefing for the Communication Platoon, which includes the Air and Naval Gunfire communicators. Our General Paragraph and Appendices can contain an overall view of our communications particulars for the operation in question, for our own reference and the information of anyone who may care. But these need not be voluminous and fancy. The wire diagram can contain all the locals as well as the trunks, and the radio net diagrams can contain call signs, frequencies and all of the *other* information. (See Figures 1 and 2.)

Now, I'm not saying it won't take a *while* to win back the interest and confidence of the people whom we

have spent so long in alienating, but we can *do it* in time.


There are a few more little things we can do to improve the understanding and confidence of the trigger-squeezers. Rather than cry that people don't write messages properly, or that they fail to ring off when they finish their calls, send them an informal "Communication Bulletin," explaining "how and why." They appreciate that. You can explain all sorts of things with Communication Bulletins — what communications are presently operating and planned for the future, how field communications for supporting arms are organized, or a critique of the communications in the last field exercise. A simple Bulletin on *one* subject, written in an engaging manner will be read widely and at leisure, and the result is *education* far more effective than meetings and seminars.

We can get even more ambitious and set up demonstrations on a parade ground to show *everybody* what communications there are in an infantry battalion and how they link units, where they are in relation to each other and who operates them. This will take a lot of signs and people plus plenty of imagination, but it will pay off on the very next field exercise.

It is amazing how friendly and interested people can be when we talk their language instead of haranguing them with gobbleddegook which goes over their heads. Likewise it will amaze the average communication officer how communications-conscious the average infantryman *can be* if he understands the Communication Order. But most of all, it is amazing how good communications can get in the infantry battalion when *everybody* knows how to make *his* communications work in every situation. And when communications are *good*, it is amazing how well the battalion operates — how excellent is the intelligence, and how rapidly the battalion can re-

(FIG 2.)

## RADIO DIAGRAMS



Q-2-2

verse direction or organize and execute a new attack, and how efficient become logistical operations. Morale reaches new heights from the commanding officer to the newest recruit. The battalion can do *anything*! We can help achieve all this by sacrificing our "High Pockets" so *let's do it*!

When we hear the phrase "Communications stunk!" it is seldom in reference to division headquarters or regimental headquarters. It is aimed squarely at the "Guys what lost the battle," the "beans and bullets" echelon, the infantry battalion, where communications is a life-or-death matter right now!

Here, then is the "hot spot" of communications and it is no coincidence that it is here that our communication efficiency depends to a large extent on the judgment and efforts of non-communicators. The CommO loses the capability of direct supervision simply because his empire is spread over several acres. Infantry officers and NCOs *must* pick up the ball and supply that supervision. If they are to do this efficiently they must understand the communications. So there you are! *That is our mission!* US MC

**Capt Chapman**, now I&I for the 42d Special Inf Co at Pittsfield, Mass, is a career communicator. Starting as a private at the Field Telephone School, Camp Lejeune in 1943, he has served in a communicator's billet in almost every type ground unit in the Fleet Marine Forces. Many of his ideas on how to increase the efficiency of subordinate-unit communications have appeared as articles in the Gazette.




# A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES

By LtCol Irving Heymont, Inf, USA

*Reprinted from the Military Review  
Command and General Staff College  
Ft Leavenworth, Kans.*



*The new improved 160mm mortar*



*240mm — assumed to be the world's largest operational mortar*

WHILE THE STARTLING POSTWAR development of the Soviet air forces since World War II may have received more public attention, the changes and developments in the Soviet ground forces have been many and equally far-reaching.


With the end of WW II the Soviets embarked on a program to develop a highly mobile army possessing great fire power and shock action. The development of an army with these characteristics coincided with the development of tactical atomic weapons. The characteristics required of forces for atomic warfare are precisely the same that the Soviets started to develop as a result of the lessons of WW II. Now the Soviet ground forces development program is reaping a bonus effect that all modern armies must be equipped to fight on the atomic battlefield.

In the field of weapons the Soviets have taken full cognizance of the good and bad features of their wartime models. In fact, apparently only a few—the very best—of their wartime weapons have been retained.


Before WWII Soviet small-arms design stressed accuracy of fire. During and after the war the trend was toward the development of increased automatic fire in keeping with the new Soviet emphasis on assault and area fire. The new Soviet small

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





*85mm divisional gun*



*100mm field antitank gun*



*152mm howitzer*




*203mm gun-howitzer*

arms, issued to units within the last few years, are in keeping with this emphasis. (Top left photo on opposite page shows the semiautomatic rifle, SMG and LMG.) All of the new small arms fire a common cartridge, a fact which greatly simplifies logistical requirements.


In recent May Day parades the Soviets have shown two new mortars of 160mm and 240mm caliber. The new 160mm mortar apparently is an improvement of the M1943 model, and probably has an increased range capability. The 240mm mortar is an innovation. Probably no other army in the world has an operational mortar of such large caliber. The range of such a mortar should well approximate that of a light field artillery piece. It is also not inconceivable that an atomic shell may be developed for a mortar of that caliber.

Postwar field and antiaircraft artillery developments have been most extensive. Shortly after the war the 76mm divisional gun was replaced by an 85mm gun which is well suited for indirect fire and for use as an antitank piece.

Other new artillery weapons seen in recent parades are a new 122mm field gun, a 100mm field antitank gun, a 152mm howitzer and a new 203mm gun-howitzer. All these new models indicate more mobile pieces and increased range capabilities.




**6-inch  
rocket launcher  
(16 rounds)**



**9-inch  
rocket launcher  
(12 rounds)**



**Heavy  
rocket launcher  
(4 rounds)**



**Armored  
personnel carrier  
6x6**

The new 203mm gun-howitzer, considering its caliber and range, may well be capable of firing an atomic artillery round.

Mobility of artillery also has been enhanced by the development of high-speed artillery tractors. One such tractor, utilizing a medium-tank-type suspension, appeared in the 1955 May Day parade.

In the field of heavy rocket launchers, the *M13* and *M31 Katushas* of WWII fame have been replaced with new self-propelled launchers of 6-inch and 9-inch caliber. These launchers, judging from reports of experts who have seen them, probably have increased accuracy and stability because of spin stabilization rather than the old fin stabilized weapons. A very new large rocket launcher capable of firing 4 large-diameter rockets was first seen in 1954 parades. Some speculate that this new rocket may in time have an atomic capability.

Apparently cognizant of the western strength in the air, the Soviets have not neglected anti-aircraft artillery developments, particularly for close support of troops. The war-time 12.7mm, single barrel, anti-aircraft machine gun has been replaced by a larger caliber rapid firing, heavy anti-aircraft machine gun in single, twin and quadruple barrel versions.

Other new Soviet anti-aircraft artillery weapons are of 57mm, 100mm and 122mm caliber. These new weapons are believed equipped with indirect and radar controls giving the Soviets a well-balanced family of modern anti-aircraft artillery weapons.

Mobility of ground forces both on the ground and in the air has not been neglected. Long supply columns of horse-drawn wagons are things of the past. The organic vehicle authorization for the rifle division has been increased tremendously. In addition, the Soviets, judging from the recent May Day parades and articles in the Soviet press, have developed amphibious vehicles of varying capacity. Equivalent and improved versions of the United States amphibian 1/4-ton truck and DUKW are known. Armored personnel carriers have been developed. Production of these vehicles must be extensive as they are known to be utilized in satellite armies. One



model widely seen is an open topped lightly armored 6 x 6. Large numbers of this vehicle certainly improve the Soviet cross-country mobility and ability to traverse radiologically contaminated areas.


In the field of armor the Soviets have developed new medium, heavy and amphibian tanks. The new medium and heavy tanks have more powerful and better engines, and lower silhouettes than the battle tested T34 medium and JS3 heavy tanks. The new medium tank mounts a 100mm cannon as compared to the 85mm cannon of the T34. With the demonstrated interest of the Soviets and their satellites in infrared development it is not inconceivable that the new tanks are equipped with infrared devices to facilitate night combat and cross-country movements, characteristics which are especially desirable on the battlefield of maneuver. It can be inferred from the Soviet bargain sales of T34 tanks to Egypt and other Near East countries that the troop issue of the new T54 medium tanks must be on a large scale.

Mobility of ground forces in the air has been greatly increased. After witnessing the 1956 Soviet Aviation Day show Gen Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and his group reported seeing large tail-loading air transports similar outwardly to the new United States Air Force C-123 Provider transport. New heavy transports also were observed. The Soviets also have been active in the helicopter field. The 5-place helicopter, the Hare, appeared in 1951. The clam-shell door Hound helicopter appeared in 1953 and has an estimated capacity of 1½ tons or 16 troops. The most recent Soviet helicopter, the Horse, appeared in 1956. This helicopter is estimated to carry a payload of about five tons, or approximately 50 fully armed men.

The developments in the Soviet ground forces described, plus others, have given the Soviet Army the means to achieve greater firepower, maneuverability, and mobility. Recent Soviet unit reorganizations, which have, for example, just about doubled the number of tanks in the mechanized division, have utilized the new equipment to achieve a tremendous increase in the combat



**Medium gun tank T54  
(100mm)**




**Heavy quadruple  
antiaircraft machine gun**




**100mm antiaircraft gun**

**122mm antiaircraft gun**





**Clamshell door Hound — capacity: 11½ tons or 16 troops**



**The Horse — capacity: 5 tons or 50 fully equipped troops**

capabilities of Soviet units for mobile operations.

The true significance of this program can be determined in the light of other recent developments. There

has been no significant increase in the Soviet production rate of heavy and medium bombers. However, the Soviets are increasing the number of planes available for air defense and

close support of army units. Jet planes are rapidly replacing conventional close support aircraft. Gen Twining's party at the 1956 Soviet Aviation Day show reported seeing experimental twin-jet planes designed specifically for close support of ground forces.

Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Defense Minister, has publicly proclaimed the increase in the firepower of Soviet ground units. In fact, in a letter to the noted *New York Times* military analyst, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, Marshal Zhukov said:

"Airpower and nuclear weapons by themselves cannot decide the outcome of an armed struggle. Along with atomic and hydrogen weapons, in spite of their tremendous destructive power, large armies and a tremendous quantity of ordinary arms will be drawn into military operations."

*Taking all these factors into account, it is apparent that the Soviets are prepared to fight either an atomic or nonatomic war with their forces now in being. It can be further concluded that the Soviets are not putting all their eggs in an atomic basket — certainly not an intercontinental bomber basket.*

US MC

### BCD

✿ WHEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ordered all American citizens out of war-torn Egypt, the USS *Chilton* (APA-38), with elements of the 3dBn (reinf), 2d Marines embarked, was directed into Alexandria by Commander, Sixth Fleet, to execute the evacuation of 1,500 US Nationals.

Since a very large percentage of the ship's newest passengers were adventuresome young boys, the ship's captain and the battalion CO decided a company of Junior Marines should be formed, with a Staff NCO as Company Commander, in order to keep the youngsters out of mischief.

These Junior Marines were outfitted in helmets and cartridge belts, shown Marine combat films and marched around a tour of the ship in a military manner. It was on one of these ship inspection tours that an 8-year-old, who had been appointed first sergeant, began to admonish one of his older contemporaries because of his lack of attitude. Realizing that his remarks were making no headway, the youthful "top" screamed, "You can't play with us anymore — you're — you're — discharged!"

Lt J. E. Page

### More Cukela

✿ I WAS PULLING DUTY as Sentry on #1 Post at NOB, Norfolk, Virginia the day Maj Cukela reported aboard to take over as CO of Marine Barracks (Old Pine Point Hotel) at that station. He came into the "Glass House" where the Sergeant of the Guard had his office and asked the "Music" (Bugler) on duty to go to the Post Office to get his mail. The Music stated he did not know the Major's name. The Major exploded and said, "It iss on de envelope, stupid. Next time I send a damn-fool, I go myself!"

Capt J. J. Sullivan

### By the Dawn's Early Light

✿ A FAMOUS Marine Corps character of a few years back, known as "Nuts" because of his crazy antics, had a knack for getting into and out of trouble. On one of his many appearances before his commanding officer he was asked why he had been 17 hours over leave. His reply was, "Sir, I was just about to board my train in Boston when a nearby band struck up the 'Star Spangled Banner.' While I was standing at attention the train pulled out."

Capt C. B. Haslam

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)



## LITTLE ORPHAN ATA

✦ FT BENNING, GA.—A careful study of Lt Kloefkorn's article, *ATA Platoon—An Orphan?* gives one pause for wonder. There is no doubt as to the sincerity of the Lieutenant's concern over the way his ATA platoon is staggering around looking for a place to collapse, and if things are really as bad as he describes them, it may do just that!

The Lieutenant complains first of lack of fire power in his unit. He suggests that a longer range weapon be provided for antitank work—a suggestion that in itself is well founded. The 3.5-inch launcher is a short range weapon (as Marines who used them in Korea well know) but it is also light in weight, fairly easy to handle and to carry. When gunners are well trained and confident in the use of the weapon, it is accurate within its range limitations. The Lieutenant should stop and take a good look at the 75mm recoilless rifle, and perhaps drag it around over the hills on a strictly man-carried operation—the type that the ATA platoon normally finds itself conducting before he advocates too strongly its adoption at battalion level. The supply of ammunition alone, at better than 70 lbs. per packing box will present him with a problem of no mean proportions. A problem which, in spite of Korean service troops and motor transport, was not quite adequately solved during the first year of the Korean War. Our dear, departed friend, the 57mm recoilless rifle would be a far better substitute, but as history records, in spite of successful use by Marines after WW II, and by the US Army and the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, that weapon has disappeared from the scene. A better, more potent weapon, yes, but not the 75mm.

The lieutenant further states that there is a requirement for more flame throwers and more operators in the battalion ATA platoon, and that the 3.5-inch rocket launchers should be increased proportionately. He does not state the number of demolition men he wants added to the T/O, but by inference it is a substantial increase. All this sounds very fine, but if we add the two 19-man, 75mm recoilless sections to the ATA platoon, plus the equipment and

transport to keep them operational, we come up not with the ATA platoon, but the ATA COMPANY! It is apparent from the Lieutenant's remarks about the mis-employment of his present T/O platoon that in increasing his outfit in numbers, he is also increasing his troubles. His final suggestion on equipment and its distribution in the battalion makes me realize just how aged I have become, for his recommendation for placing flame throwers in the rifle company headquarters takes me back all the way to 1944-45 when companies of the 26th Marines and other Marine regiments, had the entire ATA effort in the headquarters of the rifle companies—flame, demolitions and rockets. Personnel who formed these ATA teams were drawn from the platoons of the rifle companies and were sent back to the platoon when the need for assault weapons arose. Other and wiser minds than ours decreed that after Iwo Jima there would be an ATA *platoon*, and the companies gave up all but the rocket launchers, for there were indeed holes in the system—such as the re-filling of fuel tanks and the re-charging of pressure tanks at company level, a task well nigh impossible in a moving situation.

The concern which the Lieutenant feels about the employment of the ATA platoon is perhaps a bit premature on his part and more than a little unjustified. There seems to be a tendency among the leaders of supporting units to listen to the wails of their troops with a fatherly glow in their eyes, and hate a-building in their chests for those company and platoon commanders of the rifle companies who have treated the supporting troops in such a foul manner. In the case of the representative ATA platoon set forth in this article, it would appear that with so many officers uneducated in the functioning and employment of the ATA platoon, that perhaps it would be of advantage to all hands if the leader of the ATA platoon would visit, not once, but many times, the leaders of the companies who were using sections of the ATA platoon so improperly, and explain the approved utilization of that platoon to them. No commander of troops wants to be in error in the employment of any arm which supports him. If close liaison was effected between the ATA platoon com-

mander, the weapons company commander, the S3 and the rifle companies, it would take but a short time to clear up such cases of improper employment as the Lieutenant set forth as examples in his article. Too often, once the attack has started, the ATA platoon leader and platoon sergeant join the battalion command group, grouse because they have nothing to do, and in the meantime, the section leaders must battle it out with the company commanders as to what is proper or improper. These decisions which could be made on the spot if the platoon leader or platoon sergeant were forward with the assault companies, recommending employment to the company commanders, which is as much their responsibility as is the training of the platoon in its weapons and tactics.

As for training, realistically and thoroughly, it is felt that here again the ATA platoon commander, can, and will receive the utmost in co-operation from the S3 and the company commanders if he wants to work at it. Other supporting units such as the mortars and the machine guns enjoy such freedom of action in training and there is no reason that the ATA platoon should not do likewise. There are well defined, tried and true doctrines for ATA work set forth in numerous publications. Films and film strips are available, and last but not least, there is a wealth of information available to the platoon leader in the minds of the NCOs and officers who employed ATA sections and platoons in WW II and in Korea. Field exercises using the ATA platoon can bring about the maximum in training only if co-ordination, co-operation, and planning for those exercises are carried out to the most minute detail. If the ATA platoon commander wants to *sell* his platoon to the company commanders, he will stay in business and make it a profitable one. If he does nothing but sit on his butt and complain, he will *sell it down the river!* It can be the favorite child of the infantry family, or it *can* be the orphan. The decision is squarely up to the platoon commander.

Maj G. P. Averill

✦ PARRIS ISLAND, SC—Lt Kloefkorn hits this problem pretty much on the head, but I think he missed a point when he suggested a T/O change which would double the number of flame throwers and rocket launchers. In recommending any changes now we must recognize that they will be temporary measures to ensure effective utilization of weapons now on hand to meet present needs while keeping an eye on future requirements of mobility and flexibility. I don't believe we can justify the



additional manpower and equipment proposed in the light of these needs.

However, I agree that certain T/O changes should be made and that unit commanders must assume a different attitude toward the ATA Platoon. Therefore, I would like to propose a change in the T/O of the ATA Platoon after first considering two factors. The first consideration is the mission: to provide close antitank support to the front line companies by stopping enemy tanks in front of the forward infantry elements. The *secondary* mission is to engage and reduce heavy positions. During WW II and most of the Korean fighting the platoon was used characteristically in the assault of fortified positions because the enemy possessed a limited mechanized potential. The problem is to increase the antitank capabilities of the platoon without loss of the assault potential.

The second consideration is the shortcomings to the present organization. There are two: first, the battalion lacks depth in its antitank defenses; second, the assault of a fortified position, or area, requires too much co-ordination and prior training between the infantry and the assault unit(s). To eliminate these two deficiencies I propose that the ATA Platoon be recognized to contain a Recoilless Rifle Section and 2 self-supporting Antitank Assault Sections. (See new T/O.) There is a definite need for the recoilless rifle (either the 75mm or the 106mm) at battalion level. The maximum effective range of the 3.5 rocket launcher does not permit us to engage tanks or other mechanized vehicles far enough in front of friendly troops to effectively delay and disorganize an attack. In the hands of *well-trained* troops the 3.5 is only effective against tanks at ranges of less than 300 yards. The only depth in the battalion's antitank defenses is the depth gained by the emplacement, or displacement, of the 3.5s. The range of the recoilless Rifle would give the battalion depth in *firepower*. This depth in firepower is necessary if the battalion is to successfully combat a tank attack once it starts

rolling. As it now stands the battalion must depend upon higher echelons and supporting units to kill a tank at ranges greater than 300 yards. Time and space factors, weather, communications and the tactical situation may deny the use of supporting arms which have the capability of destroying tanks.

The recoilless rifle can also be used as a long-range, direct-fire, assault gun. In an attack, preparation fires must be lifted when the attacking forces are from 600 to 1,000 yards from the enemy. But the recoilless rifle, used much the same as a heavy machine gun, can assault key emplacements accurately until its fires are masked.

The reorganization of the Antitank Assault Section should be accomplished to make them self-supporting, more adaptable, and mobile in order that they can better accomplish both the antitank mission and the assault mission. The primary objective of this proposed reorganization is to give the Antitank Assault Squad the capability of assaulting, reducing and seizing a single emplacement. The demolitionists are carried in section headquarters rather than in the squads so that they may be employed where most needed. Normally one would operate with each squad. The squad, by having its own supporting rifleman-grenadier and automatic rifle-men, reduces the amount of co-ordination necessary within rifle platoons and squads and between them and the assault personnel. The assault squad or section, when attached to a rifle platoon, would act as the assault unit in attacking a fortified position. The infantry would render fire support and exploit the action of the assault unit. Thus, the only co-ordination necessary would be between the assault squad or section leader and the platoon leader of the infantry unit.

The feasibility of such a reorganization of today's weapons for today's or tomorrow's conflict is excellent. Two-thirds of the recoilless rifles needed and their transportation are already present in the regiment. A slight reshuffling of personnel now with the ATA Platoon would accomplish the reorganization of the Antitank Assault Sections. The training necessary to perfect the assault techniques would be minimal. The extra flame throwers and rocket launchers could be retained in the platoon or company as replacements or to reinforce in specific situations. In summary, the objectives of reorganizing the Antitank Assault Platoon into a Recoilless Rifle Section and two Antitank Assault Sections is 1) to add fire power depth to the battalions antitank defenses; 2) to reduce the co-ordination necessary between assault personnel and the infan-

try; 3) to increase the overall antitank effectiveness of the Antitank Assault Platoon and its usefulness to the battalion.

#### ANTITANK ASSAULT PLATOON

##### Platoon Headquarters

Platoon Commander.....	2dLt
Platoon Sergeant.....	TSgt
Maintenance NCO.....	Sgt
Ammunition NCO.....	Cpl

##### Recoilless Rifle Section

##### Section Headquarters

Section Leader.....	SSgt
(2) Squad Leader.....	Sgt
(2) Gunner.....	Cpl
(2) Asst Gunner.....	Pfc
(10) Ammo Carrier.....	Pvt

##### 2 ATA Section Each With Section Headquarters

Section Leader.....	SSgt
Demolitionist.....	Cpl
Demo Assistant.....	Pfc
(2) Squad Leader.....	Sgt
(2) 3.5 Gunner.....	Cpl
(2) Asst. Gunner.....	Pfc
(2) Ammo Carrier.....	Pvt
(2) Grenadier.....	Pfc
(4) A/Rifleman.....	Pvt
(2) FT Operator.....	Cpl
(2) Asst FT Opr.....	Pfc

##### T/O Summary

2dLt.....	1
TSgt.....	1
SSgt.....	3
Sgt.....	7
Cpl.....	13
Pfc/Pvt.....	38

1/62

Capt Robert Rice

ED: See article on new M Series T/O, page 22.

## LOYALTY! TO WHOM?

3d MAR DIV, FMF — I'm confused, which is really nothing new, but the reason for it this time bothers me. Am I a Marine with one loyalty to the entire Corps, or am I a member of one division with loyalty only to it? And when I join a different division, which I'm bound to do sooner or later, does my loyalty automatically follow my transfer?

What I'm getting at are the various Division Associations. Right now we members of the 3d Marine Division are being urged to join our Division Association. The purpose of this is to perpetuate the spirit of the men who fought and died with the division in WWII and to instill pride in current members which, by making them more aware of the history and traditions of the division, will cause them to become better Marines. For \$2.00 I can join, and if I do, I get a large certificate suitable for framing, a decal for my car or office window, another card for my already full (of cards) billfold and the association's publication, *Caltrap*.

Admittedly, the 3d MarDiv is a fine organization, and we should keep its



history alive. But so is the 1st MarDiv, and since I have served briefly with it I suppose I should join its association; and when the times comes that I serve with the 2d MarDiv, which I'm sure to do eventually, I should join its association also, if it has one. So there I'll be, a Marine with loyalties split 3 ways and money going each way, and actually I'll have no more feeling for one division than either of the others. What I will have is what I have right now, without claiming membership in any division association: one loyalty to the Corps, one pride in the achievements of the Corps, one reverence for the memory of all Marines who have died in the line of duty throughout the history of the Corps.

We have a Marine Corps Association and a Marine Corps League. Why can't these serve the purpose of all the division associations? I think they can. But if they can't then perhaps we should expand the division association idea and form such organizations as the Post and Stations Association, the Security Forces Association and the Detachments Afloat Association, for certainly the Marines who serve in these organizations perform their duties with the same spirit and enthusiasm as FMF Marines. And look how many more associations we'll be able to join during those phases of our careers when we serve with units in those categories!

It's rather like going to college and pledging each fraternity on campus. As I say I'm confused.

Capt T. H. Galbraith

## DISPLACING FORWARD

QUANTICO, VA.—I see that Capt Fredericks has come through with another article which should stir up some comment (*Displace the Combat Base*, Jan 1957). As former members of the Okinawa branch of the "Ale and Quail" club, he and I spent many hours hashing over this subject. Now, as then, I am forced to disagree with him in some respects.

In most cases the BLT will be moving into an operating area not controlled by friendly forces. (If the reverse is true, the move is primarily administrative and poses no particular problem.) Similarly, in most cases, the BLT should have accomplished its mission of controlling the operating area it is vacating by destroying the enemy within and denying the enemy access to this area. Accordingly, the greatest threat lies within the new operating area. The desire to protect the old combat base is commendable. But, if the mission has been accomplished, no more than a company should be required for this

task. On the other hand, piece-mealing the BLT into the new operating area in 3 basically company-strength echelons leaves it open to defeat in detail.

The greater share of the combat power of the BLT should make the initial move into the new operating area in order to insure sufficient strength to seize and retain, in the face of enemy counteraction, a combat base. Since, as Capt Fredericks pointed out, there are certain problems in moving the supporting arms, this would mean that the forward echelon would be "infantry heavy." Therefore, I would suggest that the forward echelon consist of 2 rifle companies, the 81 mm mortar platoon, attachments from the machine gun and ATA platoons, and necessary supporting arms, CP and communications personnel. This would provide a strong advance unit capable of overcoming most likely enemy resistance and capable of moving by any mode of transportation. In any but a foot movement, the 4.2 mortars could also accompany the forward echelon. However, all elements of a given echelon need not move by the same mode of transportation, and thought might be given to moving the 4.2 mortars by helicopter just as soon as the forward echelon uncovers a position for them in the new operating area. Based on his estimate of the situation

and where his personal influence is most needed, the BLT commander would command the forward echelon himself or make it into a temporary task group commanded by the executive officer.

The rear echelon of the 2-echelon movement would then consist of one rifle company, the artillery unit and the administrative and logistics group. The movement of the rear echelon would be covered not only by the 4.2s and 81s but also by patrols and strongpoints from the forward echelon, who could keep clear the route into the new operating area. Incidentally, while speaking of unit separation, let's not rule out mutual support from other BLTs. Other BLTs may be in a position where their long range ground support arms could cover most of the route into the new operating area, which support could be readily obtained by a little prior coordination.

This, too, is only "a" solution to what will be a vexing problem. However, it cuts the movement down to 2 echelons, providing greater control and less possibility of defeat in detail, and concentrates the greater combat power in the area of greatest danger, affording better opportunity for successful seizure of a new combat base and more support for movement of the rear echelon.

Maj R. F. Van Cantfort

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Weight \_\_\_\_\_ Neck \_\_\_\_\_ Sleeve \_\_\_\_\_ Glove \_\_\_\_\_

Waist \_\_\_\_\_ Chest \_\_\_\_\_ (outseam) Shoe \_\_\_\_\_

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# passing in review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

### Japanese Fighter Ace . . .

**SAMURAI**—The Personal Story of Japan's Greatest Living Fighter Pilot. 375 pages, illustrated. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., NY. \$4.95

"I brought my hand to the top of my head—my fingers, moving over the helmet felt slippery and sticky. I knew it was blood—a slit in the helmet on top of my head. The depression was deep and greasy with blood—something hard met my fingers—my fingers were deep—that something hard could only be my skull laid open by bullets." Saburo Sakai permanently lost the sight of his right eye as a result of this engagement with 3 American Avengers, 2 of which were credited as his 61st and 62d victories. He was at this time Japan's leading ace. (Nishizwawa, later officially credited with 103 confirmed kills, was lost when the transport in which he was riding as a passenger was shot down in the later stages of the war.)

Sakai's name must be added to the roll of the world's leading aces. Probably the first published factual account of the exploits of a Japanese fighter pilot, an ace 12 times over, his ability was demonstrated early in his career when he was one of 70 applicants accepted from 1,500 candidates for flight training, one of 21 to graduate, the outstanding student pilot of his class, and at the war's end its sole survivor and Japan's leading live ace. He ranged the Pacific from Japan to Guadalcanal and back, attacking and downing all types of aircraft from all nations: Australian, Dutch and American. He did this in a plane that had no radio, no self-sealing tanks, no armor plating, nor parachute. Although fighters were his principal targets—3 in 15 seconds on one occasion, 4 in another day—B-17s also fell to him; the famed Colin P. Kelly was his first. Team mates vied to fly with him, for in over 200 combat missions he never lost a wingman and at the same time acknowledged that the Japanese lacked the teamwork of the Americans. Based in Japan in the war's closing days, half-blinded and crippled, he continued to fly and only 12 hours before the surrender, he "shared" a B-29. A grateful government, in recognition of his outstanding service, broke a hallowed tradition and Sakai became an officer, the first noncommissioned Japa-


nese pilot to achieve this status while living.

A book of this nature has been long overdue in the bibliography of the world's military pilots and although the co-authors may have taken occasional descriptive license of Sakai's aerial exploits, the book is completely absorbing and particularly so to those who fought the "Samurai" squadrons.

Co-author Martin Caidin will also be remembered as the co-author of *Zero*. Fred Saito, who spent every week-end for a year with Sakai in his research, was a news editor with Radio Tokyo during WWII.

Reviewed by Maj David Riley

Ed: *A veteran WWII fighter pilot Maj Riley is with the Air Section, MCDC.*



### Decisive Engagements . . .

**THE BATTLES THAT CHANGED HISTORY**—Fletcher Pratt. Maps. Hanover House, Garden City, NY. \$4.95

Everyone who has read history to any degree has his own personal thoughts regarding which particular battles changed the course of human events. But it is both refreshing and educational to read a series of battle accounts selected by so respected a military writer as the late Fletcher Pratt. In this, the last book he completed, is found the unmistakable Pratt style of writing which makes reading his books such a pleasure.

Many experts and self-styled experts may well find fault with Pratt's selections. But he justifies in his own way the battles which he describes. In his "A Few Words in Introduction," he writes that the book "... is a half-closed-eye view of one aspect of Western history. . . . Not that the Far East and Africa have been lacking in great battles or great victories, but their results have had less permanent effect on the stream of world history." The primary considerations in making his selections were that the "war in which the battle took place must itself have decided

something" and "that the battle represent a positive decision."

Although the book is written in chronological order, probably one of the most interesting of his selections (because it is within the memory of many GAZETTE readers) is the battle chosen from WWII. Pratt selected Midway. "The forces mobilized against the Axis were already so tremendous that if Stalingrad, Alamein, Casablanca and Guadalcanal had never taken place substitute decisions must have brought the same result." He describes the air battle over Britain in 1940, the failure of the German tank columns before Moscow in 1941 and the Allied success against submarines in the Atlantic in 1942 as "negative decisions." But Spruance's victory over Yamamoto at Midway made Japan's defeat inevitable.

Pratt ignores the First World War, and in the American Civil War selects Vicksburg as his decisive battle. "... Vicksburg was . . . a political as well as a military victory, a visible evidence of progress. . . . In a sense, Atlanta, the Chattanooga battles, the Wilderness fighting, Cedar Creek may be called decisive. . . . But they all rested firmly on the foundation of Vicksburg, and it is necessary only to ask what would have happened had Grant been defeated there."

His other selections include Alexander the Great's victory over the Persian, Darius, at Arbela in 331 B.C.; "The Red King at Beneventum"—the defeat of King Pyrrhus of Epirus by a Roman consular army in 280 B.C.; the Nike sedition in Constantinople in 532 A.D.; the battle at Kadişiyah in 637; the defeat of the Moors in Spain at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212; "Jeanne d'Arc and the Non-conquest of England"; the Turkish defeat at Vienna in 1529; William of Orange's victory over the Spaniards at Leyden in 1574 by means of seapower; Gustavus Adolphus; Frederick the Great; Wolfe at Quebec; the American Revolution, and the Napoleonic Wars.

Fletcher Pratt's description of the battles he has selected plus his justification therefor add up to recommended and entertaining reading.

Reviewed by LtCol John A. Crown

Ed: *This reviewer is a student of military history. He is currently assigned to MCS, Quantico.*



## Tactics on the Eastern Front . . .

### COMBAT IN RUSSIA 1941-1944 —

Hans Kissel, MajGen a.D. 149 pages with diagrams. E. S. Mittler and Sons, Frankfurt/Main.

The long bitter war on the Eastern Front during WWII is one about which Americans have known little. Of recent years we have learned more. The source of this information was primarily ranking German officers who had published their memoirs and novelists who had brought to light the sufferings and tribulations of the lowly frontline soldier. There has been a noticeable void in the middle ground. This little volume is a solid contribution toward filling that vacuum.

*Combat in Russia* is basically a professional analysis: the experiences of an officer who commenced the Russian campaign as a battalion commander of the German 101st Light Inf Div. A methodical and objective account of the actions of the German infantry, it is markedly impersonal in its approach, regardless of how dramatic or desperate—or even occasionally humorous—the situation might be. (The description of what happened upon first meeting, being run-over by and finally destroying the first T-34 tanks has an element of grim humor in spite of its unemotional telling.)

There are several interesting observations to be made from reading this book. First among these is the quality of leadership which held the German Army together long after it should have disintegrated in defeat. The extremes of the Russian winter and the terrain, the fierce offensive power of the enemy, and an overall military situation that was far from heartening, demanded the utmost exertions of the troop leaders. As a result the leader casualties were high in all ranks. (Early in the campaign the division's commanding general was wounded by enemy hand grenade fragments while visiting the assault platoons.)

Another point is the immediate and close co-operation between the Services. Whatever disagreement there may have been at the top, there certainly was none at the operational level. Where combined task forces were made up, involving combined arms, the missions were executed immediately and without question.

Most impressive was the constant use of verbal orders—even at division level. The element of personal leadership which it connotes is striking.

The author of this book, in his report of his unit's experiences in attempting to hold the Nikopol bridgehead, provides an interesting lower-level parallel to the article in this issue by the army

group commander there during the same period. In another sense the same book is also timely because it coincidentally deals with some of the problems the Board which reorganized the FMF tried to visualize. Here is a practical example of the problems of unit separation and dispersion. Albeit, the reasons for our recent changes and the experiences of the Germans are vastly different, the end objective remains the same—to avoid defeat in detail by a powerful massed enemy while still retaining sufficient mobility and striking power to defeat him in detail. This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the German organization of the light infantry division was in many ways similar to our own new division.

There are many extraordinary combat experiences recorded here which are worthy of more than a casual glance—particularly in its characterization of the nature and combat methods of the Russians. It appears that such a book (it is rather short) might make excellent supplementary reading for the students during the tactical phase of their instruction. Unfortunately, however, the book has not yet been published in English.

Reviewed by Capt H. W. Henzel

ED: *The volume reviewed here was brought to the attention of the GAZETTE by RADm Walter Ansel, USN (Ret). Upon his recommendation a copy was obtained from the author. Should any reader wish to buy a copy of the German edition, the GAZETTE will furnish Gen Kissel's address. No English edition is in print.*

## Ordnance Authority . . .

THE MACHINE GUN, Vol IV—LtCol George M. Chinn, USMCR. 638 pages. GPO, Washington, DC. \$6.50

"If this work can help . . . to revive in this country the almost forgotten art of automatic weapon design . . . the effort and toil . . . spent in preparing this book will have been well repaid."

Thus the author closes his preface to the volume in a series that presents a comprehensive study into the design analysis of automatic firing mechanisms, which incidentally includes an excellent chapter on the development and history of the much neglected rotary-type automatic mechanism.

Divided into 2 parts, Vol. IV covers first, a detailed analysis of the principles of the blowback, recoil and gas operation of automatic weapons, which includes a mathematical analysis of each type of operation. The remainder consists of 290 pages of schematic illustrations of representative mechanisms used in automatic weapons.

From first glances the book seemed to

## NEW BOOKS

*The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.*

### COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE

—George C. Guins. Philosophical Library, N.Y. \$7.50

This book does not contain any predictions. It is a collection of facts put into logical order from which the author concludes that Communism has reached a stage of progressive decay and degeneration.

### THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1948—

Edgar O'Ballance. Frederick A. Praeger, NY. \$4.75

A major in the British Army, the author has served extensively in the Middle East. In preparing this timely account of the war, he consulted not only the published accounts, but also many of the leaders of both the Jewish and Arab forces.

### THE GREEN DRAGON — Robert

D. Bass. Henry Holt, NY. \$5.75

This is the story of LtCol Banastre Tarleton and Mrs. Mary Robinson, London actress. "Butcher" Tarleton had just returned from the American Revolution when their lives were joined. A factual account set in 18th Century England.

### OFF LIMITS—Hans Habe. Frederick

Fell, NY. \$4.95

A novel by a German writer, with the setting in the US Zone of Western Germany 1945-51. Here is told in terms of moving human drama and deep compassion the story of a difficult and dramatic era.

### THE WINTER WAR — Vaino Tan-

ner. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. \$5.00

Here is the story of one of the first of the "little wars" in our time, the Russo-Finnish struggle in the winter of 1939-40. The author is a former foreign minister of Finland. He presents a personal account of the events and diplomatic background of the war.

### GUERRILLA SURGEON — Lindsay

Rogers. Doubleday, NY. \$3.95

Lindsay Rogers is a New Zealand surgeon. This is the story of how he used his skills to aid the Yugoslav partisans in WWII when he served as a major in the British Army.

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be tailored to the ordnance engineer. However, a more detailed reading found the material exceptionally well organized and made understandable by an extensive use of charts and drawings. The schematic illustrations include major nomenclature and directional arrows to explain functioning. As an extremely readable book for one covering so complex a subject and one which contains a world of knowledge for a person interested in weapon design.

LtCol Chinn is a graduate of Middlesburg Military Institute and Centre College. Always interested in firearms and explosives, he published his first writings, in serial form, in *The Lexington Herald*. Entitled *Tools of Pioneer Warfare* it was a comparative study of the Indians and the pioneer settlers. His second book, published in 1939, *Encyclopedia of American Handarms*, is now a collector's items.

Leaving the Army in 1942, Col Chinn enlisted in the US Marine Corps. As a gunnery officer in the 3d Marine Air Wing he developed a set of gauges which took the guesswork out of assembling automatic aircraft weapons and was soon assigned to the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent, Md., where he became a trouble shooters for that unit. Further assignments to Dahlgren, Virginia and BuOrd found him working on the development and improvement of aircraft automatic cannons which he continued until his return to inactive duty on 4 February 1957.

LtCol Chinn's latest work on weapons is a 3,700 word section on automatic weapons for the new *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Reviewed by Capt M. C. Christie

Ed: Capt Christie is the Examiner, Ordnance, at the Testing and Education Unit, which prepares all the promotion examinations for the Marine Corps.

## Cannoneers, Caissons and Campaigns . . .

**SOUND OF THE GUNS** — Fairfax Downey. 337 pages, illus. David McKay Inc., NY. \$5.50

A lusty, vivid portrayal of the advent and development of American artillery and cannoneers from the founding of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston in 1638, through all the campaigns and wars of our history to the present time.

By skillfully weaving together incidents and individuals, from artillery private to general officer, the author Fairfax Downey has created a moving story that leaves the reader feeling as though he has had an eye-witness account of every action our country has been engaged in.

In 1745 the volunteer militia from Massachusetts embarked on a "mad

scheme" to capture the strong French fortress of Louisburg. This famed Gibraltar of the West had taken the French 25 years to build and was manned by French regulars and Canadian militia. Yet, the farmer, fisherman, and shopkeeper artillerymen (most of whom heard their cannons fire for the first time as they sighted in on Louisburg) by their courage and resourcefulness caused the fortress to yield.

It was interesting to note that many of the principles observed by our ancestral gunners are still in effect today. Author Downey quotes a gunner's proverb of the time, "The first shot is for the Devil, the second for God and only the third for the King." The gun captains attempted to cause the first round to fall short of the target so it could be more easily observed, the second round to be over the target (to establish a bracket) and then by "splitting the bracket" obtain a target hit with the third round.

From this first engagement author Downey leads the reader through history with graphic illustrations of artillery usage in our nation's campaigns, filling in with accounts of valorous actions as well as those blights on our military record.

Of particular interest to all military personnel is the historical proof of another of Napoleon's maxims that the author could well have used, "The better the infantry, the more it should be economized and supported by good batteries. Good infantry is without doubt the sinews of an army; but if it has to fight a long time against very superior artillery, it will become demoralized and will be destroyed. A general who is the superior tactician and more skillful than his adversary may, with better infantry, obtain some success during a part of the campaign even if his artillery is very inferior. But on the decisive day of a general battle, he will severely feel his inferiority in artillery."

Reviewed by Maj C. V. Hendricks

Ed: The reviewer is with the Artillery Section, Educational Center, Quantico.

## Modern Leadership Research . . .

**THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY FOR LEADERSHIP**—Donald A. Laird, Eleanor C. Laird. 206 pages. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. \$4.00

The mere mention of leadership in Marine circles is usually sufficient to detonate a violent table pounding discussion. Even so, this recent publication more than justifies broaching this controversial subject.

Written without recourse to the obscure, technical language of classic psychology, this volume is unlikely to cause



much dictionary thumbing. The absence of vacuous verbiage, coupled with extensive use of graphs and "cartoons" results in an unusually lucid straightforward presentation of the subject matter. And the subject matter is important.

Understanding of the forces within a group, and the methods a leader can employ to best direct these forces, is the basic theme.

After discussing the various styles of leadership, and the climates they engender, (are you Autocratic or Democratic?) the authors develop what they conclude to be the 6 cardinal functions of leadership. Their conclusions are based largely on the results of an analysis of 500 leaders and the methods they used. Having established these essential functions of a successful leader, each is treated in a separate chapter.

Reviewed by Capt John K. Parker

Ed: Capt Parker is an instructor at Training and Test Regt, MCS, Quantico.

#### G-Men . . .

THE FBI STORY — Don Whitehead. Foreword by J. Edgar Hoover. 368 pages. Random House, NY. \$4.95

There has been a need for this story for a long time. The exploits of Mr. Hoover's organization have been just well enough known and just well enough hidden to allow a great body of myth to grow up. Some of this myth has been of the hero type, some of it has taken the line that the country, in permitting it to grow and operate, has in fact been nurturing a suckling Cheka, OGPU, or Nazi police. And here we have the real story, but strictly from a chronological and "permitted" point of view.

It should be said at once that this is not, and does not pretend to be, a definitive history of the organization. Mr. Whitehead gives us a most interesting and highly detailed account not only of how the Bureau came into being, but the background of it. This background has a sad and familiar tone — the subordinating of decent aims and purposes to political expediency and worse, the multiplicity of small and unco-ordinated groups whose activities overlapped and cancelled each other out, and, of course, outright venality. The author tells how young Hoover, when faced with the prospect of taking over the Bureau of Investigation, laid down the principles upon which the Bureau has operated ever since — no politics, merit to determine advancement, and well defined responsibility.

With these preliminaries over, Mr. Whitehead plunges into some of the more interesting work which the Bureau has done.

I think it a little ingenuous of the

author to present us with what is practically a chronicle of perfection. An organization which has been in existence for over a quarter century must have made some mistakes at one time or another, and the chances are that, given the type of work the FBI does, some of them must have been dandies. All we get of this kind of thing, however, is the confession that once, in the Midwest, a mistake in the identity of a car thief was made, and in another place in the book the author says that the percentage of failures or errors is a minute fraction of a per cent. I believe Mr. Whitehead would have a better book if he had given us a better balanced mixture of victory and defeat.

To sum up, the story is an intensely interesting one and very well told. We get an unusual amount of historic information regarding the conduct of subversive activities in the country, and of how it was fought. The book should appeal especially to Marines, because we have been hosts, in a sense, to the FBI for a number of years. Every young man who aspires to serve as an agent spends a number of rough tough weeks at Quantico.

Reviewed by LtCol J. L. Zimmerman

Ed: The reviewer, a Reserve officer on active duty with the Advanced Base Problem, is also a sometime student of criminology.

#### THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER — Edited by E. B. Potter. Prentice-Hall, NY. \$8.85

This book develops 6 main themes: 1) the influence of sea power upon history; 2) the rationale of strategic decision; 3) the characteristics of successful leadership; 4) the development of naval weapons; 5) the evolution of naval tactics, and 6) the evolution of amphibious doctrine.

#### STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS —

Roger Hilsman. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. \$4.00

A study and evaluation of the organizational doctrines that currently guide the work of American intelligence agencies. The author is a research associate in the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

#### THE WORLD'S FIGHTING PLANES — William Green & Gerald Pollinger. Doubleday, NY. \$3.50

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
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
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